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Abstract
In this thesis, an approach is presented that turns the currently unstructured process of
automotive hazard analysis and risk assessments (HRA), which relies on creativity techniques,
into a structured, model-based approach that makes the HRA results less dependent on
experts' experience, more consistent, and gives them higher quality. The challenge can be
subdivided into two steps. The ﬁrst step is to improve the HRA as it is performed in current
practice. The second step is to go beyond the current practice and consider not only single
service failures as relevant hazards, but also multiple service failures.
For the ﬁrst step, the most important aspect is to formalize the operational situation of
the system and to determine its likelihood. Current approaches use natural-language textual
descriptions, which makes it hard to ensure consistency and increase eﬃciency through reuse.
Furthermore, due to ambiguity in natural language, it is diﬃcult to ensure consistent likelihood
estimates for situations.
The main aspect of the second step is that considering multiple service failures as hazards
implies that one needs to analyze an exponential number of hazards. Due to the fact that
hazard assessments are currently done purely manually, considering multiple service failures
is not possible. The only way to approach this challenge is to formalize the HRA and make
extensive use of automation support.
In SAHARA we handle these challenges by ﬁrst introducing a model-based representation of an
HRA with GOBI. Based on this, we formalized the representation of operational situations and
their likelihood assessment in OASIS and HEAT, respectively. We show that more consistent
situation assessments are possible and that situations (including their likelihood) can be
eﬃciently reused. The second aspect, coping with multiple service failures, is addressed in
ARID. We show that using our tool-supported HRA approach, 100% coverage of all possible
hazards (including multiple service failures) can be achieved by relying on very limited manual
eﬀort. We furthermore show that not considering multiple service failures results in insuﬃcient
safety goals.
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1 Introduction
In this thesis, we will use Figure 1.1 as a recurring guideline throughout
the thesis and indicate the location in the ﬁgure at the beginning of the
corresponding section.
Figure 1.1: Schemantic overview of this thesis
In the subsequent sections of this chapter, we will ﬁrst give a short intro-
duction to the scope of this thesis and then introduce the problems we are
addressing in this thesis.
1.1 Motivation
The evolution of embedded systems has shown one immanent trend: Electric,
electronic, and programmable electric systems are increasingly becoming the
driver for innovations and an enabler of new features and functionalities. In
2015, the cost of electronics in road vehicles will amount to over 40% of
the overall costs [fAR11]. The state of the practice, especially in automotive
systems, is far away from single independent subsystems, but the E/E sys-
tem is characterized by complex networks of interacting subsystems. Luxury
class vehicles contain more than 80 electronic control units (ECUs) [Ber03].
Nowadays, many ECUs communicate with each other, and the tendency is
for this to increase even more in the future.
Safety has always been one of the most important properties in such systems.
The ever increasing complexity of modern systems does however impose new
challenges when it comes to ensuring the safety of a system. The process
for making a system safe can be divided into two phases: (1) safety re-
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quirements elicitation and (2) implementation of these requirements. It is
common knowledge that precise, complete, and correct requirements are the
key to success. Leveson pointed this out already in 1995[Lev00]: "The ma-
jority of software-related accidents are caused by requirements errors." For
safety engineering, this means that complete and correct safety requirements
are indispensable.
While the equal importance of the elicitation and implementation of safety
requirements is common knowledge, this balance is not reﬂected in the
maturity of the respective safety engineering phases. The implementation of
safety requirements uses structured methods and state-of-the-art techniques
such as formal models and model-based development. In contrast, the elici-
tation of safety requirements is often performed unsystematically and is, to
a large extent, based on creativity techniques.
In the automotive domain, the process for eliciting top-level safety require-
ments is termed hazard analysis and risk assessment (HRA). In this thesis,
we advance the state of the art by providing a model-based, structured
approach for HRAs.
2
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1.2 Problem Statement
In the previous section, we pointed out that the maturity of hazard analysis
and risk assessments lags far behind the maturity of safety requirements
implementation. The goal of this thesis is to push HRAs to a more mature
level by ﬁlling the gaps currently existing in the state of the art of HRAs.
In this section, we present an overview of these gaps and the respective
challenges that need to be tackled on the way to a structured approach for
hazard analysis and risk assessments.
While the overall goal and general challenge is to ﬁnd an integrated model-
based approach, this challenge can be partitioned into sub-challenges. As
the term implies, the task of HRA can be split into two parts. (1) the
hazard analysis and (2) the risk assessment. The ﬁrst part deals with the
task of deciding which critical concomitances of hazards and operational
situations might occur, while the second part quantiﬁes the risk of such a
concomitance. This is schematically shown in Figure 1.2. The oval shapes
represent tasks, the rectangular shapes represent the resulting artifacts.
Figure 1.2: Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment process
1.2.1 Problem discussion of the hazard analysis part
In the hazard analysis part, three tasks need to be performed. The starting
point is usually the hazard identiﬁcation. It deals with the elicitation of pos-
sible system-level failures and corresponding hazards. In parallel, the safety
engineer has to prepare a list of operational situations that express relevant
environmental conditions and operating modes that may allow a hazard to
transition to a harmful event, i.e., an accident. The hazardous event anal-
ysis deals with this harmful event by "pairing" hazards with situations and
reasoning about the eﬀect.
The basic challenge of a hazard identiﬁcation is completeness. If one omits
or forgets a hazard the possibility exists that a critical concomitance might
not be considered. The situation analysis has to be correct in the sense
that an operational situation should lead to harm, if the respective hazard
occurs. A hazard describes a misbehavior at system-level. For being a valid
operational situation (for the misbehavior), the eﬀect of the misbehavior in
3
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the operational environment must result in a harmful event. If the situation
is to general and a possibility exists that the misbehavior is not harmful,
the situation is not valid. The combination of an operational situation and
a hazard (the misbehavior) is termed hazardous event. The analysis of haz-
ardous events is only a matter of double checking whether each situation
on the list is valid with respect to the hazard. In practice this is often con-
sidered a challenge, but it is only challenging because the validity of each
situation is often checked in this step not in the step of situation analysis.
Thus, if we assume that the situations are correctly analyzed in the situation
analysis step, the analysis of hazardous events is not necessary anymore and
therefore does not impose a scientiﬁc challenge anymore. We therefore do
not discuss this aspect any further.
The completeness requirement of hazard identiﬁcations addresses essentially
the aspect of eliciting all system-level service failures. A system consists of
multiple services and each service usually has multiple possible failures. A
hazard is a subset of possible service failures. The complete set of hazards
is therefore the power set of the set of single service failures. Completeness
can therefore be subdivided into coming up with a complete set of single
service failures and building the power set. The identiﬁcation or deﬁnition
of single service failures is already quite mature, thanks to existing hazard
identiﬁcation methods. The creation of a power set is trivial. In contrast,
the assessment of this power set is a huge challenge. This will be discussed
as part of the risk assessment section.
The correctness requirement of a situation analysis implies two fundamental
challenges.
(1) The challenge of formalizing operational situations in general and the
environment speciﬁcally:
Due to unlimited inﬂuence factors in the environment, the number of pos-
sible situations is unlimited as well. The challenge of formalizing situations
means essentially that one needs to handle the potentially unlimited set of
inﬂuence factors on the one hand and that one needs a way of representing
operational situations on the other hand. In practice situation are deﬁned
mostly textual and contained in lists. However, this is not suﬃcient because
it is not possible to decide whether a situation is valid to be used in combi-
nation with a respective hazard. If the situation for example contains "ice",
it is not clear which aspect the safety engineer wanted to express? Was
it the information that it is cold outside, or that the underground might
be slippery. Without this information the situation deﬁnition is not useful.
Additionally, a list has the disadvantage that one needs to go through the
complete list in order to collect all relevant situations and systematically
identifying situations not on the list is diﬃcult. This leads us to our second
challenge.
(2) The challenge of reusing operational situations. Because situations are
independent its possible failures/hazards, they are an obvious artifact for
reuse. Reusing situations does, however, impose new challenges. Deciding
which situations to reuse is not trivial. Situations need to be appropriate in
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the sense that all suﬃcient but only necessary details are described. Lists
do not support this. Systematic selection of appropriate situations based on
lists is not possible. In practice, this results in situations being selected that
are close to the real situation, but not optimal. Another disadvantage of a
situation list is continued "learning" on lists. By just extending a list with ev-
ery new situation ever encountered, one would end up with an enormous list
that would not be usable anymore. Therefore, a more structured approach
for deﬁning, retaining, retrieving, and reusing situations is required.
1.2.2 Problem discussion of the risk assessment part
A similar picture can be sketched for the second part, the risk assessment.
The task is that the safety engineer takes the list of hazardous events and
needs to process the list in order to come up with a risk assessment for each
of these hazardous events. We subdivide this challenge into (1) coming
up with a risk value for one hazardous event and (2) determining a risk
assessment value for each of these hazardous events on the list.
(1) In the automotive domain the criticality/risk of a hazardous event is
expressed in terms of an integrity level (ASIL1). The determination of the
ASIL value is in ISO 26262 deﬁned by three parameters:
1. exposure, describing the probability of occurrence of the operational sit-
uation;
2. severity, deﬁning the degree of harm of a possible accident;
3. controllability, which describes the likelihood that a person, usually the
driver, can prevent the occurrence of harm.
We subdivide the classiﬁcation challenge into the determination of the val-
ues of the three parameters:
The assessment of severity requires in-depth knowledge in medicine in or-
der to support speciﬁc reasoning about possible injuries. The formalization
of the determination of the severity value is therefore out of scope of this
thesis.
The same is true for the controllability parameter. To reason about controlla-
bility, profound knowledge in human behavior modeling and human-machine
interaction mechanisms is necessary. Even though we deﬁne what the core
information from a human-machine interaction model is and include this
information as interface in our model, we do not deﬁne a concrete control-
lability model in this thesis.
In contrast to the other parameters, the exposure parameter is fully in-
cluded in this thesis. Formalizing operational situations was already one of
the major challenges in the ﬁrst part, thus it is straightforward that the
assessment of the exposure parameter should be tightly coupled with the
situation model. If we assume that we have a structured way of representing
situations, the challenge remains of how to consistently assess the exposure
1ASIL = Automotive Safety Integrity Level
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parameter. In practice, this is done (for the limited situation lists) in la-
borious cross-OEM/tier meetings in order to ﬁnd a common classiﬁcation.
This is, however, very time-consuming, error-prone, and works only for very
limited lists. Additionally, there is no way to decide whether the situations
are consistently assessed amongst each other: A situation that is a special-
ization of another situation should obviously be less (or equally) probable as
a more general situation. Thus, to ﬁnalize the model-based consideration of
operational situations, the challenge remains to include the exposure param-
eter assessment in the model construction as well and to support automated
reasoning about situations already assessed before.
(2) The second challenge is to process the complete list of hazardous events.
In practice this is not considered a challenge, because only hazards consisting
of single service failures are listed. A bigger challenge arises if we assume
complex network of functions as described in the introduction. There is
obviously a strong interdependence between functions and we therefore have
to accept that one internal failure may result in multiple simultaneous service
failures on the system level. As an example of this, ISO 26262 [ISO11] brings
up the power supply: If the power supply is lost, multiple systems will be
aﬀected at the same time: The power steering, the head lights, and even
the engine torque are all lost at once. Thus, the list of hazardous events
should obviously include hazards consisting of more than one service failure.
However, if we consider a car with 100 system-level services and only one
failure mode for each service, in a worst-case scenario we would end up
analyzing 2100 = 1030 hazards. Thus, the challenge is to ﬁnd a way to
argue the completeness of hazards without actually assessing all hazards. By
assessing all hazards we mean the manual assessment task a safety engineer
has to perform.
1.2.3 Summary of problem statement
Figure 1.3 shows an overview of the problem statement identiﬁed in this
section.
We summarize the major challenges for ﬁnding a structured approach for
HRAs as follows:
1. To formalize operational situations, including their exposure assessment,
in such a way that enables a safety engineer to ensure situation consis-
tency and support the systematic reuse of situations.
2. To handle the enormous number of system-level hazards when moving
from single service failures to multiple (simultaneous) service failures.
Furthermore, we acknowledge that the assessment of the severity and con-
trollability parameters in a more structured way is an open topic. These
topics should, however, be addressed by experts from the medical and hu-
man behavior domains. We do not address these challenges in this thesis.
6
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Figure 1.3: PhD overview including major challenges/problems
7

2 State of the Art and Related Work
In this chapter, we further structure the challenges arising when we aim at
complete and correct safety goals. Our work is based on the HRA process
from the automotive domain and therefore aligns with ISO 26262 [ISO11].
Hence, this chapter is structured as follows. We begin by introducing the
ISO 26262 process of an HRA. This especially includes clariﬁcation of the
terms used in safety engineering. Afterwards we will discuss the state of the
art. As a result of this discussion, we will provide concrete challenges. In the
last part, we take these challenges and point out related work that can help
us to handle these challenges.
The goal of this chapter is to give justiﬁcation and substantiation to the
problems identiﬁed in the problem statement. Figure 2.1 shows this as an
overview.
Figure 2.1: Logical localization of the state-of-the-art chapter
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2.1 Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment Fundamentals
Because the central topic of this thesis is HRA, we introduce ISO 26262's
process of an HRA here. This has two purposes. First, this will present the
basic terms and practices and will show their usage in HRA. Second, every
domain has a slightly diﬀerent concept of HRA. Hence, in order to start
with a common basis, it is necessary to point out the concrete process as
described in ISO 26262.
"The objective of the hazard analysis and risk assessment is to identify and
categorize the hazards of the item and formulate the safety goals related to
the prevention or mitigation of these hazards, in order to avoid unreasonable
risk"[ISO11]
2.1.1 Important terms
In order to fully understand this quote, we need to discuss what is meant
by the terms: "hazard", "item", "safety goals", and "risk". Some of these
terms were informally introduced in the motivation, but we will discuss them
in more detail from ISO 26262's point of view in this section.
The standard talks about "hazards of the item"; furthermore, the ﬁrst re-
quirement in the HRA section states that the HRA "shall be based on the
item deﬁnition". In ISO 26262 the term "item" refers to a "system or array
of systems or a function to which ISO 26262 is applied". The item deﬁnition
itself has two objectives:
− The ﬁrst objective of the item deﬁnition is to deﬁne and describe the
item.
− The second objective is to support an adequate understanding of the item
so that each activity deﬁned in the safety life-cycle can be performed.
Thus, the item deﬁnition requires a profound understanding of the item un-
der development. If the item is not the whole system, "it shall be ensured
that the boundary of the item and the item's interface, as well as assump-
tions concerning other items and elements, are determined [. . .]"[5.4.3]. This
implies that one cannot slice the system into single simple functions and
perform an HRA on these functions without considering other items or ele-
ments. This requirement establishes the demand for analyzing the complex
network of functions instead of single functions.
In ISO 26262, a "hazard" is deﬁned as "potential source of harm". The def-
inition itself is very fuzzy, because every factor contributing to an accident
could be considered as a "source of harm". This deﬁnition, however, is the
common deﬁnition found in various standards and in the literature. Besides
this deﬁnition, one usually ﬁnds a hint on how to interpret this deﬁnition in
the concrete setting. Therefore, it is not surprising that interpretations range
from being a "state of a system and its environment [. . .]"[Lig09] to being
"any biological, chemical, mechanical, or physical agent that is reasonably
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likely to cause harm or damage to humans, other organisms, or the environ-
ment in the absence of its control" [wik13]. In section 7.4.4of ISO 26262:
"Situation analysis and hazard identiﬁcation", the term "hazard" is further
reﬁned: "Hazards shall be deﬁned in terms of the conditions and events that
can be observed at the vehicle level." Thus, ISO 26262 excludes the envi-
ronment from the deﬁnition. The term that includes the environment, as
in the deﬁnition of Liggesmeyer [Lig09], is "hazardous event". Because this
thesis is based on the view of ISO 26262, we will use ISO 26262's wording
of separating hazards from hazardous events.
Closely related to the term hazard is the term risk. The relation is that
risk gives us a comparative score for classifying hazards. In ISO 26262, it is
deﬁned as:
"Risk = combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and
the severity of that harm."
Annex B of ISO 26262 part 3 gives a more detailed picture of "risk". It
says that "a risk R can be described as a function F, with the frequency f
of occurrence of a hazardous event, the ability of the avoidance of speciﬁc
harm or damage through timely reactions of the persons involved (C =
controllability), and the potential severity of the resulting harm or damage
(S = severity):
R = F (f, C, S) (2.1)
The frequency f is, in turn, inﬂuenced by two factors:
− One factor to consider is how frequently and for how long individuals
ﬁnd themselves in a situation where the aforementioned hazardous event
can occur. In ISO 26262, this is simpliﬁed as being a measure of the
probability of the driving scenario taking place in which the hazardous
event can occur (E = exposure).
− Another factor is the failure rate of the item that could lead to the haz-
ardous event (lambda = failure rate). This factor is characterized by
undetected random hardware failures and by hazardous systematic faults
remaining in the system.
F = E × λ (2.2)
Because development in accordance with ISO 26262 leads to safe systems,
the resulting ASIL determines the minimal set of requirements for compli-
ance with the item, in order to avoid random hardware failures and system-
atic faults. For this reason, the lambda of the item is not considered in the
risk assessment.
Summarizing, we can state that:
Risk = Probability of Occurrence of Harm × Severity of Harm (2.3)
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The "probability of occurrence of harm" can furthermore be reﬁned as a
combination of the failure rate lambda, the exposure E, and the controlla-
bility C. Thus:
Risk = (λ× E × C)× S (2.4)
Developing a system according to ISO 26262 leads to a safe system and
implies that the residual risk is acceptable:
RiskAcceptable = (E × C)× S (2.5)
The missing parameter "lambda" is encoded in the required ASIL. The
higher lambda, the more frequent failures would occur and the more eﬀort
has to be spent on making the system safe, thus the higher the ASIL.
It is important to note that the ASIL is fully determined by the three pa-
rameters Severity S, Exposure E, and Controllability C.
Severity :
"Estimate of the extent of harm to one or more individuals that can occur
in a potentially hazardous situation" [ISO11]
Table 2.1 shows the severity classes as deﬁned in Part 3 of ISO 26262.
Table 2.1: Severity classes
(Table 1 of Part 3 of ISO 26262, [ISO11])
Class
S0 S1 S2 S3
Description No injuries Light and mod-
erate injuries
Severe and
life-threatening
injuries (survival
probable)
Life-threatening
injuries (survival
uncertain), fatal
injuries
In addition to the normative table 2.1, there is a more concrete table listed
in the informative annex B of part 3. Table 2.2 shows this table.
Exposure:
"State of being in an operational situation that can be hazardous if coinci-
dent with the failure mode under analysis" [ISO11]
Table 2.3 shows the classes of probability of exposure regarding operational
situations as deﬁned in Part 3 of ISO 26262.
In addition to the normative table 2.3, there is a more concrete table listed
in the informative annex B of part 3. Table 2.4 shows this table.
Controllability :
"Ability to avoid a speciﬁed harm or damage through the timely reaction of
the persons involved, possibly with support from external measures" [ISO11]
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Table 2.2: Examples of severity classification
(Table B.1 in Part 3 of ISO 26262, [ISO11])
Examples of severity classiﬁcation based on AIS [HJE+10]
S0 S1 S2 S3
Reference for
single injuries
(from AIS scale)
AIS 0 - Dam-
age that can-
not be classiﬁed
as safety-related,
e.g. bumps with
roadside infras-
tructure
More than 10%
probability of
AIS 1-6 (and
not S2 or S3)
More than 10%
probability of
AIS 3-6 (and
not S3)
More than 10%
probability of
AIS 5-6
Table 2.3: Classes of probability of exposure regarding operational situations
(Table 2 of Part 3 of ISO 26262, [ISO11])
Class
E0 E1 E2 E3 E4
Description Incredible Very low
probability
Low proba-
bility
Medium
probability
High proba-
bility
Table 2.4: Classes of probability of exposure regarding duration in operational situations
(Table B.2 in Part 3 of ISO 26262, [ISO11])
Class of probability of exposure
E1 E2 E3 E4
Duration (% of
average operat-
ing time)
Not speciﬁed <1% of average
operating time
1% to 10% of
average operat-
ing time
>10% of aver-
age operating
time
Table 2.5 shows the classes of controllability as deﬁned in Part 3 of ISO
26262.
Table 2.5: Controllability classes
(Table 3 of Part 3 of ISO 26262, [ISO11])
Class
C0 C1 C2 C3
Description Controllable in
general
Simply control-
lable
Normally con-
trollable
Diﬃcult to con-
trol or uncon-
trollable
In addition to the normative table 2.5, there is a more concrete table listed
in the informative annex B of part 3. Table 2.6 shows this table.
The result of an HRA is a safety goal. A safety goal is a "top-level safety
requirement as a result of the hazard analysis and risk assessment." Assigned
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Table 2.6: Examples of hazardous events possibly controllable by the driver of by the persons potentially at
risk
(Table B.4 in Part 3 of ISO 26262, [ISO11])
Controllability classes
C0 C1 C2 C3
Description Controllable in
general
99% or more
of all drivers
or other traﬃc
participants are
usually able to
avoid harm
90% or more
of all drivers
or other traﬃc
participants are
usually able to
avoid harm
Less than 90%
of all drivers
or other traﬃc
participants are
usually able, or
barely able, to
avoid harm
to each safety goal is an ASIL. This gives the safety goal the information
of how stringent this safety goal needs to be achieved in order to end at an
acceptable level of risk.
2.1.2 ISO 26262's Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment process
Following the introduction of the terminological basis, we will now present
how to perform an HRA. Figure 2.2 shows an overview of the process.
The oval elements display activities while the rectangular boxes represent
artifacts.
Figure 2.2: ISO 26262’s Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment process
The item deﬁnition, i.e., the information about the system or function the
HRA is scoped to, is the general input to every HRA. The process starts
from the left with two activities: the situation analysis and the hazard iden-
tiﬁcation. In the situation analysis, one shall prepare a list of "operational
situations and operating modes in which an item's malfunctioning behavior
is able to trigger hazards". Another constraint for the preparation of the list
of situations is given by requirement 7.4.7: "During hazard analysis and risk
assessment, having established the list of operational situations [. . . ], it shall
be ensured that the chosen level of detail of the list of operational situations
does not lead to an inappropriate lowering of the ASIL of the corresponding
safety goals."
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This requirement seems to be relevant for the determination of the ASIL
value in the classiﬁcation step. This is true in the sense that the eﬀect
will be evident there, the challenge is, however, a challenge of the situation
analysis. shows its relevance later in the classiﬁcation step, but should be
considered in the situation analysis. An operational situation should describe
suﬃcient conditions that a hazard transitions to an accident, but should only
describe necessary conditions. If the operational situation is split into small
sub-situations, the splitting factor is not necessary for the hazard to tran-
sition to an accident and therefore lowers the probability of the situation
inappropriately.
The other activity, hazard identiﬁcation, is related to the system or the
function under consideration. Here, a list of "hazards of the item shall be
determined systematically". This relates to the possible failures of the sys-
tem observable at the vehicle level. The next step combines both lists. Each
hazard is analyzed for possible consequences if combined with each situation;
thus, hazardous events are built. In this step, "consequences of hazardous
events shall be identiﬁed [. . . ]". After this step, the whole hazardous sce-
nario is built: The system failure, the resulting (mis-)behavior, the inﬂuence
on and of the environment, and the expected harm. The last step quantiﬁes
the risk by classifying the scenario with the parameters introduced above:
Exposure, Controllability, and Severity.
The result of this classiﬁcation is that "a safety goal shall be determined for
each hazardous event evaluated in the hazard analysis" and that "the ASIL
determined for the hazardous event shall be assigned to the corresponding
safety goal."
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2.2 Core Challenges and Goals
We structure our discussion of the state of the art and related work along
our HRA process introduced in the introduction:
Figure 2.3: Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment process
Our related work is therefore classiﬁed into the areas the work addresses in
accordance with the problem statement:
V Holistic model-based approach for a structured HRA process
I Structuring of hazard analysis
B Correctness of situation analysis
⇒Formalization of operational situations
⇒Eﬃcient reuse of operational situations
B Identiﬁcation of system-level failures
I Structuring of risk assessments
B Hazardous event classiﬁcation
⇒Controllability assessment
⇒Severity assessment
⇒Exposure assessment
B Dealing with multiple service failures
We will further classify the related work into two categories:
1. Work that directly addresses one of the challenges above, i.e, work that
claims to have solved one or more of the above challenges.
2. Work that can be used to solve the problems, but was not developed for
use in HRA.
In the next section, the state of the art is reviewed, which discusses mostly
work of category one. Category two work will then be discussed in the related
work section.
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2.3 State Of The Art
The awareness that the existing methods and techniques for HRAs are not
optimal and are still a ﬁeld of research is evident in the fact that this topic
is being explicitly included in current research project applications. In SPES
2020 XT, for example, an explicit request for model-based HRAs was in-
put by industry. There is, however, related work dealing with this challenge
already.
2.3.1 ATESST2
In the automotive domain itself, there have been some research activities
in the area of functional safety. ATESST2 [ATE13] stands for "Advancing
Traﬃc Eﬃciency and Safety through Software Technology - Phase 2" and
was a European research project based in FP7. The goal of ATESST 2 was
to improve the management of complexity and to handle the criticality of
modern vehicles. To this end, ATESST2 provided means for integrating the
engineering information found in documents, spreadsheets, and legacy tools
into one systematic structure. Thus, the goal was a model-based approach
for system-model-integrated safety analysis. The project addressed the whole
safety lifecycle. We will focus on the HRA part of this lifecycle and will
discuss their ﬁndings. Deliverable 2.1 (D2.1) [WMP+10] is named "Review
of relevant Safety Analysis Techniques" and gives an overview of the state
of the practice and the state of the art from the industry's point of view.
For HRA, this review is limited to giving some guidelines on how to perform
certain tasks from ISO 26262's HRA process. In section 4.4 of D2.1, a
scenario deﬁnition is proposed. Figure 2.4 shows the inﬂuence factor classes
they provided.
Figure 2.4: ATESST2’s influence factor classes
This model is only a suggestion, however, and it is not meant to be complete.
But it is a good reﬁnement of the general term "situation" (in ISO 26262).
In section 4.5 (of D2.1), hazard identiﬁcation is addressed. It is stated that
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"all possible functional anomalies derivable from each foreseeable source,
either internal (system faults) or (e.g. foreseeable misuse) shall be deﬁned".
Furthermore, an exhaustive list of anomalies of function activation is pro-
vided:
• Unwanted activation
• Missed activation
• Degraded activation (vs. value or timing)
• Incoherent activation (in the presence of more than one function's output)
• Unwanted deactivation
• Missed deactivation
• Degraded deactivation (vs. value or timing)
• Incoherent deactivation
This list is consistent with the HAZOP guideword approach [Kle92] and
Papadopoulos's Functional Failure Analysis approach [PM99]. In addition
to these functional failure classes, the notion of Hazard is reﬁned in section
4.5.3 (of D2.1): "Hazard is a potential source of harm, due to an item's mal-
function in concomitance with a particular scenario's condition. Therefore
a malfunction can be cause of several hazards with diﬀerent consequences,
really as a function of the involved scenario." Additionally, the following
ﬁgure is provided to make the relation between malfunction, scenario, and
hazard clear:
Figure 2.5: Relation between malfunction, scenario, and hazard
However, this ﬁgure is misleading if one has the ISO 26262 deﬁnitions of
the respective terms in his mind: In ATESST2 a hazard describes with the
concomitance of a malfunction and a scenario in terms of ISO 26262 a
hazardous event. A malfunction would be one possible hazard. To be precise,
it would be a single service failure. For the term "scenario" ISO 26262 would
probably use "situation". Figure 2.6 shows the correct ﬁgure from ISO 26262
point of view. Please note that the besides the terms, the multiplicity located
close to the "Situation/Scenario" block changed.
This inaccuracy of terms is particularly interesting due to the fact that some
members of the ATESST2 consortium were involved in the development of
ISO 26262 as well. For us, this reinforces our conviction that this topic has
to be addressed in a more holistic and formalized way.
ATESST2 additionally propose to use the so called, Cooper-Harper scale for
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Figure 2.6: ISO 26262’s view on hazard, scenario/situation, and hazardous event
a better controllability argumentation. The Cooper-Harper scale was sug-
gested in 1969 for evaluating the aircraft response related to pilot actions.
A pilot's performance or better the success of a pilot's action is rated on
a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is kind of "easily controllable" and 10 is
"uncontrollable". The rating process is guided by three questions to help
the engineer achieve a reasonable result. Because ISO 26262 has a ﬁve-level
scale only, the ATESST2 group deﬁned a mapping from the ten-level scale
of the Cooper-Harper approach to the ﬁve-level ISO 26262 scale. Besides
this interesting adaptation for controllability, the ATESST2 deliverable con-
tains only limited additional information compared to ISO 26262's Annex B
(Hazard analysis and risk assessment) of part 3.
We can conclude that the ATESST2 approach is very close to practice.
Therefore, it especially provides valuable insights into the automotive do-
main and the state of the practice. As such, it addresses many challenges
we identiﬁed. The solutions provided, however, are more practical guide-
lines than scientiﬁc advances. The environment formalization is a good ﬁrst
approach because it provides possible inﬂuencing factors of operational sit-
uations. The exhaustive list of system-level failure identiﬁcation guidewords
is a good domain-speciﬁc adaptation of the HAZOP and FFA approaches
and can be used directly for hazard identiﬁcation. The risk assessment does
not provide any new information on assessing the ASIL parameters, with the
exception of the review of the Cooper-Harper scale adaptation for control-
lability.
2.3.2 EASIS
Another big research project in the domain of automotive safety engineering
was called "Electronic Architecture and System Engineering for Inte-
grated Safety Systems - EASIS". The goal of the project was to provide
an integrated view on vehicle development. This means system engineering
principles were applied to the vehicle as a whole. We should point out that
the EASIS project was completed in parallel with ISO 26262 development
and was ﬁnished three years before the ﬁnal publication of ISO 26262. Many
EASIS members were involved in ISO 26262's development and therefore the
results of the EASIS project should be treated as additional information to
ISO 26262. In deliverable 3.2 part 1 "Guidelines for establishing dependabil-
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ity requirements and performing hazard analysis", our notion of separating
system-internal and system-external analysis is supported by Figure 2.7.
Figure 2.7: Bow tie diagram for hazard analysis
Therefore EASIS supports ISO 26262's hazard deﬁnition by stating that:
"A hazard is an undesirable condition or state of a vehicle that could lead to
an undesirable outcome depending on other factors that can inﬂuence the
outcome."
Based on this ﬁgure, three fundamentally diﬀerent ways are described to
identify a hazard.
1. Through a causal analysis of the system-external eﬀects. The movement
of the vehicle could, for example, deviate from the intended movement.
Starting from this, one could try to ﬁnd causes for the deviation of the
movement. One example could be a "self-steering vehicle".
2. Through a forward analysis from system-internal causes to vehicle-level
eﬀects. If one considers, for example, that the ESC-ECU fails, one would
ask what might happen. One eﬀect could be the loss of stability control.
3. Through an analysis of the border between system as a function and the
vehicle in the physical domain. The general starting point for such an
analysis is the actuator-level.
In additional to this classiﬁcation, an evaluation of hazard identiﬁcation
methods was performed. The techniques and the basic results are given in
Table 2.7.
Based on the review of available hazard identiﬁcation methods, a recom-
mended approach was formulated: "The most eﬀective way to identify haz-
ards appears to be to use several methods since they complement each
other. Checklists can be used for an easy start followed by HAZOP, FHA
20
State of the Art and Related Work
Table 2.7: Hazard identification classification and assessment
and 'Hazard Identiﬁcation Based on State Transition Models' for the diﬀer-
ent aspects they bring into the analysis."
We support this idea of combining several techniques to cover diﬀerent
aspects. The piece missing to make this optimal would be a guideline on
which approaches to combine in which situation. Furthermore, the precise
prerequisites for applying the approaches are not 100% clear, especially for
the state-based approach. Applicability is called a matter of abstraction, but
guidance is neither given on how to achieve this abstraction nor on what a
correct level of abstraction is.
The EASIS project does not explicitly propose or review a process for per-
forming an HRA, but reviewed diﬀerent hazard classiﬁcation approaches and
derived its own EASIS hazard classiﬁcation method.
EASIS provides a very good review on hazard identiﬁcation methods. The
suggestion to combine more than one technique is reasonable. One deﬁ-
ciency we see in this approach is that ﬁnal guidance on how to combine the
various techniques is missing. The challenge of structuring the risk assess-
ment is addressed directly. However, the result has the same maturity as the
approach described in ISO 26262. Thus, while this work is probably the basis
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for ISO 26262, it is a very good research result. Due to the fact that it was
reﬁned and specialized in ISO 26262 and our focus is on compliance with
this standard, the fundamental work provided by EASIS does not advance
our work.
2.3.3 EmMORI
The EmMORI approach by Ständer [Stä11] was developed as part of his
PhD entitled "Eine modellbasierte Methode zur Objektivierung der Risiko-
analyse nach ISO 26262" (free translation: A model-based method for ob-
jectifying risk analysis according to ISO 26262). The title of Ständer's PhD
thesis directly addresses our overall challenge of providing a holistic model-
based approach for HRAs. In the introduction, Ständer sets his scope of
contributions to formalizing the terminology used in ISO 26262 and to de-
riving a model-based approach for situation deﬁnitions and assessments.
For the formalization, Ständer transformed the terminology of the HRA pro-
cess into a petri-net (cf. Figure 2.8).
Figure 2.8: Ständer’s HRA terminology translation into a petri-net
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This approach is an adoption of the petri-net approach of Schneider from
2010 [WBS10]. The advantage of this approach is that it visualizes the re-
lations and precisely deﬁnes contributing factors and the sequence of states
and transitions to an accident. Using this formal model, he deﬁnes ISO
26262's parameters (Exposure, Controllability, and Severity) in terms of
states and transitions in the petri-net model. By doing so, he can formally
derive the contributing factors to consider when deﬁning and assessing the
ASIL parameters. With a reachability analysis he proves that the exposure
parameter cannot be determined independently as ISO 26262 demands. This
would be a highly relevant conclusion for our work. However, we do not adapt
his view on exposure because he (re-)deﬁned "exposure" as being the prob-
ability of the hazardous situation, "P5_Gefährdungs-Zustand" (cf. page 93
in chapter 6.1.1 of his PhD). ISO 26262, however, strictly distinguishes be-
tween hazardous situation and the "operational mode and environmental
situation", where the latter gets the exposure parameter. A hazardous situ-
ation is the concomitance of hazard and situation.
His second contribution is the formalization of exposure. For this formaliza-
tion, he drops his ﬁnding mentioned above and limits himself to the notion
of exposure as given in ISO 26262. For the formalization, he uses a decom-
position approach developed by Meyer in 2004 [MzH04].
As shown in Figure 2.9 Ständer distinguishes between the environment and
the vehicle itself and provides generic reﬁnement levels for these classes.
However, there is no description of how to instantiate this meta-model and
derive situations. We additionally interpret ISO 26262's "operational mode"
as describing interaction or maneuver information. For us, it is not clear
whether or not this concept is contained in the meta-model or in which
meta-element this is subsumed.
Ständer uses the meta-model as a basis for his petri-net approach for deter-
mining the probability of situations. In order to do this, one has to model a
petri-net of relevant inﬂuence factors and their possible relations. For each
transition in the petri-net, one has to deﬁne a kind of conditional probability,
where the condition is given by the preceding path in the petri-net. This ap-
proach has the advantage that the situations in a petri-net are specialization-
consistent. The real specialization of a situation is an extension of a given
petri-net path. This naturally results in an equal or lower probability (be-
cause each additional transition mathematically adds a factor between 0
and 1 to the probability). The disadvantage of this model is, however, that
modeling a petri-net for each situation analysis is an enormous eﬀort. From
practical experience we would assume that this is too time-consuming for
practical application. Another disadvantage is that the real diﬃculty lies in
deﬁning the transition probability in the model. This is especially true since
we need precise transition values, but in the end the exposure parameter is
classiﬁed by orders of magnitude. The preciseness of the model is therefore
very time-consuming on the one hand and not necessary on the other hand.
Besides this, it is still up to the engineer to decide which situations to model
and how ﬁne-grained the situations are. A key result presented in the thesis
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Figure 2.9: Meyer’s influence factor decomposition approach (translated from German to English)
is that with the EmMORI approach, risk assessment tends to result in lower
ASILs (due to the precise situation modeling). From our point of view, this
is critical because no argumentation is provided that shows that the require-
ment from ISO 26262 ("situations shall only be as detailed as necessary") is
fulﬁlled. Furthermore, there is no support for coming up with the petri-net
transition probabilities and no consistency check is possible as to whether
the ﬁnal exposure value is correct or not.
Ständer's work focuses on overall formalization by using a petri-net formal-
ization approach. Due to conclusions contradicting ISO 26262's view, his
formalization approach does not provide useful information for our work.
His second focus on situation modeling and exposure assessments based on
petri-nets is interesting, but leads us to the conclusion that formalization
of inﬂuence factors and the deﬁnition of inﬂuence factor probabilities is not
a suitable approach and that formalizing situations in such a way that the
probabilities can be calculated is not the most eﬀective and eﬃcient so-
lution. Another huge area of related work is accident analysis. One of the
most popular methods in this area is Leveson's STAMP (Systems-Theoretic
Accident Modeling and Processes) approach [HWL06]. STAMP "rests on
modeling and analyzing socio-technical systems and using the information
gained in designing the socio-technical system." The goal is to analyze acci-
dents and draw conclusions for the process of developing future systems. All
approaches dealing with accidents post-factum naturally try to reconstruct
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situations and system failures. In contrast, we try to prevent accidents in the
ﬁrst place and focus on the prediction of possible situations and system fail-
ures. Especially the question about completeness cannot be answered with
post-factum approaches, because the investigation focuses on one situation,
i.e., the concrete situation that existed at the time of the accident. Accident
investigations deﬁne "completeness" too, but their completeness focuses on
the investigation of all contributing events to the accident (not all possi-
ble situations). Another fact is that we focus on functional safety, whereas
accident reconstruction models usually deal with the whole process as a
"socio-technical system"[HWL06]. We therefore omit this area of research
from further investigation.
2.3.4 Conclusion
To the best knowledge of this author, there exists no further related work
that directly addresses the improvement of the overall HRA process. Based
on the reviewed work, we state that most of our core challenges are still open.
The only challenge for which the state of the art if suﬃcient is the iden-
tiﬁcation of system-level failures as describes in the ATESST2 discussion.
Furthermore, an operational situation in the reviewed approaches always
structured by classifying and structuring smaller building blocks of situation
inﬂuence factors. How to come up with these inﬂuence factors, what a good
structure is and how to use these building blocks to produce situations has
not been answered.
2.4 Related Work
In this section, we will present related work that addresses partial challenges
of our holistic model-based approach for structured HRAs. To do so, we stick
to our scheme of challenges introduced above and discuss the related work
corresponding to it. Please note that we omit the identiﬁcation of system-
level failures because we identiﬁed this as being solved in the previous section
already. The remaining three main challenges are:
− Correctness of situation analysis
− Hazardous event classiﬁcation
− Dealing with multiple service failures
2.4.1 Correctness of situation analysis
The ﬁrst partial challenge we will discuss is the challenge of "Formaliza-
tion of the operational situations". Besides the approaches introduced
above, there is no other approach dealing with formalization of environmen-
tal information for application in HRAs in the automotive domain. There is,
however, a lot of work that can be used to solve partial challenges. In the
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following sections, we will discuss how it is related to our work and show
which aspects can be (re-)used in our approach.
The challenge of modeling a system in its environment is not unique for
safety engineering. Many areas deal with a system in its environment in some
way. Since it is an early phase of development, requirements engineering is
the most important area and has a similar understanding of the importance
of context and environmental information. In 1997 Jackson stated [ZJ97]:
It is not necessary or desirable to describe (however abstractly) the machine
to be built. Rather, the environment is described in two ways: as it would be
without or in spite of the machine, and as we hope it will become because
of the machine.
For safety, we could extend the last sentence by explicitly stating "as we hope
it will and won't become because of the machine". Jackson's view on the
environment is obviously broader than ours, but he directs the focus away
from the system to the environment. The meaning for safety is expressed
very nicely by Lutz [Lut01]:
It is not the internal complexity of a module but the complexity of the
module's connection to its environment that yields the persistent, safety-
related errors seen.
In 2008, as part of his PhD, Allmann investigated the state of the art for
situation- and scenario-based requirements management in the automotive
domain [All08]. He extracted the three main speciﬁcation techniques for
scenario-based requirements elicitation.
− Statecharts [Har87][DH89]
− Software Cost Reduction (SCR) [Hen80][vSPM93]
− Formal Speciﬁcation Language (ForSeL) [HRWS06]
Allmann concluded that statecharts and the SCR method are used in prac-
tice and science but they are not suited well for abstract descriptions of
scenarios and situations. Based on this ﬁnding, he used the ForSeL lan-
guage because of its "intuitiveness and high usability"[All08]. Furthermore,
he stated that by using ForSeL one does not exclude a higher level of formal-
ity and complexity because ForSeL can be translated and reﬁned through
more formal languages such as SCR. Allmann provides a meta-model for
scenario modeling and extended the ForSeL approach to describe concrete
scenarios. He did his PhD at AUDI AG and therefore strongly focuses on
the needs of the automotive domain and on practical applicability. He ex-
plicitly mentions ISO 26262 in general and especially discusses HRA. He
cites Grady [Gra93] by stating that safety engineering and requirements en-
gineering are coupled too loosely. Allmann's work therefore integrates safety
engineering in order to make it possible to represent safety scenarios in his
framework as well. Furthermore, he deﬁned the completeness of scenarios
by using Boolean logic on relevant classes of inﬂuence factors. The logical
constraints are deﬁned by manually specifying rules stating which scenarios
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should be considered. With a predeﬁned set of inﬂuence factors and the set
of rules he can decide whether all subsets (all situations) have been con-
sidered. While this is generally a good indicator for requirements scenario
completeness, it uses assumptions that are not applicable for our challenge.
First of all, he assumes completeness of the set of relevant inﬂuence factors.
For the requirements scenarios, this is applicable because the situations are
more abstract and general than the ones for HRA. Thus, the set can be de-
scribed eﬃciently. As discussed above, this is not possible for HRA inﬂuence
factors. To ﬁnd relevant inﬂuence factors, i.e., to know what is relevant and
what is not relevant is however exactly the challenge we see as fundamental
for HRA. The other assumption is the completeness of the rule set. Due to
the deﬁnition of being complete, iﬀ all rule-derivable scenarios are consid-
ered, implies that the rule set has to be complete (and correct). Deﬁning
rules capturing the complete domain knowledge for the situation deﬁnition
of HRAs is not possible (as will be discussed as part of the situation reuse
discussion).
A fundamental observation is that the environment cannot (eﬃciently) be
described without the system and vice versa. Thus, the most basic concept
we need is an integrated model of the system in its environment. One of
the most inﬂuential models addressing this challenge is Parnas' and Madey's
Four-Variable Requirements Model from 1995 [PM95]. The idea of Parnas
and Madey was to provide a more formal way to describe the requirements
of complex software systems. It is named Four-Variable Model because they
deﬁned four sets of variables and relations between these variables.
Monitored: These are hardware inputs from the physical world.
Controlled: These are hardware outputs into the physical world.
Input: Variables in this set are environmental quantities ex-
pressed in the logical world.
Output: Variables in this set are environmental quantities ex-
pressed in the logical world.
The deﬁned relations are:
IN: This maps input variables to monitored variables; IN describes
the transition from physical values to logical values.
OUT: This maps controlled variables to output variables; OUT de-
scribes the transition from logical values to physical values.
NAT: This relation places constraints on the values of environmental
quantities. NAT describes the environmental context of the
system that is being controlled.
REQ: This relation places further constraints on the environmental
quantities. REQ describes the behavior of the system in its
environment.
SOFT: This relation describes requirements for the system develop-
ment. SOFT is of no further interest for our challenge.
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Note that the approach was meant for dealing with software-systems and not
for systems engineering. Miller and Tribble, however, "extended the Four-
Variable Model to bridge the System-Software gap" [MT01]. Galloway et
al. extended the FVM in order to formally develop safety-critical software
[GIMT08]. The basic principle of separating the physical from the logical
domain is given in both extensions and we therefore omit the explicit expla-
nation of this model here. Especially noteworthy is the concept of separating
the logical from the physical world. An accident and direct sources of harm
are always located in the physical world. Functional safety, however, ad-
dresses unwanted behavior in the logical world. Therefore, the Four-Variable
Model forms an important conceptual basis for our work by bridging the gap
between the logical and the physical world.
Another more formal starting point for environmental formalization is the
area of mathematical situation theory.
"It is an information theoretic mathematical ontology developed to support
situations" [Dev95].
Rather than trying to represent total possible worlds, situation semantics is
a relational semantics of partial worlds called situations. As such, situations
support (or fail to support) items of information or in terms of situation
theory, infons. They are of the form
〈〈R, a1, . . . , an, 1〉〉 , 〈〈R, a1, . . . , an, 0〉〉 (2.6)
where R is an n-place relation and ai are objects appropriate for R. The
last parameter indicates the polarity, whether the relation holds or does not
hold. In our context, examples of infons are:
σ1 = 〈〈excludes, Highway, parking, 1〉〉 (2.7)
σ2 = 〈〈excludes, Highway, parking, 0〉〉 (2.8)
Thus, we assume we have a relation called "excludes". The semantics are
that it relates certain aspects of driving situations to each other. In this
example we have created two infons. One states the fact that "parking
on highway" is not possible (= excludes with polarity 1) and the other
one states that it is possible (polarity is 0). One would assume that either
parking on a highway is possible or not. Stating both facts seems to be kind
of inconsistent. This is of course true, but it is true for one speciﬁc "world".
Due to the fact that the world is described by situations, we can state that
we have to deﬁne which infons make sense in a situation and which do not
make sense. When a situation supports a state of aﬀairs, we say that the
situation "s" makes the concrete infon "σ" factual, written s |= σ.
Due to the very high and theoretical level of abstraction, we do not want
to discuss situation theory in detail. A brief and non-technical introduction
to situation theory and situation semantics can be found in Devlin's work
from 2006 [Dev06]. Due to the formality of situation theory, it makes many
aspects explicit, which is very interesting for our approach. Especially the
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separation of infons and situations is fundamental. Many approaches, such as
the one we discussed above, use partial aspects or facts in order to construct
a situation. These facts such as "city driving" are all similar to the concept
of infons in situation theory. The diﬀerence, however, is that situation theory
has a formal background and is therefore more conclusive. It does therefore
make sense to align our approach with the general concepts of situation
theory. Due to its rather elementary nature, however, the transition from
basic mathematical research results to concrete application in environment
formalization for HRA is not trivial.
Situation theory constitutes a good formal basis for describing all kinds of
situations. Due to its abstract nature it does not help in answering ques-
tions about how to construct a good domain-speciﬁc situation theory, i.e., it
does not help to identify infons and does not support the decision regarding
the identiﬁcation of necessary and suﬃcient criteria for creating situations.
For HRA, however, one important part of the "Formalization of operational
situations" is to know what information is necessary and suﬃcient to de-
scribe a situation suitable for an HRA process. Thus, we need to move one
step further to practical applications of situation theory or of environment
descriptions. In this direction of research the concept of "context" appears.
With their work "The use of situation theory in context modeling" [AS97]
Akman and Surav support a formal transition of situation theory to context
modeling. Their work focuses on context in natural language and logical AI.
They cite a context deﬁnition of Crystal from 1991: "Context is a general
term [. . .] to refer to speciﬁc parts of an utterance near or adjacent to a
unit which is the focus of attention" [Cry08]. With this notion, they formal-
ize the relation of context and situations mathematically. The fundamental
diﬀerence between context and situation is the "presence of a unit". Thus,
context always refers to some application or unit, while a situation does not
have this constraint. This notion is congruent with the natural language
usage of "context" and "situation". When we talk about context only, we
usually ask "context of what", while a situation can stand on its own; it is
self-contained in the sense that it contains all information to make a useful
statement. With this distinction we could state that a situation is a wider
concept than context. Describing the context of something could be deﬁned
as eliciting all situations relevant for the unit the context focuses on.
For our work, the general term situation is obviously limited to the aspect of
being relevant in the usage of a vehicle. Thus the situations we are looking
for or the environmental aspects we want to formalize are in the context of
vehicle usage.
Looking at the domain of context modeling, a plethora of related work ap-
pears. For our work, most of it is not essential because most of the work
focuses on the concrete modeling of a context for a speciﬁc application
scenario. Due to the fact that we have not found related work addressing
context modeling in support of the automotive HRA process, we will not
discuss concrete context modeling approaches, but will rather discuss con-
text modeling on a meta-level in order to derive essential concepts for our
approach. In order to understand "context" better, we would like to refer to
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the work of Abowd et al. [ADB+99]: "Towards a Better Understanding of
Context and Context-Awareness" from 1999. In this work, they give a more
detailed deﬁnition of context:
"Context is any information that can be used to characterize the situation
of an entity. [. . .]"
The concept of characteristic information of an entity is obviously essential
in context modeling. For our approach, essential information means how
to represent "context". Strang and Linnhoﬀ-Popien published "A Context
Modeling Survey" in 2004 [SLP04]. This survey focused on the applicability
of context modeling approaches for ubiquitous computing. They introduce
six quality attributes of context modeling approaches.
1. Distributed composition (dc): As ubiquitous computing systems are usu-
ally distributed computing systems it is important that the context models
are composable. For our approach, the distributed composition attribute
is of minor importance.
2. Partial validation (pv): This quality attribute describes the possibility
of validating contextual knowledge on the structure as well as on the
instance level. For HRA, this is obviously highly important because it
enables consistency checking of captured knowledge.
3. Richness and quality of information (qua): The quality of information
sensed in the environment varies over time. For ubiquitous computing,
the tagging of context information wrt. quality is important. For HRA,
however, we have ideal situations and are not dependent on any sensor
quality. Thus, this quality attribute is irrelevant for us.
4. Incompleteness and ambiguity (inc): This attribute addresses the fact
that the knowledge model may be incomplete and ambiguous. A model
of context knowledge should be able to handle this. Incompleteness, in
particular, is highly important in our approach because we cannot include
every single peculiarity of an environment.
5. Level of formality (for): Formality is obviously important in most appli-
cations. It enables the precise and automated handling of data on the
one hand and resolves ambiguities on the other hand. Due to our goal
for HRA, a certain formality is highly important.
6. Applicability to existing environments (app): This attribute addresses
"legacy" ubiquitous computing environments in the sense that every new
context modeling approach should support the existing environments.
This is obviously not of interest for us.
Because ubiquitous computing is quite distinct from situation modeling for
automotive HRA, we cannot use their evaluation of applicability, but we have
to come up with our own rating based on the essential quality attributes for
context wrt. automotive HRAs. The quality attributes "distributed composi-
tion", "quality of information", and "applicability to existing environments"
are of minor interest to us. The reason is that we are in an idealized situation
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and solely in the design time. If we had to perform a kind of runtime HRA,
distributed composition and quality of information would most certainly be
indispensable.
With these quality attributes, Strang and Linnhoﬀ-Popien evaluated six con-
text modeling approaches:
a) Key-Value Models
b) Markup Scheme Models
c) Graphical Models
d) Object-oriented Models
e) Logic-based Models
f) Ontology-based Models
The result of their survey is compactly given as an appropriateness indication
table (cf. 2.8).
Table 2.8: A Context Modeling Survey Table [SLP04]
Approach-Requirem. dc pv qua inc for app
Key-Value Models - - - - - +
Markup Scheme Mod. + ++ - - + ++
Graphical Models - - + - + +
Object Oriented Mod. ++ + + + + +
Logic Based Models ++ - - - ++ -
Ontology Based Mod. ++ ++ + + ++ +
Note that we grayed out the columns not relevant for us. The result is that
the most promising approach for describing context or, in our case, environ-
mental models is an ontology-based approach. In the solution chapter, we
will further reﬁne how we used ontologies to support our approach.
Concluding the related work review on "Formalization of operational situa-
tions", we state that:
− The Four-Variable Model provides a very good conceptual basis for our
work by bridging the gap between the logical and the physical world.
− Situation theory gives a formal background for dealing with situations
and relevant pieces of information, called infons. Our approach will be
based on the idea of situation theory.
− Context modeling is a promising area from which to adapt concrete mod-
eling approaches. The survey for context modeling has shown that the
most suitable modeling approach for contexts or environments (for HRA)
are ontology-based models.
We still have to answer to the question of what constitutes necessary and
suﬃcient information for an HRA. Besides the general guideline from the ISO
26262 standard saying that one has to make sure that a situation contains
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only necessary but suﬃcient information, we could not ﬁnd any related work
addressing the question of what exactly this means.
The next area of related work addresses the challenge of "Eﬃcient reuse of
operational situations". Formalization is a prerequisite for eﬃcient reuse.
As we have seen in the previous section, there is no approach available for
the formalization of situations for HRA. Thus we could not ﬁnd any eﬃcient
reuse approach in the related work. If we abstract from the demand of being
explicitly suitable for situations in the HRA context, we ﬁnd ourselves in the
area of "eﬃcient reuse of knowledge". Ruben Prieto-Diaz discussed in his
keynote talk at the 2001 Symposium on Software Reusability the general
nature of reuse by comparing the traditional engineering and the software
engineering disciplines [PD01] . Most interestingly, he stated that there is
no reuse sub-community in traditional engineering. Electrical engineers, for
example, do not have special courses on reuse. For software he argues that
"despite several years of trying to bring reuse to practice, software engineers
have found out that reuse in software is not the same as in other areas, that
software is very hard to reuse." As he points out, the fundamental reason is
that software engineers always try to ﬁnd the best possible solutions. Tra-
ditional engineering disciplines usually try to ﬁnd the best trade-oﬀ. Thus,
traditional reuse does not work for software because we expect every com-
ponent to be perfectly reusable without any adaptation. For our goal, it is
important to have precise situations on the one hand, but on the other hand
we do not only want to reuse identical situations, but we want to reuse
similar situations as well (as traditional engineering would do).
Another requirement for eﬃcient reuse in our context is practical applicabil-
ity. In general, there are two extreme approaches for reuse in practice. One
is to build a model covering all possible reuse situations up front. This is a
kind of investment for reuse. Its advantage is that we can expect a very high
reuse factor, but the drawback is the initial high investment in building the
repository. The other strategy is to incrementally build up our reuse reposi-
tory by storing more and more concrete artifacts. In this strategy, the reuse
possibilities increase over time. The advantage is, of course, that we do not
need any signiﬁcant up-front investment; the disadvantage is the initial time
where we have to put information into the repository without any signiﬁcant
reuse potential.
In our case, as discussed earlier, it is not eﬃciently possible to come up
with a set covering all possible situations. Therefore, the ﬁrst strategy is not
suitable for us. The second strategy seems to be more appropriate, because
we already have some situations from the ISO 26262 standard and from
industrial projects. Thus, it is a good idea to use the second strategy but
skip the initial learning phase by ﬁlling the reuse repository with an initial
set of situations.
The important aspect in reusing situations, however, is not to avoid creating
the same situations over and over again, but to reuse the related domain
knowledge. The essential domain knowledge for HRA is not only the situation
itself, but particularly the exposure probability assigned to the situation. To
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recapitulate the idea of exposure: The exposure parameter is the assessment
parameter deﬁning an order of magnitude of the likelihood of being in a
certain driving situation. The scale ranges from E0 to E4.
As discussed in the previous section about the formalization of the envi-
ronment, situations usually consist of partial aspects. These aspects have
diﬀerent names, ranging from infons to inﬂuence factors. In the following,
we will use inﬂuence factors, but independent of the term, the notion is
always to have atomic information artifacts. A situation is therefore a set of
relevant inﬂuence factors together with an assessment of the probability of
the situation. It is appealing to base the reuse approach not on situations,
but on the more basic building blocks, the inﬂuence factors. Due to the
fact that a situation is a set of inﬂuence factors we have an exponential
number of situations we can derive from a set of inﬂuence factors. Thus, if
we could assign atomic independent inﬂuence probabilities, we could make
the reuse process even more eﬃcient. However, this is not possible because
the probability of inﬂuence factors is highly dependent. Imagine the inﬂu-
ence factor "ice": The probability of ice occurring on the road is obviously
higher if the inﬂuence factor "-5◦C" is given (than in a situation where we
have "+20◦C"). Still, we could try to achieve this, but we have to deal with
conditional probabilities.
The technological solutions in this direction are probabilistic graph models
with machine learning or rule inference and induction approaches.
Both approaches try to infer new knowledge based on given facts. For con-
ditional probabilities, Bayesian networks in particular, seem to be promising
[Bis07]. For a Bayesian networks approach we see the following challenges:
If we want to infer information based on the building blocks of situations
(the inﬂuence factors), we would need a lot of information about the inﬂu-
ence factors and their dependencies with respect to conditional probabilities.
This would either require explicit modeling of dependencies between inﬂu-
ence factors or we would need to learn from examples. Thus, we would have
to "learn" from the situations and their probabilities and derive conditional
probabilities for inﬂuence factors. This is very diﬃcult to achieve because we
have only a very limited number of situations and their probabilities to learn
from. For good "training", we would need a very high number of training
situations for the approach to learn.
Another disadvantage is the greedy learning action. This means that the
techniques do not wait for a new problem or target to be solved, but they
try to infer as much as they can up-front and if a new target comes up,
they simply try to match their "knowledge" to the target. If the number of
situations increases, the "knowledge" has to be updated completely every
time. For us this would mean that we would have to derive all possibly con-
structible situations, which would only create a huge amount of data, which
might not be necessary. This is obviously not eﬃcient. Another challenge
is that we have to adapt traditional approaches in order to deal with two
special conditions:
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1. We need to deal with an open world assumption on situations. The open
world assumption essentially implies an intuitionistic logic, which means
that we cannot derive "false" if if something is "not true". So the basic law
of many logic systems, "tertium non datur", does not hold. For example,
not stating "ice" in a situation does not mean that there is deﬁnitely no
ice.
2. The other special condition is that we want to have our "world" extend-
able in the sense that we want to be able to add details about inﬂuence
factors and add inﬂuence factors, meaning the "world" might change
occasionally.
Due to the arising challenges and the disadvantages, our evaluation of using
probabilistic graph models for inﬂuence factor based models is that these
solution areas are not appropriate for our application scenario. For us it
seems to be more appropriate to use the situations directly as reuse assets.
We want an approach without the overhead of eagerly trying to infer as
much knowledge as possible.
Case-based reasoning is highly appropriate for doing this. Its basic idea is to
use old cases and try to derive knowledge (lazily) if a new case comes up
[Lea94]. For us the cases are situations and if a new situation comes up we
want to compare this situation to older situations. Hence, this ﬁts well to
our problem. Furthermore, case-based reasoning does not need any up-front
investment in cases, meaning there is no minimal required set of cases to
allow it to be used. Note that having some cases upfront is good, of course.
For our approach, this is the optimal prerequisite.
The process of case-based reasoning is described in [AP94] as a four-step
approach:
1. RETRIEVE cases that are similar to the new problem case
2. REUSE the information of the retrieved cases to solve the problem
3. REVISE the new solution in order to check whether it is valid or not
4. RETAIN the new case in the general knowledge database to support
future problem solving tasks.
This process is depicted in Figure 2.10.
This technology ﬁts very well into our situation-reuse challenge. The "prob-
lem" in our case is to determine the exposure of a new situation. The new
situation is therefore our "new case". By retrieving similar situations that
have already been assessed, we can suggest an exposure value for the new
situation or at least give constraints for consistently assessing the new sit-
uation. The developer or domain expert then revises the suggestions or the
constraints and assigns the ﬁnal exposure to the new situation as a con-
ﬁrmed solution. Having the expert in the loop has the additional advantage
that all decisions are made by the expert. Especially in the area of functional
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Figure 2.10: Case-based reasoning cycle [AP94]
safety, this has great advantages due to responsibility reasons. The "case"
is afterwards retained in the knowledge base.
Thus, case-based reasoning is a very good approach for our "Eﬃcient Situa-
tion Reuse" challenge, but we need to deﬁne what similar situations are and
how to represent situations as cases. As discussed in the previous section, our
inﬂuence factors and situations are modeled in an ontology. Recio-Garcia pre-
sented in [RgDaGc+06] the connection between ontologies and case-based
reasoning. The basic idea is to have the ontology as the general knowledge
database and deﬁne similarity metrics on the structure of the ontology. This
is generally a very nice approach, but we still need to adapt this idea to the
application scenario dealing with situations and their associated inﬂuence
factor ontology.
Overall, we can conclude for the section on "Eﬃcient Situation Reuse" that
there exists no speciﬁc related work for HRA-focused reuse of situations.
In the general area of reusing knowledge and infering new knowledge from
already existing knowledge a huge amount of research work is available.
The focus of this thesis is not on advancing the state of the art of reuse
and knowledge engineering in general. Therefore, we evaluated the current
state of the art with the focus on applicability for our challenge. The most
appropriate and best ﬁtting related work in this area is the use of case-based
reasoning in combination with ontology engineering.
With this observation, we also ﬁnish our discussion of related work with
respect to the challenges comprising the completeness of situation analysis.
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2.4.2 Hazardous event classiﬁcation
Hazard classiﬁcation is essentially the assessment of three risk parameters:
− Exposure
− Controllability
− Severity
The assessment of the exposure parameter deals with the estimation of
the likelihood of a driving situation. While there exists related work for the
description and deﬁnition of situations as seen above, the classiﬁcation of
the likelihood is speciﬁc for the automotive domain (and for the ISO 26262
standard). Besides the above-mentioned approaches discussed as part of the
state-of-the-art chapter, there exists to the best of our knowledge no related
work that speciﬁcally addresses exposure assessment.
The parameter "controllability" puts the human into the chain of actions
when considering an accident or an incident. ISO 26262 deﬁnes controlla-
bility as the
"ability to avoid a speciﬁed harm or damage through the timely reactions
of the persons involved, possibly with support from external measures".
In this deﬁnition, we can identify two main aspects that have to be consid-
ered:
1. the ability to avoid [. . .] harm [. . .] possibly with support from external
measures, and
2. timely reactions of the persons involved
The ﬁrst aspect refers to changing the use of the subsystem that has a fail-
ure. The appended "external measure" especially points out that controlla-
bility is often based on using other functions to compensate for a failure. If,
for example, the brake system has a failure and an unwanted lateral accelera-
tion occurs, this may be controlled by the driver by increasing or decreasing
the steering angle. For a controllability argumentation using the integrity
and availability of another function one obviously needs to show this. The
underlying challenge refers back to the challenge discussed above of dealing
with multifunctional degradation. While this will provide the technical de-
pendency information, controllability will reuse this knowledge to prove the
ﬁrst aspect of a controllability argumentation.
The second aspect of controllability is the description of the reaction of a
person involved in a particular scenario. Not only the correct reaction, but
also the timely execution of the reaction needs to be argued. As already
discussed in the problem statement, the formalization of this aspect would
lead us into the area of human factors and human capability modeling and
will not be considered in this thesis. We discussed some fundamental issues of
human factors in the context of ISO 26262 as part of our publication [KT11].
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The interested reader is referred to this publication for further references that
might be interesting in this area.
The assessment of the severity of an accident is the "estimate of the extent
of harm to one or more individuals that can occur in a potentially hazardous
situation" [ISO11].
In ISO 26262, the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) is used to classify the
severity of an injury. This scale has seven classes: AIS 0: no injuries to AIS
6: extremely critical or fatal injury. In Annex B of part 3 of ISO 26262, it
is stated, however, that other categorizations could be used. The rationale
is that ISO 26262 acknowledges that the use of AIS can only classify single
injuries. Multiple injuries of one person or injuries of multiple persons cannot
be classiﬁed with AIS. The aggregation of injuries is, as stated in the problem
statement, still a ﬁeld of research. As alternatives for AIS, ISO 26262 refers
to MAIS and ISS, which we will present very brieﬂy.
MAIS stands for maximum abbreviated injury scale [HJE+10]. The straight-
forward approach is to select the maximum of the AIS scores. Note that
a "maximum" operation requires at least an ordinal scale. The seven-class
version of the AIS as used in ISO 26262 meets this requirement. The orig-
inal AIS code, however, is a nominal scale because there is an additional
code 9 assigned to "not further speciﬁed injury". The MAIS approach is
probably the implicit approach one applies in case of multiple injuries. The
second approach mentioned is the Injury Severity Score (ISS) [BOHL74].
This approach originated in polytrauma research, thus considers mostly se-
vere injuries. The basic idea is to convert the ordinal scale AIS codes into
survival probabilities. These probabilities are then interval-scaled and enable
arithmetic operations on the values. This is a neat handling of the problem
of not being able to calculate an overall injury score from single injuries.
Some objections should be pointed out as well. The ﬁrst one is the indepen-
dence of the injuries. This independence is required in the arithmetic's of
ISS calculations. The second objection is the way the calculation is deﬁned.
It is based on squaring and adding single injury probabilities. This is based
on empirical data collected for polytraumatic estimations, not necessarily
suitable for usage scenarios in the automotive domain. Therefore, there is
still ongoing research in this area. The precise and formal decision of the
severity of an accident is not within the scope of this thesis, however, and
we will therefore omit further discussions of related work in this area.
2.4.3 Dealing with multiple service failures
The last challenge we have to investigate is how to deal with multiple
service failures.
The assessment of a multiple service failure itself is not diﬀerent from the
assessment task of a single service failure. The challenge for the assess-
ment arises from the number of multiple service failures. Manually assessing
an exponential number of hazards (2n) is obviously not possible. Automa-
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tion or computer-aided analyzes do not exist (to the best knowledge of the
authors). However, one could claim that in avionics, multiple service fail-
ures are handled with their functional hazard analysis (FHA). This true, but
the advantage of avionics systems (in the past) has been that the systems
comprise many single independent sub-systems. Thus, strong interrelations
and dependencies did not occur by construction. In the future, avionics sys-
tems will rely on highly integrated architectures, implying the need for a
more structured and formal way of dealing with multiple service failures.
This trend is already becoming evident when we look at avionics industry
demands in current research projects, such as SPES XT. An explicit task
for developing a model-based, structured approach for FHA is strongly de-
manded by the avionics industry. Thus, we conclude that the current FHA
is not applicable for our approach.
We can summarize the review of related work for dealing with multiple
service failures by stating that with failure logic models, a good basis for
addressing the challenges of multiple service failures already exists. Fur-
thermore, there are already existing analysis techniques (such as FHA) for
dealing with multiple service failures. There exists, however, no approach
that focuses on relevant multiple service failures and deals with eﬃcient
assessment.
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3 SAHARA - a Structured Approach for
Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessments
In the previous chapters, we gave an introduction to hazard analysis and risk
assessments and derived a structure of challenges and goals. Subsequently,
we gave an overview of the current state of the art and work related to
structured model-based hazard analysis and risk assessments.
In this chapter, we present our contributions and solutions for the identiﬁed
challenges and goals. The structure of this chapter is such that we will ﬁrst
give a solution overview, which explains the overall solution architecture, the
building blocks, and their role in SAHARA. In the subsequent sections we
present the concrete solutions and contributions of the four main building
blocks of SAHARA, namely GOBI, OASIS, HEAT, and ARID.
3.1 Solution Overview
In this section, we will explain SAHARA's solution architecture. Figure 3.1
depicts an overview of our solution.
Figure 3.1: PhD overview of SAHARA’s solution
Please note that we combined the OASIS and HEAT blocks into one solution
block because both address the formalization of operational situations. Cor-
responding to the HRA process, which distinguishes between hazard analysis
and risk assessment, we separated the aspect of deﬁning operational situ-
ations from the aspect of assessing operational situations. Therefore, we
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reﬁne the one block combining OASIS and HEAT into these two aspects as
shown in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Refinement of the operational situation formalization
In this section, we translate our solution overview, shown in Figure 3.1, from
a problem-driven perspective to a solution-oriented perspective. Figure 3.3
shows on the left the problem-driven coarse-grained structure and on the
right our detailed solution architecture. The latter structures the solution
building blocks as discussed in the next sections and shows their dependen-
cies.
In the introduction, we already discussed that the model-based representa-
tion developed in GOBI is a common foundation for our core contributions
presented in the sections on OASIS, HEAT, and ARID. Based on our prob-
lem discussion and the formalization in GOBI, we derive speciﬁc technical
challenges for the respective contribution blocks to solve. These technical
challenges are represented as orange ovals. Hence, in order to reach the goal
shown on the left of Figure 3.1, we had to cope with the challenges shown
as corresponding orange ovals on the right. For example, the block on the
very left "Formalization of operational situations" is the goal of OASIS. In
order to reach this goal, we basically have to solve the two technical chal-
lenges, "Formalize and structure situation restrictions", and "Correctness of
situations (wrt. concomitance)". The detailed blocks on the lower part of
the ﬁgure that shows the solution domain, depict the sections we are going
to discuss in the subsequent solution approach.
However, before discussing the detailed solution blocks, we will explain the
solution architecture on a black-box level. Due to the black-box view, we will
focus on the building blocks as such and especially describe the connections
shown in solution part of Figure 3.1.
We will use an interface speciﬁcation with the following recurring structure:
− State the main challenge of the building block
− Explain the provided interface.
− Explain the required interface.
− State the result as a concrete contribution.
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Figure 3.3: Overview of SAHARA in the problem domain and the solution domain
↓ G O B I
Challenge: The overall challenge and main contribution of SAHARA is to provide a
holistic, model-based approach for structured HRAs.
Prov.-IF: GOBI subdivides the HRA process and our challenges into the two fun-
damental challenges: structured risk assessment, and a structured hazard
analysis. This is the provided interface as shown on top of the GOBI box
in Figure 3.3. The reﬁnement of these challenges is done in GOBI using
a conceptual model and propagated down to the single building blocks as
concrete challenges.
Req.-IF: GOBI deﬁnes and formalizes the general participants of an HRA: the sys-
tem, the human, and the environment. Using this conceptual model, GOBI
revisits the HRA process and deﬁnes responsibilities for the three partici-
pants on the one hand and derives from that overall ﬁve concrete challenges
for the subsequent building blocks as required interface.
GOBI uses Parnas' commonly known conceptual model, the Four-Variable-
Model and extends this into an Interacting-Four-Variable-Model. The inter-
acting participants are the core elements of an HRA: the system, the human,
and the environment. The fundamental idea of (re-)using Parnas' model is
the separation of the physical domain from the logical domain. We discuss
in GOBI that this ﬁts very well to HRAs. Using the GOBI-FVM approach
the HRA is revisited and the two basic tasks, the hazard analysis and the
risk assessment is explained using the FVM. By this we transformed the
high-level process-based HRA to a model-based HRA requirements model.
The requirements are demands on the the interaction as a whole and the
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respective single FVM in particular. These conceptual requirements are then
propagated down to the single building blocks representing our core contri-
butions, OASIS, HEAT, and ARID.
Contrib. 1 Formalized HRA framework:
Semi-formal framework that bridges the worlds of HRA and systems engi-
neering to allow talking more structured about HRAs.
↓ O A S I S
Challenge: GOBI gives an overview of the basic requirements of a formalized HRA.
One requirement of GOBI and the challenge addressed by OASIS is the
formalization of operational situations.
Prov.-IF: OASIS provides an ontology-based structuring and classiﬁcation of pos-
sible inﬂuence factors, i.e., situation restrictions that enable the formal
construction of situations. OASIS furthermore provides a situation deﬁni-
tion process that fulﬁlls GOBI's requirements for situation correctness.
Internally, OASIS provides an ontology containing inﬂuence factors and
corresponding domain knowledge.
Req.-IF: OASIS deals with inﬂuence factors and their construction into correct sit-
uations. The deﬁnition and formalization of "correctness" and the infor-
mation on what an HRA relevant situation is is given by GOBI.
Contrib. 2 Ontology-based situation inﬂuence factor classiﬁcation:
A situation ontology for classifying inﬂuence factors and integrating HRA-
relevant domain knowledge in order to enable a more formal and structured
way of constructing situations.
↓ H E A T
Challenge: While OASIS structures the inﬂuence factors of an operational situation
and describes a process for constructing a situation, it does not address the
modeling and consistent assessment of operational situations wrt. their ex-
posure. The corresponding challenge addressed in HEAT is how a situation
along with its exposure can be modeled as reusable domain knowledge.
Prov.-IF: HEAT provides a model-based representation of operational situations in-
cluding their assessment result, the exposure, and the rationales for that
result. HEAT furthermore provides an analytic consistency checking ap-
proach as well as constructive consistency assuring assessment support.
With this, HEAT provides a concrete solution for the requirements elicited
in GOBI.
HE
Req.-IF: HEAT requires the ontological model of inﬂuence factors provided by OA-
SIS.
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Contrib. 3 Situation modeling and exposure assessment support:
Model-based situation representation with a similarity function, for reusing
the assessment results of (similar) situations, in order to support the safety
engineer in consistent situation assessments.
OASIS formalizes situation inﬂuences and provides a situation deﬁnition
process, and HEAT complements this with a modeling and reuse approach
for operational situations. The other aspect making up the essence of an
HRA, the hazardous event, is the hazard itself.
↓ A R I D
Challenge: The corresponding challenge is how to deal with hazards consisting of
multiple service failures and the resulting exponential number of hazards.
Prov.-IF: ARID provides a model-based representation of hazards consisting of mul-
tiple service failures along with their foothold within a system and failure
propagation model. Based on that, ARID provides a process for dealing
with multiple service failures through the extensive use of system and do-
main knowledge collected.
Req.-IF: ARID uses the situation assessment and support facilities of HEAT on the
one hand and fulﬁlls the demands of GOBI to not distinguish between
single and multiple service failures when it comes to risk assessments of
hazards.
Contrib. 4 Approach for dealing with multiple service failures:
A model-based representation of multiple service failures and a correspond-
ing method deﬁning a computer-aided analysis process.
With the description above we gave a very condensed overview over our
solution approach and our contributions. A more detailed overview and the
internal goals of the respective solution components are presented at the
beginning of each component section.
43
GOBI - Gradation of Baneful Inﬂuence
3.2 GOBI - Gradation of Baneful Inﬂuence
As stated above, GOBI constitutes a formalization approach of HRAs on
the one hand and as such constitutes an integration framework for the
core challenges identiﬁed above on the other hand. Figure 3.4 shows the
integration of GOBI into the overall thesis.
Figure 3.4: Integration overview of GOBI
For our Structured Approach for Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessments
(SAHARA), we identiﬁed in section "2.2 Core Challenges and Goals" the
following fundamental challenges:
6 Holistic model-based approach for structured HRA processes
w Structuring of hazard analysis
w Structuring of risk assessments
Additionally, we derived from our state-of-the-art review that there is no
integrated view or conceptual model of HRAs. With GOBI we provide such
a holistic, model-based integration framework, by mapping the general idea
of an HRA to a conceptual, but integrated model. This allows us to provide
a semi-formal integration framework for the challenges elicited in chapter
2.2. The core challenges that are integrated into this framework will be the
topics of subsequent sections called OASIS, HEAT, and ARID.
We structure this section in the following way:
1. The Gradation - Understanding the overall idea of an HRA
In this section, we will ﬁrst discuss the HRA and derive our conceptual,
semi-formal system representation as Interacting Four-Variable-Model
(FVM). The purpose of this model is to bridge the world of HRAs and
systems engineering.
2. The Systems  Detailing the core elements
In this section, we will investigate the interacting FVMs in more details.
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We will discuss properties and peculiarities which need to be considered
in the subsequent sections.
3.2.1 The Gradation  Understanding the overall idea of an HRA
As the title implies, the goal of this section is to provide an overall framework
for formalized discussions of HRAs. The challenge of such a formalization is
to connect the two worlds of HRA-focused safety engineering and systems
engineering. We approach this challenge by ﬁrst discussing the overall goals
pursued in an HRA. Then we will present a semi-formal model of essential
elements and map the goals and the respective responsibility onto these
elements.
The fundamental task of a safety engineer performing an HRA, is to build
a model of possible interactions of the vehicle with its environment that is
as close as possible to reality. Every safety engineer has such a model in his
mind. Our task is to make this model explicit and guide the safety engineer
in building the model eﬃciently. It is eﬃcient to omit uncritical information
and focus only on potentially critical parameters. Classiﬁcation into uncrit-
ical and potentially critical parameters is done by reasoning logically about
the interaction. This means that the safety engineer forms a concrete picture
(or scenario) in his mind, with real world objects, such as a highway, ice,
high-speed driving, etc. The basic argumentation of his parameter decision
regarding uncritical and potentially critically parameters is done purely log-
ically. If the safety engineer has a concrete scenario in mind that could lead
to an accident (an argumentation), he needs proof for his argumentation.
The proof needs to be something objective and provable. So he translates
the envisioned scenario into the physical world. By physical world we mean
the scientiﬁc physics1. While "ice" is something in the physical reality, it
is not speciﬁc or precise enough for our purpose. It is unclear whether one
implies with "ice" the temperature being < 0◦C, or the friction being low
µ < . Thus, for us "ice" would be a logical parameter and the concrete
physical value the manifestation in the physical world. If a safety engineer
argues with "ice", he might use the "evidence" of low friction µ < , for ex-
ample. We can therefore state that ﬁnding a set of possibly critical scenarios
is eﬃciently done in the logical domain of the interacting behavior of our
three core elements. The amount of risk is determined by deriving physical
values from the hypothesized accident. We can separate the logical domain
from the physical domain by its purpose. The logical domain is mostly used
for arguments and reasoning, while the physical domain is used to produce
evidences for these arguments.
If we want to formalize HRAs, we need to integrate the two worlds, the
logical domain and the physical domain.
Parnas' Four-Variable-Model (FVM) constitutes a (semi-) formal approach
1In German, we distinguish between "physisch" und "physikalisch". With scientiﬁc physics we refer to the
German term "physikalisch".
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for (software) system representations that makes exactly this distinction (as
discussed in chapter 2.4.1 "Correctness of situation analysis"). Parnas states
that the system "perceives" and "aﬀects" the environment only physically.
The behavior and strategy of the system is modeled in the logical domain.
A shortcoming of using this model straightaway for HRAs is that Parnas
considers everything outside the system as purely physical. Furthermore, he
respects the behavior taking place "only" by one relation (called NAT ). The
core elements we need to look at are not only the system, but also extend to
the human and the environment as well. We therefore extended Parnas' FVM
into interacting FVMs, where each element, "System", "Environment", and
"Human", is represented by one FVM. Figure 3.5 shows the interacting
FVMs schematically.
Figure 3.5: GOBI’s interacting Four-Variable Models
In the ﬁgure, the physical domain is represented as the inner circle with
"MON → CON", while the strategic, logical world is represented on the
outside circle with "IN → OUT".
The semi-formal model GOBI-FVM, implemented as interacting FVMs, al-
lows us to express the diﬀerence between ﬁgurative, logical reasoning and
physically proven facts. In the following, we will refer to the corresponding
FVMs by sub-scripting them:
I FVMSys represents the FVM of the System
I FVMHum represents the FVM of the Human
I FVMEnv represents the FVM of the Environment
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Using this conceptual model, one can think of an HRA as being an analysis
of concrete interaction scenarios of this model.
The hazard analysis sets up a very concrete picture of possibly critical inter-
actions. The hazard is becoming obviously a misbehavior (service failures)
of the FVMSys. The operational situation is described by inﬂuences and
characteristics of all FVMs. This step is complete if the setup of the model
would inevitably result in harm of the human, if executed. We have however
to add that it leads inevitably to harm, if the human does not perform any
controllability action. If there exists an execution starting from the respec-
tive setup which does not end in a harmful event, the setup is not yet valid.
If we assume to have a valid setup, the next step, the risk assessment, can
be started. This step is can be subdivided into two aspects. The ﬁrst aspect
is that the model is executed inﬁnitely often and all traces of executions
are captured. The second aspect, the original task of the risk assessment, is
to analyze these traced. The diﬀerence of various executions can only stem
from actions from the human, the controllability. Everything else stays the
same (by deﬁnition).
− The likelihood of controllability can be interpreted as the fraction of num-
bers of executions that lead to harm and the overall number of executions.
− The severity is being evaluated for the execution in which the human
does not perform any controllability action.
− The exposure is the likelihood to have the respective setup, but without
the hazard of the system.
The values are ﬁnally combined to an ASIL value and one hazardous event
has been analyzed.
Please note that, as stated above, this is only a conceptual model to bridge
the two worlds of HRAs and systems engineering. In the following we will
discuss each FVM in more detail and point out general properties and pe-
culiarities of the respective FVMs.
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3.2.2 The Systems  Detailing the core elements
In this section, we will further discuss the single FVMs of the System, the
Human, and the Environment.
The System-FVM
Representing a "system" as an FVM is the original purpose of an FVM. It
is therefore easy to understand the sets and relations of the "System" and
we will not discuss those in detail. However, we will discuss the role of the
System-FVM in an HRA in the next section.
In our conceptual representation of an HRA as executions of our the inter-
acting FVMs, the system had two roles.
The ﬁrst role was to provide a misbehavior. This misbehavior is the hazard.
Please note that we did not restrict the misbehavior. Thus, we include by this
all possible misbehaviors, thus, we cover the case of single service failures as
well as multiple service failures. The process and the risk assessment stays
the same. We therefore state that the risk assessment of a hazard consisting
of a multiple service failure is the same as the one for a single service failure.
The diﬀerentiation whether we consider a single or multiple service failure
is purely deﬁned system-internally.
The second role the was to provide characteristics of the situations setup. It
is however not deﬁned, which characteristic might be relevant for an HRA.
We answer this question as part of our OASIS discussion.
The Human-FVM
In contrast to the System, the representation of human(s) as an FVM is a
new application of FVMs. Based on Figure 3.5, we deﬁne the sets compliant
with Parnas' FVM (informally) as:
Physical domain - V arreal
MON: This is is real-world (physical) information humans sense.
CON: These are real-world (physical) actions humans perform.
Logical domain - V arlogic
IN: These are concepts or ideas humans have about their current
situation.
OUT: These are intentions or plans humans have to do something.
We again omit the names of the relations between these sets and discuss
their meaning directly:
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MON → IN : This process is often referred to as characteristics for-
mation, or recognition. It maps real physical, sensed
(raw) information to known concepts and ideas of the
human.
OUT → CON : This process is often referred to as concrete action. It
realizes an idea of the human in terms of externally
perceivable physical phenomena.
IN → OUT : This is the behavior of humans. Thus, based on the
ideas and their mental picture of the current situation,
they will create a plan or an intention to do something.
As we have seen in our conceptual FVM-based HRA, the human has two
roles in an HRA. The ﬁrst role is that the human is the one who becomes
harmed in case of an accident. Thus, a severity assessment must be possible
purely on information contained in the human-FVM. The other role the
human play is to be able to inﬂuence the interaction once, the execution
has been started.
Both, the severity and controllability is not subject of this thesis. We want,
however, point our the versatility of our conceptual model as interacting
FVMs by presenting a possible reﬁnement of the human FVM for the con-
trollability part.
The controllability describes an intentional, behavioral part of the human,
representing (re-)actions he can perform. We want to further reﬁne the no-
tion of intention, perception and action in more detail. To do so, we use
a well-known model of the human behavior: the skill-rule-knowledge model
of Rasmussen [Ras82]. It was created as a taxonomy for human errors. The
fundamental idea is to classify human behavior by the familiarity with the
task [Ras82]. Rasmussen deﬁnes that there is a tripartite distinction of task
performance:
• Skill-based level: Tasks the operator is extremely familiar with (e.g., steer
a car)
• Rule-based level: Tasks which are familiar, but not intuitively accomplish-
able (e.g., park a car)
• Knowledge-based level: Tasks that are unfamiliar (e.g., navigate through
a new situation)
Figure 3.6 shows these diﬀerent layers of Rasmussen's SRK model. We will
go through this model and explain how Rasmussen's model can be integrated
into our FVM approach. Characteristics formation
The purpose of the characteristics formation is processing physical inputs
and transform these into logical concepts of the human. We see this as the
ﬁrst stage of an argument for actions and reactions or even as an argument
for the uncontrollability of a situation.
This ﬁts to Parnas' separation of the physical world and the logical world.
In fact the idea of Rasmussen's characteristics formation is essentially the
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Figure 3.6: Rasmussen’s Skill-Rule-Knowledge Model [Ras82]
deﬁnition of the relation MON → IN . This essentially means stating the
assumed model of the situation the human has in his mind.
Skill-based behavior
Informally speaking, the skill-based behavior is given by intuition and reﬂex-
like actions. There is no conscious process involved. The behavior sequence
is therefore very short and direct, based on a statement of intention. We
therefore use this model as output interface putting intention into reality.
It is the translation instance for transforming logical actions and reactions
into physical reality, i.e., from OUT → CON . This translation can deﬁne
a one-to-one mapping, but is often multi-variable in the outputs, meaning
that one intention usually leads to one primary physical action, but is often
accompanied by secondary, subconscious actions.
If, for example, the intention is to "accelerate", this is translated into the
intuitive (primary) action of moving the right foot to the gas pedal and
pressing on it. Other more subtle actions (the secondary actions) are that at
the same time the driver changes the focus of his view into the direction into
which he expects the vehicle to accelerate. Furthermore, if the acceleration
intention is high, another secondary action could be to increase the force of
the grip holding the steering wheel.
Rule-based behavior
In rule-based behavior, "higher-grade" activities take place. They are of an
"if-then" format, i.e. they constitute ﬁxed, stored rules or procedure [Dav03].
Rasmussen describes rule-based behavior as "goal-oriented but structured by
'feed-forward control' through a stored rule" [Ras82][Rea90]. One may argue
that the distinction to skill-based behavior is fuzzy because intention/action
pairs can be represented in "if-then" format as well. The diﬀerence is the
goal orientation and the consciousness of rule-based behavior.
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Rule-based behavior means for HRAs that, on the one hand, we ﬁnd normal
maneuvers as rule-based behaviors and that controllability actions are usu-
ally rule-based as well. A controllability argument is done via the percentage
of average operators that can "control" the situation. Thus, a controllability
hypothesis can be stated as rule-based behavior. The task the safety engi-
neer has to fulﬁll in order to argue with this rule is to show statistics on how
many average drivers have the rule "stored".
The rule deﬁnes the goal, the perception and the skill-based action deﬁne
human performance. Hollnagel therefore classiﬁed human error roughly into
these two cases: The rule is inadequate, or the rule is satisfactory, but the
performance is deﬁcient [Hol93]. For an HRA this means that a controllabil-
ity action can fail because it is inadequate or it is adequate, but the human
performance is deﬁcient.
Knowledge-based behavior
Knowledge-based behavior is similar to rule-based behavior; it is goal-
oriented as well. The diﬀerence, however, is that the human states the goal
very explicitly in his mind and derives a strategy or a plan for reaching this
goal. Diﬀerent possibilities are weighted against the best path to the goal.
The result of a certain intention in terms of actions is reﬂected mentally.
Thus, one could compare this with a mental control loop. In contrast to the
mental control loop, skill-based behavior is controlled via the environment,
meaning a rule is selected and an action is performed. Based on the "re-
action" of the environment, the rule is adapted or another rule might be
selected.
As already stated in the discussion of the skill-based behavior automaton
section, our goal is to improve HRAs for automotive systems. We therefore
focus the modeling of the human on controllability actions. At the time of
this writing, there is no need to model knowledge-based behavior because
controllability actions usually take place in a very short time, with only
limited conscious inﬂuence. Strategic planning of actions in case of a system
failure is more important in other domains where the human has minutes or
hours of reaction time to prevent a situation from resulting in harm.
As a conclusion of this controllability reﬁnement of the human-FVM, we
want to point out the FVM idea again: the diﬀerentiation between the
physical world and the logical world. Rasmussen's SRK model ﬁts perfectly
into this concept because the characteristics formation on the one hand and
the sensumotorical patterns on the other hand, are exactly what the human
FVM describes when transitioning form the physical world to the logical
world. This integration was not meant to signiﬁcantly advance the state of
the art in controllability models, but we used it to show-case the very generic
conceptual framework GOBI provides, is a versatile and open model.
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The Environment-FVM
As discussed before, in Parnas' original FVM model, the environment was
"only" represented as one relation denoted as "NAT" from the set CON
to MON : CON
NAT−−−→MON
Due to the importance of the environment in an HRA, we need a more
explicit representation of the environment. We accounted for that by repre-
senting the environment as an FVM as well. At ﬁrst glance, this seems to
be a straightforward extension, because the environment was already rep-
resented in the original FVM. Upon closer examination, the question arises
what the logical part of the environment is? Furthermore, what are logical
inputs and outputs?
The basic idea of having a physical as well as a logical domain even for the
environment is that in an HRA, we often ﬁnd informal conceptual proper-
ties of the environment. The physically relevant properties are often implicit,
and which aspect is relevant may change dependent on the expert and the
hazard. One example could be "ice" on the road. On the one hand, "ice" is
something physical and one could expect to ﬁnd this in the physical domain.
For an HRA, however, "ice" is only a logical representative of something
physically more concrete/measurable, such as the temperature, or the fric-
tion of the ground (µ). We therefore distinguish between inﬂuences that are
semantically meaningful for describing a concrete situation and inﬂuences
stating values or properties of technical, physical quiddity.
In the following, we will detail the FVM as we did with the other two GOBI-
FVMs before. Based on Figure 3.5, we deﬁne the sets compliant with Parnas'
FVM (informally) as:
Physical domain - V arreal
MON: These are real-world (physical) values that are put into the
environment.
CON: These are real-world (physical) values that are created by the
environment.
Logical domain - V arlogic
IN: This set represents known relevant inﬂuences or inﬂuence
classes.
OUT: This set represents suggested inﬂuence factors.
The meaning and purpose of these sets alone is quite fuzzy and hard to
grasp. Their nature becomes clearer once we discuss their relations:
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MON → IN : The MON set contains values and variables present
and therefore known in the physical world. Depen-
dent on these physical values, the environment can be
constrained into "incredible" and possibly "credible"
situation facts. If the "System", for example, provides
the information that the hazard is "loss of steering",
the subset of situations where no steering is required,
"steering angle = 0", is irrelevant for the HRA.
IN → OUT : This relation represents formalized domain knowledge
in terms of situation inﬂuence dependencies. With do-
main knowledge we can sub-classify the remaining
set of possibly "credible" situations, or at least parti-
tion the remaining state variables into "equivalence"
classes.
OUT → CON : This relation ﬁnally makes the domain-knowledge ex-
plicit in the physical domain. Thus, if we identiﬁed
a partition of logical environmental inﬂuences, these
classes need to be translated into reality, i.e., we need
to deﬁne corresponding physical variable partitions.
We can therefore interpret the environmental FVM as a three-step process:
MON→IN︷ ︸︸ ︷
Analysis →
IN→OUT︷ ︸︸ ︷
Reasoning →
OUT→CON︷ ︸︸ ︷
Synthesis (3.1)
I The analysis part restricts the logical values based on incoming physical
values. If we know, for example, that the vehicle speed is vx > 100km/h,
the analysis would produce the knowledge that the situation cannot be a
"parking" nor a "city-driving" scenario.
I The synthesis part does the opposite: restrict the physical world based
on logical values. If the synthesis gets as input "ice", it concludes the
restriction that the temperature "t < 5◦C" and "µ = low". Another
synthesis would be that "parking" implies "vx = 0".
I The reasoning part ﬁnally "decides" on dependencies of logical inﬂuence
factors and suggests possibly relevant other inﬂuence factors (logically).
Let's get back to the steering system and assume a "self-steering" hazard.
The vehicle can only state actor-related values, such as the steering angle
sa > 0. The analysis part partitions the logical facts into irrelevant and
relevant facts. "Parking" would belong to the irrelevant set, while "driving
straight" would belong to the relevant inﬂuence factors: If the vehicle is
"parked", nothing happens if the steering angle changes. However, if one
wants to "drive straight" and the vehicle (suddenly) starts to turn, the sit-
uation gets critical.
The analysis part "communicates" this to the reasoning part. Based on
"driving straight", the reasoning part could conclude that, for example,
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"Country Road" or "Highway" are important logical situation facts relevant
when "driving straight". Additionally, "upcoming traﬃc" or "heavy traﬃc"
could be relevant.
The synthesis part translates the suggestions of the reasoning into physically
relevant partitions of variable valuations. From "Country Road" and "High-
way", the synthesis can produce, for example, classes of vehicle velocities,
such as 50km/h ≤ vx ≤ 100km/h. Another example is that from "upcom-
ing traﬃc", one could conclude a high diﬀerential speed: ∆vx ≥ 50km/h.
We can state that the environment-FVM takes over a huge part of the chal-
lenges identiﬁed for the formalization of operational situations. While every-
thing in the environment seems to be physical, our notion of being physical
becomes evident with this reﬁned FVM: It is semantical preciseness. Addi-
tionally to the preciseness the environmental model implies, the reason part
is, as discussed above, one fundamental aspect of domain-knowledge, we
want to formalize situation deﬁnitions and for deﬁning exposure assessment
consistency.
3.2.3 GOBI conclusion
In GOBI we presented a semi-formal model of interacting Four-Variable-
Models. Furthermore, we mapped the general HRA process of hazard analy-
sis and risk assessment to that model. By this, we derived basic requirements
for the remaining core challenge, which will be discussed in the next three
sections. We handled the challenge to capture the fuzzy concept of an HRA
in an extended version of a commonly known model, a FVM. Our contri-
bution with GOBI is therefore the idea of representing and formalizing an
HRA conceptually as interacting Four-Variable-Model.
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3.3 OASIS - Ontology-based Analysis of Situation Inﬂuences on
Safety
In the previous section, GOBI, we presented the foundation of this thesis; a
model-based HRA representation. In this section, we address the ﬁrst part
of the challenge of providing a more structured and consistent approach of
HRAs in general. In this section, we focus on the formalization of operational
situations. Figure 3.7 shows the integration of OASIS with the overall thesis
on the one hand and the general structure of this section on the other hand.
Figure 3.7: Integration overview of OASIS
In section "2.2 Core Challenges and Goals", we identiﬁed a structure of
relevant challenges. The following branch was one of the paths of derivation
of concrete challenges on the way to a formalized, model-based HRA:
6 Structuring of hazard analysis
6 Correctness of situation analysis
w Formalization of operational situations
Additionally, we derived as part of the work related to "correctness of situ-
ation analysis" (cf. section 2.4.1), we derived the following ﬁndings, which
we will transfer to the application of HRA-formalization in this section.
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1. Situation theory uses infons, which are relations containing information
items about a situation. In situation theory, the relations and relevant
information items to consider need to be adapted for each purpose. Thus,
in our case we need to deﬁne this for HRA situations.
2. Based on the context modeling survey of Strang and Linnhoﬀ-Popien,
we argue that ontological models are the most suitable type of model for
capturing HRA situation information.
Thus, in this section we will present our solution for formalizing environ-
mental information for the purpose of being used in an HRA. This challenge
can be subdivided into the following structure, which directly leads to the
structure of this section.
1. Strang and Linhoﬀ-Popien claimed that ontological modeling is the most
suitable type of model for situation/context modeling. Nevertheless, due
to the observation that the term "ontology" is used for many diﬀerent
things, we start by giving an overview of diﬀerent ontology applications
and introduce concrete names for these applications. This helps to focus
on the various aspects an ontology can express and makes it easier to
deﬁne the relation between an ontology and other similar concepts such
as taxonomies and meta-models. This will be done in section 3.3.1.
2. As mentioned above, we need to deﬁne "infons" for HRAs, i.e., we need to
adapt situation theory insights to HRAs. Up to now, we have not deﬁned
how to structure "inﬂuence factors" of HRA situations. Thus, we need
to answer the questions how the "environment" can be structured and
what actual information items could look like. As a concrete technical
solution, we use an ontology as a model. We will discuss all these issues
in section 3.3.2.
3. Knowing the building blocks of an "environment" (in terms of HRAs) is
necessary, but this does not include any information about what a rea-
sonable situation is. If the task in situation theory would be to build an
HRA situation "world", one would ask for knowledge in order to decide
whether some infons make a situation factual or not (cf. section 2.4). In
our case, the HRA, this translates to the question of whether a combina-
tion of inﬂuence factors makes sense or not, or to be more precise, how
likely the combination is. How to capture this domain knowledge will be
the subject of section 3.3.3.
4. The overall purpose of this section is to come up with a more formal way
of deﬁning situations for an HRA. The structure introduced above gives
us the (formal) basis for deﬁning situations in general. Another aspect
is how to get relevant/meaningful situations. We will therefore deﬁne a
situation deﬁnition process in section 3.3.4.
After reading this section, the reader will know how to model situations
for an HRA by using our formalization of (HRA-relevant) environmental
information.
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3.3.1 Ontologies
As described above, the term ontology is used for many diﬀerent applica-
tion classes. These application classes include glossaries or data dictionaries,
taxonomies and thesauri, schemes and data models, and formal ontologies
for inference. Additionally, one can often read discussions about ontology
vs. meta-models. All of these concepts are, of course, not independent, but
they are distinguishable.
Our goal in this section is to explain the ontology characteristics for usage
in an HRA situation modeling scenario. We will therefore ﬁrst give a general
overview of diﬀerent ontology application classes and diﬀerentiate them.
Afterwards, we will apply these concepts to our goal of formalizing HRA
situations.
Ontology applications
One commonality of all ontology applications is the intention to "capture"
a certain world. The "world" is the ontology term for a set of concepts and
instances contained under a common "umbrella". The amount of structure
this "umbrella" produces is our diﬀerentiating element in the discussion.
The ﬁrst level of structure is the explicit enumeration of terms belonging to
the "world" under consideration. This can be roughly deﬁned as vocabulary.
If there is an authority ensuring the unambiguity and non-redundancy of
terms, we have the second level of structure, a controlled vocabulary.
The next level of structure is introduced by turning a controlled vocabulary
into a taxonomy. A taxonomy provides not only well-deﬁned terms, but
organizes the terms into a hierarchical structure. Each term in a taxonomy
is in at least one parent-child relationship. Traditionally, this parent-child
relationship has been a generalization/specialization or a "is a kind of"
relation. Nowadays, one can often see other meanings of hierarchy, such as
"part-of" or "instance of".
If the relationship is not limited to hierarchy, but adds associative relations
between terms, we speak of a thesaurus. Other relations known from a
word-based thesaurus are synonym or antonym words.
The step from a thesaurus to an ontology is the deﬁnition of a grammar.
An ontology grammar states what a valid "world" looks like, i.e., what is
meaningful/expedient within a speciﬁed domain of interest.
Last but not least, we have the term meta-model. The focus of a meta-
model is to construct speciﬁc models within a domain of interest. To this
end, a meta-model is an explicit model of the constructs and rules needed
to specify correct models. Ontologies in contrast, do not necessarily deﬁne
the grammar such that it can be used as a model construction plan. The
distinction is minor in concepts, but often huge in practice. The key is the
"explicity" of meta-models wrt. construction rules. Thus, a meta-model is
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an ontology (that can be used by modelers), but not every ontology is
explicitly modeled as a meta-model.
The following ﬁgure summarizes the above review of ontology applications
graphically.
Figure 3.8: Taxonomy of ontology applications
Ontology requirements for HRA situations
In OASIS, we want to deﬁne situations in a more formal and explicit way.
The model of a situation is very simple: It is a list of inﬂuence factors. Thus,
our vocabulary contains mostly inﬂuence factors. Due to our goal of reusing
situations, we need unambiguity of inﬂuence factors; otherwise, a situation
(and its assigned exposure value) might be reused in a setting for which the
situation was not deﬁned. Non-redundancy would be appealing, but by de-
manding it we would have to sacriﬁce "practicability". This is true because
engineers from diﬀerent domains speak (often slightly) diﬀerent languages
in the sense that they use diﬀerent terms for similar aspects. One example
could be "ice" and "low µ"; both terms imply that the friction of the road
is reduced. "ice" is a more ﬁgurative term, while "low µ" is a technical,
physical expression. We would like to respect this (practicably implied) sce-
nario on the one hand, but do not want to have arbitrary redundancy in our
ontology on the other hand. Therefore, we allow redundancy but oﬀer a way
to "unify" redundant terms. Uniﬁcation means in this case that a situation
would be identiﬁed as similar if only the redundant terms were switched.
The approach for uniﬁcation will be explained in section 3.3.3
Setting up the inﬂuence factor structure as a taxonomy, i.e., including hierar-
chical concepts, has multiple advantages for the deﬁnition of HRA situation
inﬂuence factors:
1. Handling of complexity
Hierarchies are a way of handling complexity and structuring huge sets of
information. A vehicle's environment is a complex "set of information".
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Thus, due to the goal of formalizing this in terms of inﬂuence factors,
some structure and organization is necessary.
2. Keeping consistency
Separation into classes (or hierarchical structures) has the advantage that
it becomes easier to decide about the attributes introduced above: unam-
biguity and non-redundancy. If each level of the hierarchy is unambiguous
and non-redundant (and if the inﬂuence factors are assigned to the correct
classes), we do not need to check each and every pair of inﬂuence factors,
but can already restrict the analysis to the class level. This reduces the
eﬀort for maintaining a consistent ontology.
3. Support inﬂuence factor retrieval
For deﬁning an HRA situation, it is important to ﬁnd the inﬂuence factors
the engineer has in mind. Thus, an HRA inﬂuence factor model needs to
support the retrieval/ﬁnding of inﬂuence factors. A hierarchical structure
is easier to browse.
With the above-stated requirements for an HRA taxonomy, we have good
requirements for handling the single inﬂuence factors. How these inﬂuence
factors are related to each other and what their "meaning" is for an HRA
situation has not been discussed yet. As we have already stated as part of
the "non-redundancy" discussion above, we need at least one associative
relation deﬁning a uniﬁcation property for relating two inﬂuence factors to
each other. Furthermore, the domain knowledge of safety experts in HRA
encompasses more aspects that deﬁne further relations between inﬂuence
factors. For our goal of formalizing HRA situations, this domain knowledge
is very valuable. There are two reasons for this:
1. Decide about validity of situations
We need domain knowledge to decide about the validity of a situation.
(This in turn helps us not to introduce useless situations in our database
and keep it practicably usable.)
2. Support consistent exposure assessments
Domain knowledge must be formalized in order to achieve our goal for
supporting the engineer in consistent situation assessments. Consistency
is laxly deﬁned as fairness of situation assessments. To decide on whether
something is fair, one usually needs a notion of similarity. For deciding
whether situations are similar or not we need domain knowledge.
Hence, transitioning from an inﬂuence factor organization model to a
situation-focused one is a step from a taxonomy to (at least) a thesaurus.
The relations are also an essential part of our (implicit) grammar. Please
remember that a grammar turns a thesaurus into an ontology by deﬁning
what correct combinations of concepts and instances are. This does not nec-
essarily include how to construct a useful combination. For us, the handling
and the decision regarding the expedience of a situation is the main focus
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(not the modeling of situations). Therefore, for our approach, an ontology
is appropriate/suﬃcient.
A meta-model, in contrast, adds the aspect of explicit modeling, thus the
constructive aspect. We do not see a huge challenge to "model" a situation
(as a list of inﬂuence factors). Therefore, there is no need for a meta-model-
based approach.
Note that we will introduce a meta-model and a modeling approach in
section 3.3.3, but this meta-model does not describe the explicit modeling
of situations, but rather domain-knowledge modeling of inﬂuence factors.
Based on the structured review of ontology applications shown above we
structure the subsequent chapter as follows:
First, we will introduce an HRA taxonomy by classifying and deﬁning situ-
ation inﬂuence factor classes.
Second, we will turn the taxonomy into an ontology by deﬁning rules or
relations for capturing domain knowledge for HRA situation deﬁnitions.
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3.3.2 Situation inﬂuence characterization - a taxonomy
In this section, we present our HRA inﬂuence factor taxonomy. The taxon-
omy is extracted from industrial case studies and project experience. On the
one hand, we respect the fact that an environment description can always
be extended, detailed, or reﬁned, meaning there no the ﬁnal HRA environ-
mental model; on the other hand, one can deﬁne a ﬁxed (non-extensible)
general structure on which an extension can be based.
Thus, we claim that the ﬁrst two levels of our taxonomy form a complete and
correct basis for HRA inﬂuence factor classiﬁcation, while the more detailed
classes and concrete inﬂuence factors are an initial, but extensible inﬂuence
factor model. Please remember our discussion as part of the related work
section 2.4 on "Eﬃcient reuse of situations", where we discussed that
trying to build a complete model for HRA inﬂuence factor models is not
practical.
First-level OASIS taxonomy
A good practice for engineering taxonomies is to have one common "par-
ent" for all other terms. Our root or top-parent is "OASIS Characteristic".
This means that everything deﬁned as a child of OASIS Characteristic is an
inﬂuence factor of OASIS.
The second level of hierarchy can be adopted from GOBI (cf. Chapter 3.2).
In GOBI, we discussed that we have three participants in an HRA: The sys-
tem or vehicle, the environment, and the human. Therefore, we deﬁned as
a ﬁrst level of our taxonomy these participants as concepts for this level.
In other words, if we are talking about a certain HRA situation, we can
subdivide the single facts into contributing characteristics from the vehicle,
the environment, and the human. For the latter we extended or focused
the classiﬁcation more on the fact that humans act or interact with the
system, while the environment is "just there". The taxonomy concepts are
termed accordingly: "VehicleCharacteristic", "EnvironmentalCharacter-
istic", and "InteractionCharacteristic".
Separating these characteristic classes along our GOBI model gives us the
unambiguity and non-redundancy property for these classes because an inﬂu-
ence factor can describe either the vehicle, the environment, or an interaction
aspect. If we take the original FVMs of GOBI, namely system, environment,
and human, this strict separation becomes evident.
More interesting is the reﬁnement of the characteristic classes introduced
above. This is the second level of our taxonomy, which we will discuss in
the next section. Figure 3.9 shows the OASIS root and the ﬁrst two levels
of the characteristic hierarchy.
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OASIS_Characteristic
Vehicle_Characteristic Environmental_Characteristic Interaction_Characteristic
Dynamic_Characteristic Static_Characteristic Usage_Location Natural_Condition Actor Action
Figure 3.9: OASIS’ top levels of influence factors
Second-level OASIS taxonomy
In the following section, we will discuss the second level of our situation
inﬂuence taxonomy. Additionally, we will show the speciﬁc instances we
identiﬁed during our work. Note that we claim that the hierarchy is correct
and complete, but we do not claim the concrete model to be complete. This
model is subject to continued learning and extension.
VehicleCharacteristics are all situation inﬂuences that describe the state
of the vehicle in more detail. Examples are the vehicle's velocity, its acceler-
ation, "clamp 15" on, or having a roof luggage rack installed. For an HRA
it is essential to know how vehicle states can change. Each change of a
vehicle state introduces a possibility to switch to a bad situation (which we
need to be aware of). A vehicle can change its state on duty or oﬀ duty.
With "duty" we mean the intended usage of a system: in our case, driving
the car. Due to the fact that these are easily separable state changes, we
subclassiﬁed "VehicleCharacteristic" into two concepts: static and dynamic
characteristics.
Static characteristics are those that are persistent at least throughout one
driving cycle and change at most oﬀ duty. They describe the setup or conﬁg-
uration of the car in more detail. The setup itself might change the general
physics of the vehicle, such as wind resistance, weight, gravity center, in a
way that aﬀects the behavior of the vehicle (on duty). "Roof luggage rack"
or "trailor attached" are examples of static characteristics. Both change the
general physics of a vehicle and need to be considered in an HRA. Thus, we
use this class to describe general setups in the sense of persistent structural
or functional features. In our industrial case studies, inﬂuence factors in this
class were most of the time mentioned as constraints in the item deﬁnition
and not explicitly mentioned in the situation description. The item (should),
however, describes a functionality and not a physical structure. We therefore
moved this information into our situation ontology as a static characteristic.
We did not identify any further sub-classiﬁcation in this class. Furthermore,
only eight concrete inﬂuence factors were extracted.
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Dynamic characteristics, in contrast, contain inﬂuence factors for describing
the vigorous nature of driving situations, such as the vehicle's velocity and
its current acceleration. Thus, dynamic characteristics may change fast and
often during one driving cycle, i.e., on duty. Additionally, there are dynam-
ics included that may change but do not change as often and fast as the
vehicle's velocity. These describe concrete states, such as "drivers seatbelt
buckled up" or "charging cable connected" (in case of electrically driven
cars). Therefore, one can think of dynamic characteristics as descriptions of
states on the one hand (if discrete) and the deﬁnition of concrete physical
values on the other hand (if continuous).
In the following, we will give some rationales for the next (third) level of
reﬁnement of dynamic characteristics.
X Vehicle State
This is a container class containing state based vehicle inﬂuence factors.
This class includes, for example, the inﬂuence factor "Interior_Open",
referring to the scenario that we describe an opened convertible. Other
example inﬂuence factors are "vehicle_locked" or "battery attached". All
optional "features" described as static characteristics have their concrete
states listed as inﬂuence factors of this sub-class.
X Delta Speed
With this class we can specify the diﬀerence in speed between the vehicle
under consideration and other traﬃc participants. We could theoretically
distinguish lateral and longitudinal delta speeds, but in practice we have
not found a case in which an explicit lateral delta speed was mentioned.
X Distance
Besides the diﬀerence in velocity, the distance to an obstacle or another
traﬃc participant is crucial for deciding on the failure tolerance time.
X Velocity lateral
The lateral velocity is often referred to in highly dynamic situations such
as driving in a curve.
X Velocity longitudinal
The longitudinal velocity is obviously important.
X Acceleration lateral
Besides the lateral velocity, the lateral acceleration is often used in vehicle
dynamics to reason about the stability of the vehicle.
X Acceleration longitudinal
The longitudinal acceleration is obviously important.
X Steering Angle
The steering angle expresses the drivers wish to drive a curve. It can be
found in many situation descriptions of HRAs, but one has to be careful
not to confuse the steering angle with the curve radius of the street.
The latter describes the actual path the vehicle should take, whereas the
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steering angle describes only the driver's projection and might diﬀer from
the actual path driven (due to drifting).
The above classiﬁcation was evaluated in industrial case studies and auto-
motive projects and a list of initial subclasses and a concrete set of inﬂuence
factors were introduced. While the separation into "on and oﬀ duty" intro-
duces unambiguity and non-redundancy in theory, we experienced that in
practice there are still borderline cases. The snapshot shown as Figure 3.10
shows the subclass "Vehicle State" as a dynamic characteristic. This class
includes, for example, the state of "Clamp 15". Clamp 15 refers to the
state of whether the car is operational or not (kind of "ignition"). Thus,
one could argue that if clamp 15 is oﬀ, the car is by deﬁnition in oﬀ-duty
mode. While this is true, it is still misleading because a parked vehicle is
"on duty" as well: The brakes have to hold the car! Clamp 15 is therefore
dynamic throughout the vehicle's duty cycle. The other diﬀerentiating as-
pect is the physical implication. As discussed above, static characteristics
change the general setup and the physical conﬁguration of the car. Dynamic
characteristics might express physical characteristics as well, but these are
situation-dependent physical values, such as Acceleration, Velocity, Delta
Speed.
Another lesson learned is that we need to distinguish features and their
state or usage. One example is the "feature" of being a "convertible". Be-
ing a convertible is a static characteristic because it deﬁnes a general vehicle
setup. The state of being "converted" in the sense that the roof is open is,
however, a dynamic characteristic! In this sense we could include "Clamp15"
as a feature in the static characteristics and keep the inﬂuence factors clamp
15 on/oﬀ in the dynamic characteristics. Due to the fact that every car has
a "Clamp15", it does not really make sense to include this in the static
characteristics (it would be included in all situation descriptions!).
OASIS_Characteristic
Vehicle_Characteristic
Dynamic_Characteristic Static_Characteristic
Vehicle_State Delta_Speed Distance Velocity_lat Velocity_long Acceleration_lat Acceleration_long Steering_Angle
Passenger_Airbag Clamp_15 Battery_System_State Engine
Figure 3.10: OASIS’ Vehicle Characteristics classes
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EnvironmentalCharacteristics contain all situation inﬂuences that are part
of the context of the vehicle. Thus, the environmental characteristics de-
scribe the situation surrounding the vehicle in more detail. Thus, if one
wants to express a driving situation such as "approaching a congestion on
a highway in winter with ice", the context information are: "congestion",
"highway", "winter", and "ice". One important aspect of HRA situations
is their likelihood. To determine the likelihood of a situation, we reason
about all inﬂuence factors and their dependent likelihood. Some inﬂuence
factors are more likely if we already included others. If we have "driving
at 150km/h" already, it is very likely that we are driving on a highway,
for example. During our analysis of situations of industrial case studies, we
discovered, however, that some (environmental) inﬂuence factors are not
dependent on any other inﬂuence factor classes. The class we are talking
about are natural phenomena. We separated these inﬂuence classes into
their own class "Natural Condition". The advantage of doing this is that,
by deﬁnition, all inﬂuence factors in this class are independent (from other
classes). Note that these inﬂuence factors can, of course, depend on them-
selves. The advantage of being independent lies in the situation assessment.
If we take, for example, the inﬂuence factor "ice" and say that ice occurs
during around 2-3% of the year, we could derive an exposure reduction of 2
orders of magnitude (roughly). Due to the independence we could now take
every other situation Sit with the respective exposure value, let's say E3.
By adding the inﬂuence factor "ice" we can mathematically determine the
exposure of the new situation, Sit ∪ {ice}, being 3 - 2 = 1 (E1).
Besides "Natural Conditions", which are independent of Interaction- and
Vehicle-Characteristics, there are environmental inﬂuence factors that are
not independent. "Street type" or the current "traﬃc situation" are, for ex-
ample, certainly not independent of the likelihood of the vehicle's "velocity".
One commonality of all these dependent environmental inﬂuence factors is
that these are all man-made and the likelihood of their usage/encounter
depends on the purpose and the setup of vehicle.
The diﬀerentiation into purely natural, independent, and man-made depen-
dent environmental inﬂuence factors makes these classes disjoint and there-
fore unambiguous and non-redundant. We termed the two classes "Natural
Condition" and "Usage Location".
We introduced Natural Conditions to capture all natural phenomena. The
rationale is that all purely natural things are independent of almost all other
inﬂuence factors. Nature creates an eﬀect and humans can try to compensate
for the eﬀect, but cannot avoid their occurrence. Thus, the inﬂuence factor
is there, independent of other vehicle-speciﬁc inﬂuence factors. For example,
one cannot stop the weather from being cold, but one can heat the vehicle.
Note that one could infer some knowledge, such as if the heat is on, the
probability of the weather being cold is high. This is, however, a probabilistic
issue. The probability of the weather being cold is generally independent of
the heating system being on! The basic natural issues described in this class
are time, season, and weather. All of these cannot be inﬂuenced by humans.
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OASIS_Characteristic
Environmental_Characteristic
Natural_Condition
Temperature Underground_Condition Brightness Radiation Precipitation Time_Of_Day Season
Figure 3.11: OASIS’ Environmental Characteristics classes branch "Natural Condition"
In the following list, we will give some rationales for the subclasses we
selected for "Natural Condition".
X Temperature
The environmental temperature is important for deriving potential haz-
ards, such as overheating of the engine if the temperature is too hot, or
reduced grip if the temperature is too low
X Underground condition
The condition of the underground is obviously important. However, as
subclass of natural condition this class contains those inﬂuence factors
that are inﬂuencing the underground purely natural. One possible subclass
could be natural coverage, such as foliage or ice.
X Brightness
Brightness was included for two reasons: 1) is is important for the sight
of the driver and 2) it is important for many driving assistance systems.
Brightness was, for example, used in a case study to express glaring eﬀects
that could disturb or distract the driver or other traﬃc participants.
X Radiation
Radiation was mentioned only once in the case studies. It has only one
inﬂuence factor "UV radiation", which was used to describe situations
where camera-based systems might be disturbed. Other important radi-
ations might be possible, such as electro-magnetic radiation.
X Precipitation
Precipitation is one of the "classic" environmental parameters. It contains
everything which physically/materially falls down on the vehicle. Typical
precipitations are rain, sleet, and snow.
X Time of day
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Time of day was included due to two aspects: 1) The time of day implies
a certain brightness and 2) it can be used to reason about the vigilance
of humans.
X Season
The season was included because it describes a general setup. If we start in
a "winter"-situation for example, we already have many concrete aspects
in mind, such as "ice", "cold", and "dark". Stating a season does not
speciﬁcally deﬁne a situation, but reduces the set and the mental picture
of a situation.
For Usage Location we could extract the following subconcepts from the
industrial case studies: "Street type", "Surrounding Area", "Traﬃc Con-
trol Element", and "Traﬃc Situation". "Congestion" is obviously a "Traﬃc
Situation", "Highway" belongs to the class "Street type", and "Pedestrian
Crossing" is a "Traﬃc Control Element". The class "Surrounding Area"
does not describe the context in general, but more global aspects of a sce-
nario, such as "Charging Station", "Garage", or "Conservation Area".
OASIS_Characteristic
Environmental_Characteristic
Usage_Location
Traffic_Situation Street_type Pavement Surrounding_Area Traffic_Control_Element
Figure 3.12: OASIS’ Environmental Characteristics classes branch "Usage Location"
In the following list, we will give some rationales for the subclasses we
selected for "Usage Location".
X Traﬃc Situation
Traﬃc situation is another "classic" sub-class. It describes other traﬃc
participants and their movement. Typical inﬂuence factors are: "conges-
tion" or "stop-and-go".
X Street Type
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With the street type we describe the general class of the street. The
class of a street implies many other inﬂuence factors. "Highway", is for
example a inﬂuence factor in this class: By stating "Highway" we usually
imply high velocity and no pedestrians.
X Pavement
The pavement is important because it describes the direct contact be-
tween the vehicle (wheels) and the environment. This signiﬁcantly inﬂu-
ences typical controllability actions, such as braking.
X Surrounding Area
The surrounding area is another class which gives us a big picture, but
seldomly details. Thus, it sets up a common coarse-grained situation
frame, which needs to be detailed further. Due to the fact that talking
about the surrounding area is quite common, we included this class in
the ontology. Typical inﬂuence factors are: "city area", "residential area",
"parking lot".
X Traﬃc Control Element
Traﬃc control elements are all elements that somehow inﬂuence the ﬂow
of the traﬃc. A crossing or a traﬃc light, for example, are elements forcing
a vehicle to stop (if the light is red).
InteractionCharacteristics complete the set of ﬁrst-level inﬂuence factors
by including the human. We named the class "InteractionCharacteristics"
because not only humans directly, but other vehicles (driven by humans
or machines) might also interact with the system as well. Thus, everyone
somehow contributing active inﬂuences to a situation is in the Interaction-
Characteristics class. A (partial) situation such as "driver is overtaking in
spite of oncoming traﬃc" is purely an interaction scenario containing the
inﬂuence factors: "driver", "overtake", and "oncoming traﬃc".
Interactions always contain interacting participant and the kind of interac-
tion, a kind of eﬀect. The terms usually used are action and actors. We there-
fore sub-classiﬁed the InteractionCharacteristics into "Action" and "Actor".
These classes are obviously disjoint and therefore yield the properties of be-
ing unambiguous and non-redundant.
The class "Action" describes the usage of a vehicle. The expected usage of a
vehicle includes, of course: "Drive", "Park", "Accelerate". These we termed
"Standard Usage" because this class contains all the normally expected
usage scenarios one would think of. Besides these primary use cases, however,
we identiﬁed a secondary class of use-cases as part of the industrial case
studies. We named it "Service Usage". It comprises all maintenance and
repair actions one can think of.
The following list gives further rationales for the two sub-classes introduced
above.
X Service Usage
68
SAHARA - a Structured Approach for Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessments
OASIS_Characteristic
Interaction_Characteristic
Actor Action
Traffic_Participant Operator Passenger Passerby Standard_Usage Service_Usage
Figure 3.13: OASIS’ Interaction Characteristic’s classes
Service usages describe special cases of actions. Special for "safety" be-
cause one can argue with certain assumptions regarding the actors, such
as trained personnel. Another "special" aspect is that there are currently
discussions about whether a "workshop" scenario is covered by ISO 26262
at all.
X Standard Usage
These are the regular "maneuvers" an actor can do with a car. He can
"honk", "steer", "accelerate", etc.
In terms of "Actors", we subdivided the class into persons who are inside the
vehicle or are directly concerned with the vehicle and other persons in the
proximity of the vehicle. The classes of persons who are strongly related to
the vehicle are the "Operator"s and "Passengers" of the car. The operator
is, of course, the ﬁrst instance that directly inﬂuences the vehicle's behavior
in regular situations as well as in exceptional situations, e.g., though con-
trollability actions. The other classes of actors are "Passerby" and "Traﬃc
Participant". Both classes are characterized by the fact that they either con-
tribute sudden (hazardous) actions, and/or are endangered. The diﬀerence
is the involvement in traﬃc. A passerby is not directly taking part in traﬃc,
whereas a traﬃc participant (obviously) participates in traﬃc.
In the following, we will give some rationales for the sub-classes we deﬁned
for "Actor".
X Operator
The default operator is, of course, the "driver", but for many commission
issues, the case that "no driver" is present is important as well. Addi-
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tionally, we need to express the expertise of workshop personnel (if we
want to argue with that). Thus, this class contains an inﬂuence factor
"mechanic". Overall, this class contains all active and directly inﬂuencing
actors.
X Passenger
The passengers can directly and indirectly inﬂuence the vehicle. The main
diﬀerence is that they are not the main actor OR (in HRA situations) do
not act as expected. One secondary vehicle action is to open a window.
An example of unexpected behavior is a seatbelt being unfastened or a
dog suddenly barking or a child romping.
X Traﬃc Participant
Similar to the active or direct and indirect passengers/operators, other
traﬃc participants can be directly active or indirectly important. A traﬃc
participant can be an obstacle to which the driver needs to react. An-
other possibility is that the traﬃc participant actively changes the braking
distance by accelerating or and by performing steering actions to avoid
a collision. We state that all traﬃc participants actively inﬂuence the
vehicle or the behavior of the operator.
X Passerby
A passerby, in contrast, usually does not have a direct inﬂuence, but an
indirect one by distracting the driver. A passerby could also be the victim
of harm.
The third-level classes we presented for all second-level classes are based
on industrial case studies of HRAs and were extracted from around 300
situation descriptions. These situation descriptions led to a total amount of
around 200 concrete inﬂuence factors. We do not list every inﬂuence factor
here, but would like to give an impression of the inﬂuence factor distribution
into classes.
Figure 3.14 therefore shows how many concrete inﬂuence factors are in the
ﬁrst- and second-level classes. Note that the sum of the second-level gives
the respective ﬁrst-level value.
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Figure 3.14: Influence factor instances in OASIS’ ontology
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3.3.3 Domain Knowledge Integration - the Ontology
In the previous chapter, we introduced our OASIS classiﬁcation of inﬂuence
factors as a taxonomy. In this section, we introduce the missing piece needed
to turn a taxonomy into an ontology: the grammar. The grammar's purpose
is to deﬁne how the vocabulary of a taxonomy can be used in a certain
domain. We are in the domain of HRA situation deﬁnition and assessment
and our goal is therefore to provide a means for capturing domain knowledge
on the one hand, and, on the other hand use this knowledge to support the
safety engineer in the task of assessing a situation's exposure.
As part of the last section, we already identiﬁed the need for a unifying rela-
tion. Additionally, we discussed the possibility of automatically determining
the exposure if we have a situation and adding only an independent inﬂuence
factor. If we want to achieve this for dependent inﬂuence factors, we need
to know the factors of dependency. This dependency usually results in an
adaptation of the exposure value. However, this is domain knowledge and
needs to be captured in our model. An extreme case of this exposure value
adaptation is if two inﬂuence factors are disjoint, meaning that they cannot
occur together (or at least that such an occurrence is highly unlikely). All
situations comprising both inﬂuence factors are obviously not very useful
and can be removed from the situation knowledge base.
Thus, the fundamental challenge is to model dependencies among inﬂuence
factors (which express domain knowledge) to reason about their dependent
likelihood. We evaluated whether we can use Bayesian networks for calcu-
lating the resulting dependent likelihood, but due to the fact that Bayesian
networks are directed and acyclic, they were not appropriate for our ap-
proach. We would have to create a directed acyclic graph of dependencies
of inﬂuence factors, which does not reﬂect the nature of inﬂuence factors.
Other approaches, like Conditional Random Fields, allow cyclic dependen-
cies, but require complete domain knowledge. This is in our case not practical
and not possible to model. Therefore, we need a more lightweight possibility
to capture domain knowledge. Due to the constraint of incomplete domain
knowledge, we analyzed what kind of knowledge can be expected to be en-
tered by experts. We came to the conclusion that we can limit our model
to capturing pairwise dependencies of inﬂuence factors only. The alternative
would have been to model dependencies of sets of inﬂuence factors as well.
Besides the observation that this knowledge is hard to get, from a practical
point it is challenging to enter all the domain knowledge because the higher
the order of the sets of inﬂuence factors, the more sets we can build and
therefore the more dependencies we would have to deﬁne. That is why we
limited ourselves to the "simple" dependency of two inﬂuence factors.
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Our approach - a trade-oﬀ between theory and practice
The dependency between two inﬂuence factors inﬂuences the exposure value
(as already discussed above). If we would like to formalize/capture this
change in exposure, we can structure the way the inﬂuence takes place into
three cases:
1. There is no change of the exposure (of a situation) if we add a dependent
inﬂuence factor to the situation. In this case, the dependency describes
the above mentioned uniﬁcation.
2. Independent of the value of the exposure of the situation, if we add a de-
pendent inﬂuence factor, the combined situation becomes highly unlikely.
In this case, the dependency describes the disjoint property discussed
above.
3. The dependency changes the exposure value of a situation. The addition
of an inﬂuence factor can only make the situation more speciﬁc and thus,
the change is limited to a reduction of the exposure value.
Please remember, in ISO 26262 "exposure" is one of the three HRA assess-
ment parameters. It can hold values from E0 to E4 and each step can be
thought of as an increase of one order of magnitude in likelihood (compare
the state-of-the-art discussion as well).
In order to formalize the impact on the exposure value of our domain knowl-
edge capturing relations, we deﬁned a functional notation for exposure:
exposure : SituationSet −→ {E0, E1, E2, E3, E4}, with
SituationSet = P (OASISCharacteristic)
(OASISCharacteristic denotes the set of all inﬂuence factors in OASIS.)
We identiﬁed three basic relations that allow us to capture domain-
knowledge in OASIS. The relations are depicted in Figure 3.15 and will be
explained in more detail in the following:
1. Imply: Xa⇒ Y
The implication of characteristics has the semantics that if we have a
situation containing Xa, then Y is implicitly included in the situation
as well. Additionally, we can observe that the exposure value does not
change if "Y" is (explicitly) included or not. An example of the charac-
teristics implication is:
”driving”⇒ ”V ehicleSpeed > 0km/h”
Given this implication, the following holds:
Exposure (SIT ∪ {”driving”})
= Exposure (SIT ∪ {”driving”, ”V ehicleSpeed > 0km/h”})
where SIT is a set of characteristics not containing ”driving” or
”V ehicleSpeed > 0km/h” Please note that similar to the common
deﬁnition of an implication, this relation is unidirectional! In ”a” ⇒ ”b”
it adds only information to "a"; "b" is not aﬀected by this relation!
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Figure 3.15: Knowledge capturing relations in OASIS
2. Exclude: Xc¬Y
Means that the concomitance of two characteristics does not make sense.
If one were to assess the exposure of two characteristics with the exclude-
relation, the result would always be E0 (meaning unlikely).
An outside temperature of 50◦C and ice on the road, for example, is very
unlikely. Thus, given:
”ice”¬”50◦C”
the following always holds:
Exposure (SIT ∪ {”ice”, ”50◦C”}) = E0
Please note that this relation is bidirectional, meaning the characteristics
related to "exclude" are mutually exclusive!
3. Inﬂuence: Xb
red=x−−−−→ Y
The inﬂuence relation just states that the probability of Y depends on
the existence of Xb. It is, for example, quite probable that a car driving
on a highway has a vehicle speed of >100km/h. A car driving in the
city, however, does not usually reach a speed of >100km/h. How much
the relation inﬂuences the probability is expressed with an "exposure re-
duction" parameter. One could, for example, deﬁne that, given a certain
probability of driving up a mountain pass, this probability is reduced by
two orders of magnitude if one includes the traﬃc situation "stop and
go":
”mountainpass”
red=2−−−−→ ”stopandgo”
With the above-deﬁned relations, we introduced the possibility of deﬁning
relations between concrete inﬂuence factors. While this makes sense in the-
ory, in practice it is quite laborious to think about each combination of
inﬂuence factors. In order to reduce this number, we did a pre-analysis on
the concept or class level to decide in general whether it makes sense to
analyze concomitances of inﬂuence factors of these classes.
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If we take, for example the classes "Static Characteristic" and "Natural
Condition", the question is whether we can deﬁne one or more relations
between these two classes. Is it possible to deﬁne probability dependencies of
"Natural Conditions" from "Static Characteristics"? This is obviously
not the case: Neither can a static characteristic, such as "roof luggage
rack", change the probability of certain weather conditions, nor can the
weather (signiﬁcantly) inﬂuence the setup of a car. The classes "Action"
and "Usage location", in contrast, have obvious dependencies: "High-
way" and "Driving backwards" is obviously not likely. Thus, between our
identiﬁed relevant classes of characteristics there are certain argumentative
dependencies with respect to concomitance probability.
In order to grab the domain knowledge at the conceptual level (rather than
at the inﬂuence factor level), we created an inﬂuence analysis matrix, which
is depicted in Table 3.1.
The idea of the table is to systematically analyze the inﬂuence of each
second-level class on all other second-level classes. At the far left of the
ﬁgure are several blocks containing the general OASIS classes. In the middle,
each (second-level) class appears again next to one block. Each entry in the
left block is analyzed for potential inﬂuences on the characteristic in the
middle. The rationale can then be found on the right. The light orange
rationale cells are concomitances that are independent, meaning it does not
make sense to deﬁne any relations between inﬂuence factors from these
classes. An example of this would be our example of natural conditions and
static vehicle characteristics. If the cell is white, however, then there is a
dependency. The text in the cells gives a rationale for the color.
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Table 3.1: Influence factor dependency analysis table
Rational
Static Characteristic
Dynamic Characteristic
Natural Condition
Usage Location
Interaction
Action
Actor
Static Characteristic Static Ch. can influence the likelihood for certain dynamic 
characteristics. Pulling a trailer and driving more than 130 km/h is 
not very likely (against the law).
Dynamic Characteristic
Natural Condition Natural conditions can influence vehicle dynamics! Example: Ice 
and slip (µ)
Usage Location The usage location obviously influences the probability of dynamic 
vehicle characteristics
Interaction
Action Actions and dynamic characteristics are strongly dependent!
Actor Actors are mainly dependent on the usage location. The usage 
location again restricts the dynamic characteristics! Thus there is 
only an indirect influence.
Influencer -> Influencee
System
Environment
Static Characteristics is a pre-set system layout and cannot be 
influenced/changed. Therefore there is no influence from any 
other characteristic to Static Characteristics.
Static Characteristic
Dynam
ic Characteristic
System
Environment
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Table 3.1: Influence factor dependency analysis table (continued)
Rational
Static Characteristic
Dynamic Characteristic
Natural Condition
Usage Location The usage location cannot influence natural conditions
Interaction
Action
Actor
Static Characteristic Static Characteristics such as pulling a trailor might reduce the 
probability for a certain usage location, but this is mainly due to 
the fact that static characteristics influence dynamic 
characteristics.
Dynamic Characteristic Dynamic characteristics obviously influence the probability for 
usage locations, while the logic is however the other way round. 
Dependent on the usage location one would restrict the dynamics 
of the vehicle.
Natural Condition Natural conditions do not (significantly) influence the probability 
for usage locations.
Usage Location
Interaction
Action There is a strong dependency between interaction scenarios and 
usage locations! (Obviously)
Actor There is a dependency between usage location and active objects. 
The direction is however the other way round, usage location 
implies/influences active objects. 
Influencer -> Influencee
System
Environment
System
The system cannot influence nature.
Interacting with the system does not change/influence nature!
Environment
N
atural Condition
U
sage Location
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Table 3.1: Influence factor dependency analysis table (continued)
Rational
Static Characteristic It is possible that certain static characteristics change the 
probability for usage scenarios.
Dynamic Characteristic Dynamic characteristics influence/restrict the usage scenarios. 
Example: Acceleration >= 0 and parking of the vehicle does not 
make sense.
Natural Condition Natural conditions do not (significantly) change the probability of 
interaction scenarios!
Usage Location There is a strong dependency between usage location and 
interaction scenarios! (Obviously)
Interaction
Action
Actor There is a dependency between usage and active objects. The 
direction is however the other way round: usage 
implies/influences active objects. 
Static Characteristic Actors are restricted by the usage characteristic not directly by 
static system characteristics.
Dynamic Characteristic The probability of an actor being present is not independent from 
dynamic characteristics! The chain of argumentation/logic is 
however that Actor depend on Actions based on those certain 
dynamic characteristics are possible or not. Therefore the 
influence of dyn. char. on actors exists only indirect. 
Natural Condition Natural conditions do not (significantly) change the probability of 
an actor being present
Usage Location There is a strong dependency between usage location and actors 
being present! (Obviously)
Interaction
Action An Action influences obviously the presence of Actors!
Actor
Influencer -> Influencee
System
ActorEnvironment
System
Environment Action
The analysis result discussed above can now be used to derive relations
between the (second-level) classes of OASIS. This was done by analyzing
each white cell on the right (in Table 3.1) and assigning possible relations.
The result of this analysis is depicted in Figure 3.16. The kind of relation
is deﬁned by a short notation: an ordered set, or tuple. The ﬁrst element
refers to an "Inﬂuence", the second to an "Exclude", and the third to
an "Imply" relationship. Hence ” (I,_, I) ” means that "Inﬂuence" and
"Imply" relations are possible, but "Exclude" relations cannot be used in
this case.
While all of these relations are captured in the ontology, inputting data into
an ontology is time-consuming. It becomes evident that ontologies are not
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Figure 3.16: Influence factor class dependency graph
made for modelers (cf. ﬁrst section of 3.3). Our claim is to keep an eye on
practicability, which is why we created a modeling frontend for the deﬁnition
of ontology models and especially the modeling of inﬂuence factor relations.
The domain knowledge modeler - a meta-model approach
In section 3.3.1, we discussed the diﬀerence between ontologies and meta-
models. The main diﬀerence is that meta-models deﬁne a concrete grammar
of how to build models while ontologies only deﬁne valid concepts (without
construction information). For HRA applications, we want to use the situ-
ation information; thus we do not need construction instructions. However,
if we want the domain expert to update the ontology and integrate knowl-
edge, we have to provide an interface he/she can easily and eﬃciently work
with. Therefore, we provide a modeling frontend for specifying the domain-
knowledge-preserving relations introduced above!
For the realization of the modeling frontend we used an industry-strength
UML modeling tool (MagicDraw) and customized the tool for our needs.
The customization was done by wrapping the modeling-relevant parts in a
meta-model. The necessary modeling elements are the structural elements
of the ontology and the relations between instances of this ontology. The
meta-model is shown in Figure 3.17:
It can be seen in the meta-model that we used the UML type "Package"
to represent our ontology concepts, implemented as a specialization named
"OASISConcept". This represents the notion of being a kind of container
for similar HRA inﬂuence factors. Furthermore, it supports the nesting of
packages, thus, the building of hierarchies of packages, which is, of course,
helpful to represent our ontology.
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Figure 3.17: Meta-model (extension) for HRA domain knowledge modeling
The concrete instances, "OASISCharacteristic"s, were derived from the
UML type "Node". The decision to use the "Node" type was mainly based
on optical/graphical reasons because a "Node" is usually represented as a
block, whereas a class is a rectangle with compartments (for attributes and
methods). The visual simplicity and the analogy to "building blocks", which
are our inﬂuence factors for HRA situations, was another factor contributing
to our decision.
Figure 3.18 shows an example of the OASISConcept hierarchy and OA-
SISCharacteristic. Maybe most important is the class "OASISRelation",
Figure 3.18: Example of OASISConcept and OASISCharacteristic modeling
which is a specialization of the UML type "Association". In our case, this is
an abstract class, with the three speciﬁc reﬁnements "Imply", "Inﬂuence",
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and "Exclude". The class "Inﬂuence" additionally has an attribute "expo-
sureReduction" of the type "int". With this we can model an attributed
association and use the exposureReduction attribute to deﬁne the inﬂuence
strength introduced above.
With our meta-model it is possible to represent all (HRA-essential) informa-
tion in an UML tool. To actually use the deﬁned relations in a UML tool,
it is necessary to import the ontology into the tool. Due to the "Package"
type, this looks organized similarly to the ontology editor. Figure 3.19 shows
a comparison of the hierarchy representation in the ontology modeler on the
left and the UML tool on the right.
Figure 3.19: Comparison of hierarchy representations in an ontology tool and a UML tool
The usage of the meta-model for its purpose of modeling relations is shown
in the subsequent ﬁgures.
Figure 3.20 shows the dependencies between inﬂuence factors of the classes
"Street type" and "Surrounding Area". Thus, it is an inﬂuence factor
relation within one second-level class (within Usage Location). Note that we
layout the model so that "Street type" is in the middle and "Surrounding
Area" is both above and under "Street type". We use the above represen-
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Figure 3.20: Dependency of influence factors "Street type" and "Surrounding Area"
tation to model the "Inﬂuence" relation and the lower model representation
to model the "Exclude" relations.
This is, however, only a convenient way to keep things clearly separated. It
is neither enforced nor restricted by the tool.
Figure 3.21 represents an example of the "Imply" relation by showing the
dependency modeling of "Operator" and "Street type".
Due to the simplicity of this case, we used a simple layout where the inﬂu-
enced class "Operator" appears only above the inﬂuencing class "Street
type". The green association lines (the four lines going to the driver) are
"Imply" relations, the others (the red ones) are "Exclude" relations.
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Figure 3.21: Dependency of influence factors "Street type" and "Operator"
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3.3.4 Situation deﬁnition process
In the previous sections of this chapter, we discussed how HRA situations can
be formally represented and how their building blocks, the inﬂuence factors,
are classiﬁed and structured in an ontology. Additionally, we have shown how
one can capture domain knowledge as relations between inﬂuence factors.
The purpose of modeling situations, however, is to use them in a concrete
HRA application. Thus, the remaining question is how a safety engineer can
use the ontology in order to deﬁne HRA-relevant situations.
The requirement 7.4.2.1.1 in ISO 26262-3:2011 is: "The operational sit-
uations and operating modes in which an item's malfunctioning behavior
will result in a hazardous event shall be described, both for cases when the
vehicle is correctly used and when it is incorrectly used in a foreseeable way."
It is stated that one should create an exhaustive list of HRA situations
(including operating modes). Formally speaking, the demand is that all
suﬃcient situations should be created. A suﬃcient situation means in this
context that the situation in concomitance with "an item's malfunction-
ing behavior will result in a hazardous event". The additional requirement
7.4.4.2 states:
"It shall be ensured that the chosen level of detail of the list of operational
situations does not lead to an inappropriate lowering of the ASIL of the
corresponding safety goals".
This requirement adds the extension that the list should only contain a level
of detail that is required to distinguish diﬀerent hazardous situations. It adds
the aspect of being necessary to the set of inﬂuence factors of a situation
deﬁnition.
The demand is to deﬁne for each hazard a complete set of HRA situations,
where each situation contains suﬃcient and (only) necessary inﬂuence fac-
tors!
The safety expert has to make the decision about the suﬃciency and ne-
cessity of inﬂuence factors for each situation. SAHARA can help the safety
engineer by guiding him in this deﬁnition process. This section will discuss
this guidance by introducing a situation deﬁnition process.
We structure this section into three parts. First, we will transfer the so-
called "Meta-Model" approach (for precise communication) by Grinder and
Bandler [Gri76] to the elicitation of situations. This unveils pitfalls and basic
principles for the deﬁnition of situations (for HRA). Afterwards we will apply
this to HRA situation models and propose a speciﬁc process for the deﬁni-
tion of HRA situations. We will ﬁnalize this section by providing a running
example showing the situation deﬁnition with OASIS.
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Precise mental models - Fundamentals
In GOBI, we presented a conceptual model describing an interaction of
participants of an HRA explicitly. A safety engineer has a similar model in
mind when he performs the task of an HRA. The purpose of this section
is to understand and describe the way a safety engineer thinks or should
think to come up with a good concrete model of an interaction sequence of
the FVMs. The main process of handling information mentally, it to cluster
and chunk elements [Mil56]. For us this means that a picture (the model)
should be built, starting from coarse-grained, general information pieces and
ending with more reﬁned ones. In the case of situation deﬁnitions, we need
to set up the big picture ﬁrst, before adding details.
One experience we made during our industrial case studies is that some
experts "jump" to conclusions and omit the deﬁnition of concrete situations.
It seems to them that the information is not "necessary". The reasons for
that are the two mental processes "deletion" and "generalization". These
phenomena are well-known in psychology [Ban75], as well as in requirements
engineering [Rup04]:
− "Deletion" is in most cases a mental presupposition. This means that
the expert omits details because they are implicitly clear or obvious to
him. For the HRA situation deﬁnition "deletion" means that an expert
(intentionally) omits relevant details. The "deletion"-case we found most
often is to omit concrete details of a situation and state only physical
characteristics. Physics is good because it is precise and concrete, but by
focusing on and thinking in the physical failure world, one is often not
open for other inﬂuences and therefore for new situations (with another
physical eﬀect). The danger of "deletion" is that potentially necessary
inﬂuence factors are not considered.
One example of deletion is that the car is "locked". A situation from
an industrial case study in the context of the parking brake revealed the
situation where the car is "locked" and the car is parked on a hill. The
scenario was that the parking brake fails and the car starts to move. This
is a valid case. But the implicit assumption (the occurrence of deletion)
was that the expert implied that there is no one in the car and that no
one can quickly jump into the car in order to control the situation. The
implication was that locking a car means that there is no one inside the car
or close to the car anymore. Not stating this explicitly is a case of deletion.
Deletion often happens due to inherent domain knowledge. If we ﬁgure
out deletion cases, we can use the OASIS relation "imply" to explicitly
capture this in the ontology. Once this information is captured, "deletion"
occurrences (in this particular case) are handled by the ontology.
− "Generalization" refers to incorrect abstraction. While abstraction helps
to handle complexity, incorrect abstraction means that we make a mis-
take by not considering enough details. For the HRA situation deﬁnition,
"generalization" means that an expert (unintentionally) omits relevant
details. The "generalization" case we found most often is to abstract
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from details and therefore make the set of situations incomplete or the
aﬀected situations not suﬃcient.
An example of the generalization issue from an industrial case study is
related to the (active) power steering system. The discussion was about
omission failures of the system. I.e., the vehicle does not apply a steer-
ing angle upon request. Many concrete situations were discussed, such
as "driving/entering a curve on a highway", "cornering in the city", or
"driving on a winding road on a mountain pass". In the analysis, all this
was reduced to the single inﬂuence factor "curved road". While the pri-
mary common aspect is indeed a curved road, the incorrect abstraction
was to omit the fact that the car needs to be driving! If it is parked on
a curved road, a steering omission is not critical. Thus, in this case the
intention to focus on the essential aspect by generalizing or abstracting
from concrete situations made the resulting situation not suﬃcient. One
could argue that this is also a case of deletion, in which the implication of
"curved road" to "is moving" is deleted. However, this is wrong because
the implication is not generally true. What one might have in mind is
an implication (and therefore a "deletion") of "all considered situations
imply moving". The logic is that:
"all considered situations"
imply
=⇒ "curved road" and
"all considered situations"
imply
=⇒ "moving"
The wrong assumption is that based on this knowledge, the conclusion
is drawn that:
"curved road"
imply
=⇒ "moving"
The basic principles we should integrate into our situation deﬁnition process
are therefore:
− Start with the big picture by stating coarse-grained information
− Be speciﬁc! State even "common" knowledge/sense.
− Be complete! Do not take "short-cuts" through abstraction.
These principles were the fundamental things we considered when we devel-
oped the HRA situation deﬁnition process presented in the next section.
The HRA situation deﬁnition process
Based on the principles introduced above, we deﬁned our situation creation
process as shown in Figure 3.22. We will explain each step and give some
ideas and rationales for the proposed process as well as lessons learned during
the development.
Step 1:
As stated above, the assumption is that we have identiﬁed a concrete item
failure or more generally a hazard.
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Figure 3.22: HRA situation definition process
Step 2:
Sometimes a failure needs some vehicle conﬁguration/setup to transition
into a hazard or it simply does not make sense to think about the functional
failure because the function could not work without a certain vehicle setup.
The driver assistance function "trailor esc", for example, needs a "trailer" as
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a static characteristic in order to make sense (at least for all non-commission
failures). The static characteristics describe a general system structure in
more detail. This aspect is often used to describe variants of systems or
products. Thus, if one is interested in an HRA product line, this would be
the location for deﬁning variation points. Note that HRA product lines are
not in the scope of this thesis.
Step 3:
Once the concrete (static) model of our vehicle is deﬁned and one has the
hazard in mind, it is important to get a clear picture of the surroundings.
In our case, the inﬂuence factors of relevance are the "Usage Location" in-
ﬂuence factors. What is really essential is the coarse-grained "big picture";
thus, one should be careful not to over-specify the usage location at this
point of time. We propose this due to the "necessity" requirement stated
above. Our experience has shown that a good "subclass" to start with for
coarsely deﬁning the usage location is the subclass "Street Type": The num-
ber of street types is limited and everyone has a very clear picture of the
various types of streets in mind. Thus, it constitutes a good "big picture".
Step 3 (left):
As already identiﬁed in the previous section, the "Usage Location" might
have implications on "Action", "Actor", and "Dynamic Characteristic" in-
ﬂuence factors. It is good practice to always maximize the inﬂuence factors
because this prevents "deletion" problems and does not aﬀect exposure (due
to the deﬁnition of the "imply" relation). The expansion of the "implied"
inﬂuence factors is shown on the dashed path to the left of the process
block.
Step 4:
Once the big picture is deﬁned (with "Usage Location" inﬂuence factors),
we propose making the connection between the hazard and the big picture
more explicit. This is done by stating the current maneuver in which the
user or operator is using the vehicle. The rationale for this decision is that
if one mentally pictures the hazard of the vehicle in the usage location, one
usually already has certain maneuvers in mind.
In a previous version of our work, we switched the process steps: deﬁne the
action/maneuver ﬁrst and then integrated the usage location. However, it
turned out that it is easier to imagine a usage location ﬁrst and deﬁne a
maneuver afterwards. If one is "forced" to state a maneuver ﬁrst, he mentally
pictures a usage location and derives the respective maneuver from that. Due
to this reason we switched these steps to the order introduced above.
Step 5:
Up to now we have the system misbehavior (1), with essential system char-
acteristics (2), in a (coarse-grained) environmental setting (3) along with
the intended action (the maneuver) (4). The next step is to go back to the
vehicle and add some dynamics information. In this step, concrete physical
properties of the vehicle are described. These dynamic aspects constitute a
rationale for the harm and are often used as an argument for the severity
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of the harm. This is not too surprising because dynamics are about energy
and energy (mostly kinetic energy) is our "potential source of harm".
Now the situations are almost complete (except for some details). The (po-
tentially) missing details do not substantially change the situation, but per-
fect the situation with respect to the trade-oﬀ between exposure and severity
(and controllability) (as discussed in section 4.2 GOBI). We term the situ-
ations deﬁned up to this step "basic situations".
Step (6→ 7→ 8→ 9):
The polishing process starts with the decision of the expert about whether
the environment, i.e., the coarse-grained surrounding deﬁnition is hazardous
"enough" to be harmful. If this is not the case, he should add necessary
details of the surrounding, but only if these are deﬁnitely necessary for the
harm. The usual approach is to ﬁrst detail the usage location (6) and after-
wards add natural conditions (7).
The next steps are to reduce the controllability or increase the severity. One
can decrease controllability by specifying additional static characteristics of
the vehicle (8). Severity is often related to how people are harmed. We
can add this by adding additional "endangered" actors (9). Especially the
passive, but endangered actors are often forgotten (due to the "deletion"
phenomenon). In order to make the situation consistent (and complete), one
should check if all relevant actors are included in the situation.
After step (9) it is checked again whether the situation is complete wrt. its
submodalities. If this is not the case, the polishing process (6→ 7→ 8→ 9)
is iterated another time.
Once we leave the decision with a "yes", at the bottom, we have a complete
list of suﬃcient and necessary situations for the hazards under investigation.
In the following section, we present an example application of this process.
This should make it more concrete and tangible.
Evaluation and example: HRA situation deﬁnition
The example is taken from an active power steering case study. The ba-
sic functionality is that one can drive the car "by wire". This means that
the steering requests are purely logical and the actual steering is done by
controlling an actuator (via control software).
Step 1:
The failures we consider in our running example are shown in Figure 3.23.
Step 2:
In the example we do not have static characteristics. One might extend
the features of the active power steering by disabling the active steering if
a trailer is pulled (as a hypothetical case). Then we would add "pulling a
trailer" as a static characteristic in this step. In order to keep the example
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Figure 3.23: Example: Active Power Steering Failures
understandable, we omit this and do not add any static characteristics in
this step.
Step 3:
In step 3, the coarse-grained usage location should be added. Figure 3.24
shows the considered or selected street types relevant in this example.
On top of the ﬁgure, the failures are shown. On the left concrete street
types. The matrix is ﬁlled with "x"s and "o"s. x' on red background deﬁne
unsafe combinations, i.e., situation setups we need to further investigate.
Additionally a question mark on a yellow background is shown. This indicates
that the workshop "location" itself is neither safe nor unsafe per se. In
order to decide its relevance, we have to use a more reﬁned view on the
"workshop". We have to select one of the reﬁned inﬂuence factors. In this
case, the self-steering failure on a roller rig is considered to be dangerous,
whereas being lifted on a hoisting platform is not critical.
Step 3 (left):
In the running example, there are implications on "Action" inﬂuence fac-
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Figure 3.24: Example: Usage-Location selection
tors, on "Actors", and on "Dynamic Characteristic"s inﬂuence factors. Im-
plications of inﬂuence factors can be domain knowledge and captured in
the ontology. Figure 3.25 shows the domain-knowledge we reused from the
ontology. The pre-selection is done completely automatically. Furthermore,
note that due to spatial restrictions, not all maneuvers are shown in this
ﬁgure. The overall number of maneuvers in our ontology is 15.
Figure 3.25: Example: "Action" relations of the selected Usage Locations
The gray cells are combinations of usage locations and maneuvers that do
not make sense or are unlikely to occur. The white cells are either blank (then
we do not have any further domain knowledge about this concomitance),
or ﬁlled with a non-positive value. Those values are the values from the
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exposure reduction introduced above (of the OASIS "inﬂuence" relation).
Driving backwards in the city, for example, is considered to be two orders of
magnitude less likely than all city area situations together (meaning without
restrictions). The default marker is shown by the green background in the
column "Driving Straight". The default marker is similar (but not the same)
as the "imply" relation. It means if nothing else is stated, we should assume
this. Thus, if we do not state a concrete maneuver, one usually (implicitly)
think of "Driving Straight" for the "City Area" for example. This allowed us
to fully automatically reduce the possible number of combinations by 40%
(from 138 to 85).
This pre-selection of possible maneuvers based on OASIS information does,
however, not include information and a concomitance analysis with the haz-
ard or the failure. For our running example this means that we are still in
step (3): identify relevant maneuvers. For the consideration of hazards in the
maneuver selection process, we can reuse GOBI-"knowledge". GOBI helps
us because as part of the failure analysis in GOBI we identiﬁed the physical
implications of failures, meaning the possibly aﬀected physical values. This
can be used to automatically restrict the number of relevant actions. The
automated result is shown in Figure 3.26.Using OASIS (and GOBI) we could
reduce the number of possible combinations (fully automatic) from 138 to
106 relevant combinations.
Figure 3.26: Example: "Action"-preselection due to GOBI’s physics annotation
The cells with green background are "safe" combinations; the physical ra-
tionale is listed in brackets. The "Delayed Steering" hazard, for example,
is not relevant in a "Drive Straight" maneuver because there is no steering
request. The cells with the question mark denote combinations where we
cannot derive any information from the physics annotation. The cells marked
with an "x" are relevant and should be considered. The rationale for this
table is shown in brackets behind the "x".
The next partial step is to integrate the relevant combinations extracted
above into one set of possible/relevant combinations. The automatic calcu-
lation of relevant combinations of hazard, action, and street type, restricted
the set of possible triple concomitances to 52 possibly relevant (out of 756
possible combinations). This is essentially the ﬁnal result of the action anal-
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ysis/description (Step 3). Figure 3.27 shows the result of the action selection
process step.
Figure 3.27: Example: Selection of relevant "Actions"
In the ﬁgure, only the background color changed from white to red. Red
means concomitance not relevant (provably). In this fraction of maneuvers,
or actions the only four relevant concomitances are represented by the com-
bination of the one white cell in the lower part (the failure part) and the four
white cells in the upper part (the usage location part). All other maneuvers
can be proven to be irrelevant.
Step 5:
The next step is to add some vehicle dynamics. In the process presentation
above, we referred to energies to be considered. In our running example, the
energy mostly driving the harm is the vehicle's (longitudinal) velocity. The
annotation of the velocity is shown in Figure 3.28.
The ﬁgure additionally shows the above-mentioned "Actor", which was al-
ready implied by step 4.
With this we have completed the situation deﬁnition. We could enter the
polishing process. But for that we would have to state more assumptions,
and we would need to know more details about the vehicle and its physics.
The process and especially the integration of OASIS and GOBI knowledge
should have become clear in the steps presented above. As stated above,
the further reﬁnement is "tuning".
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Figure 3.28: Example: HRA situations of steering example
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3.4 HEAT - Handy Exposure Assessment Technique
In the previous section, the OASIS section, we presented our formalization
approach of essential inﬂuence factors and their dependencies for deﬁning
HRA situations. The contribution of the previous section was a formalization
approach for operational situations. In this section, we use this formalization
approach and extend it to capture the assessment of operational situations,
the exposure parameter, as well. Figure 3.29 shows the integration of HEAT
with the overall thesis on the one hand and the general structure of this
section on the other hand.
Figure 3.29: Integration overview of HEAT
Besides the formalization of the environment, we identiﬁed as part of section
"2.2 Core Challenges and Goals" another challenge:
6 Structuring of hazard analysis
6 Correctness of situation analysis
! Formalization of operational situations ↪→ 3.3
w Eﬃcient reuse of operational situations
Additionally, as part of the work related to "correctness of situation analysis"
(cf. section 2.4.1), we derived the following ﬁndings, which we will transfer
to the application of eﬃcient reuse of situations.
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1. Based on Ruben Prieto-Diaz' work [PD01] about reuse, we discussed
the two extremes of either building everything we would like to reuse
upfront, or building everything upon demand, starting with an empty set
of reusable items. The ﬁnding of this discussion was that both extremes
are impractical for a reuse approach of HRA situations, and we therefore
proposed a reuse approach that starts oﬀ with an initially ﬁlled set of
essential/basic HRA situations and lets the reuse database grow over
time.
2. One technological ﬁnding we discussed was that case-based reasoning is
highly appropriate for our reuse scenario. The basic idea is to use old cases
and try to derive knowledge (lazily) if a new case comes up [Lea94]. In
our domain, a case is an assessed HRA situation, and the most important
reuse factor is the assessment value.
3. Recio-Garcia presented in [RgDaGc+06] the connection between ontolo-
gies and case-based reasoning. Due to the fact that our inﬂuence factors
are deﬁned in an ontology (cf. OASIS), this ﬁnding ﬁts very well into
our solution approach, and we will reuse his ideas in order to technically
integrate our reuse approach and situation modeling.
As already stated as part of item 2, the essential part in reusing a situation is
not the HRA situation description but, more importantly, the exposure value.
"Exposure assessment" was another challenge we identiﬁed in section "2.2
Core Challenges and Goals":
6 Structuring of risk assessments
6 Hazardous event classiﬁcation
w Exposure assessment
While there is no directly related work for exposure assessments, we dis-
cussed in section "2.4.1 Correctness of situation analysis" the possibilities
for coming up with an exposure value. The results of this discussion were:
1. It is not (practicably) possible to automatically calculate situation expo-
sure values. A safety (and domain) expert always needs to decide on the
exposure values personally. This has technological as well as legal reasons.
2. We can support the decision process of an "exposure assessment" by
providing the safety engineer with similar cases he can base his decision
on (or just backup his decision).
Thus, in this section we present our solution for reusing (essentially the
exposure value of) HRA situations. The solution approach is subdivided into
the following structure, which directly leads to the subsequent structure of
this section:
1. First of all we need a representation of an (assessed) HRA situation. We
therefore introduce an HRA situation model extension of our OASIS inﬂu-
ence factor ontology. This is the subject of section "3.4.1 HRA Situation
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modeling". Note that in that section we will only discuss the elements
of an assessed HRA situation, such as the assessment result (exposure
value); the process for coming up with an exposure value will be deﬁned
in a later section.
2. Once we have a formal representation of HRA situations, we will discuss
the ﬁrst step towards reusing a situation: the retrieval of already existing
situations. We will therefore present a reuse approach that combines on-
tologies and case-based reasoning by deﬁning situation similarity. (Case
similarity is one of the most important aspects in case-based reasoning.)
We will discuss this in section "3.4.2 HRA Situation similarity".
3. Having deﬁned HRA situation similarity, we can apply the case-based
reasoning technique for our fundamental goal of reusing assessed HRA
situations. The reuse process essentially supports the safety/domain ex-
pert in the situation assessment process. How this is actually done is the
subject of section "3.4.3 Exposure Assessment Support".
After reading this section, the reader will know how HRA situations are
represented in our ontology-based approach and, even more importantly,
how he can use this representation to eﬃciently reuse HRA situations and
their exposure assessment result.
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3.4.1 HRA Situation modeling
As described in the previous section, the goal of this section is to deﬁne
the modeling basis for eﬃciently reusing situations, including their exposure
assessment result. The sub-challenges in this section are to (deﬁne and) inte-
grate the concept of "Exposure Assessment Result" while being constrained
by the following two goals:
1. We aim at supporting the safety engineer in the assessment process.
We therefore need to formalize the assessment, thus update our model.
2. Our overall approach SAHARA should be practicably applicable.
We therefore need to consider practical requirements as well.
The status of our model is that we have the concept of inﬂuence factors and
the concept of a situation. While keeping the above-mentioned constraints
in mind, we need to add an exposure level to our concept of "situation".
An easy and straightforward approach would be to introduce an attribute
"exposure level" to a situation with possible values from E0 to E4. On the
one hand, this would be a valid solution if our goal was to conserve only
the exposure value as part of our formalization approach. However, due to
the fact that our goal is to support the safety engineer in his assessment
decision process, the attribute solution has two problems:
1. The exposure value is an implicit concept (as an attribute value) and
therefore makes it hard to reason and automate things related to this
domain concept. This is due to the fact that reasoning in an ontology is
done via concepts and instances, not via attributes of instances. Thus, if
we were to use as an attribute the constraint number 1 from above, a
(semi-) automated assessment would not be possible or we would have
to use a technical workaround.
2. As described above, the determination of an exposure value is a deci-
sion process in which the safety engineer uses and combines information.
Reusing assessment results essentially means reusing the decision process.
By introducing "only" an attribute, we cannot capture the decision pro-
cess appropriately. We need the assessment, or better yet, the assessment
result as an explicit concept that we can equip with information about
the decision process. This is also a demand of the practical applicabil-
ity constraint introduced above, because one piece of information that
is highly relevant in practice is who came up with the assessment result.
Having a concept for that allows us to add attributes to this concept,
such as "CompanyName" and "SafetyEngineer".
Our solution for extending the model is therefore the introduction of two new
concepts: "ExposureLevel" and "AssessmentResult". The "AssessmentRe-
sult" plays the role of connecting an HRA_Situation to an ExposureLevel,
which is the basic requirement we had from a technical HRA viewpoint.
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Figure 3.30 (partially) visualizes the realization in our ontology. In the upper
part of the ﬁgure, one can see the textual deﬁnition of the relations intro-
duced above as axiomatic restrictions on the respective concepts. Note that
the upper left part deﬁnes the relations of the class AssessmentResult, while
the right upper part deﬁnes the ones from HRA_situation. For software en-
gineers who are used to (meta-) modeling in the UML, the way the relations
are deﬁned here might seem strange. However, this is how relations between
concepts are deﬁned in an ontology; the equivalent modeling concept in
UML would be to deﬁne an association. To be precise, the concept used
here is only similar and can be used for our purpose. What is deﬁned in the
ontology are, in fact, anonymous superclasses that the concrete classes have
as parents! An HRA_Situation is, for example, the child of an unnamed class
to which all those instances belong that have some OASIS_Characteristic
deﬁned in their consistsOf relation. Thus the ontology describes things and
relations and states how things are and not how things can be built (cf.
discussion on meta-modeling vs. ontology engineering).
Figure 3.30: OASIS Characteristics extension
Corresponding to the requirements discussed above, the concept of Assess-
mentResult serves the following two purposes:
1. Keeping track of the assessment decision:
AssessmentResult has a relation (called reasoningBasis) to itself (Assess-
mentResult). That allows us to store the information that other Assess-
mentResults were used in the decision process that resulted in another
AssessmentResult. If we provide decision support by presenting similar
situations to the safety engineer, it is interesting to know which of the
presented previous assessments he used. He can mark those and our re-
lation "reasoningBasis" stores this information.
Another important aspect for both practicability and scientiﬁcally is the
maintenance of situation assessments. Over time, situations may be as-
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sessed diﬀerently because new information is available or just because an
old assessment was proven to be incorrect. If the updated information
is used, one should additionally know which situation assessments were
based on the previous result. This information is important because it
might need to be reassessed as well. In safety engineering, an impact
analysis has to be performed for each change of safety-relevant elements.
This tracking and possible re-assessment is exactly such an impact anal-
ysis scenario. With our (simple) relation "reasoningBasis" we can trace
the decision other, process and automatically derive possibly aﬀected as-
sessments.
2. Making our model ﬁt for practice:
This class makes it possible to perform future extensions of the assess-
ment. In an industrial setting and usage of this ontology, it is most
certainly interesting to know who assessed the situation. Thus, having
the concept "AssessmentResult" makes it possible to further reﬁne what
assessment-relevant information is. Even switches to exclude certain as-
sessment results for use in a product line context would be possible.
While we have multiple ideas about which information (of an assessment)
could be additionally relevant in practice, we want to focus on the core
process of an HRA and introduce only scientiﬁcally relevant elements.
We therefore omitted (for example) the deﬁnition of the simple attribute
containing the name of the safety expert who performed the assessment.
In order to make the usage of this model more tangible, we will discuss a
small example in the following. Let's assume we want to assess a situation
that is informally described as:
"Overtake on a highway with a velocity of more than 130km/h and an ac-
celeration of +3m/s2"
The OASIS inﬂuence factors are underlined in the informal description. Ex-
tracting the OASIS ontology fraction of this deﬁnition results in Figure 3.31.
The next step in this example would be to assess the situation and assign an
exposure value as the assessment result. We assume that the assessment re-
sult is the above mentioned and modeled situation (Situation1), E3. Figure
3.32 is showing the modeling of Situation1 along with two more examples
of similar situations (HighwaySituation, HighwayOvertakeSituation) along
with their AssessmentResults (HighwaySituationAssessment, HighwayOver-
takeSituationAssessment). The assessment results were used in this exam-
ple (as a reasoning basis) to justify the exposure assessment of Situation1.
This is visible by the dotted lines that are marked by a red rectangle, from
Situation1Assessment to the other two AssessmentResult instances: High-
waySituationAssessment and HighwayOvertakeSituationAssessment.
We conclude this by summarizing that we have presented an extension of
our ontology model for integrating an AssessmentResult, including the re-
spective ExposureLevel, into the model. This step therefore gives us the
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Figure 3.31: (Internal) Situation representation example
basis for working with HRA situations, including their exposure assessment,
in a more formal way. The reason for the decision to introduce a concept
AssessmentResult rather than "only" an attribute was (1) to formally store
which (former) AssessmentResults were used in another assessment and (2)
to enable better extensibility by other attributes that might be relevant in
an industrial setting.
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Figure 3.32: (Internal) assessment result example
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3.4.2 HRA Situation similarity
In Figure 3.32 of the previous section, we have already seen the possibility
of tracing former situation assessments back to the current assessment if
those were used as a reasoning basis. The assumption is that the situations
are similar enough to be relevant for the current assessment.
In this section, we will therefore discuss how to deﬁne HRA situation similar-
ity more formally. We approach this by ﬁrst discussing instance similarity in
an ontology. This means we will discuss means for calculating the similarity
of two instances in an ontology. In previous sections, we stated that an HRA
situation is basically a set of inﬂuence factors. Thus, after discussing general
instance similarity concepts, we will transfer this idea to similarity of sets,
which will then give us our HRA situation similarity function.
The challenge with similarity is that everyone has his own (natural) opinion
on similarity. Thus, if we ask an expert whether two HRA situations are
similar, he can give us an answer, but the exact formalization of the similarity
decision process is quite diﬃcult.
If we do, for example, change "Situation1" from above (cf. Figure 3.31)
and change the vehicle speed to a lower value such as "between 100km/h
and 130km/h", everyone would say the new situation is very similar. The
reason for this is that the structure (the building blocks) did not change a
lot. What we did is to move one inﬂuence factor instance to another sibling
of the same parent (same concept: velocity). Thus, we have structural (or
topological) similarity in the ontology.
The Requirements
Before discussing our similarity formalization approach, we will ﬁrst present
the relevant requirements an HRA situation similarity function has to fulﬁll.
Similarity will be used to support the safety engineer in the decision process
for ﬁnding an exposure value for a new HRA situation. What we therefore
need is a function that is as close to the expectation the safety engineer
has regarding similarity of HRA situations. For an expert, a situation A is
considered to be diﬀerent from situation B if the picture he has in mind if
he thinks of situation B has nothing to do with the picture he has in mind
for situation A. It is similar if only slight changes of the picture occur.
More formally speaking, the mental (dis)similarity of situations is a check of
how many inﬂuence factors change and how severe the change is. Change
severity can be formalized by its commonalities. In vernacular language,
the idiom to compare apples with oranges, for example, means comparing
dissimilar things. Well, apples are not oranges, but they are both fruits; thus,
they have a commonality. If we were to compare apples and tires, we would
judge them as even more dissimilar. One commonality one could identify is
that both are physical objects.
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The same is true for inﬂuence factor similarity and therefore for HRA situa-
tion similarity. If the common covering concept is very abstract, one judges
the two inﬂuence factors under consideration as diﬀerent; if they share a
closely related concept, they are (considered) similar. If, for example, we
compare heavy rain and one-way street, it is very hard to ﬁnd a com-
monality; thus, these two inﬂuence factors are very diﬀerent. However, if
we compare > 130km/h to 100km/h <= v < 130km/h (as discussed
above), the common concept is vehicle velocity, which is very close, very con-
crete. Thus everyone would say that these inﬂuence factors are very similar.
Based on these considerations we can derive two (high-level) requirements
for our HRA situation similarity function:
1. Reﬂect generalization/specialization: If a situation A is a generaliza-
tion of another situation B, this shall be adequately reﬂected in our simi-
larity function. The generalization/specialization relation denotes whether
one situation A is covered by another situation B. All inﬂuence factors
of A would be in B. In such a situation, the exposure value of B cannot
be higher than the one of A because each additional inﬂuence factor fur-
ther restricts (the likelihood of) a situation. This should be reﬂected in
the result of our similarity function: Comparing a general situation to a
more speciﬁc situation, the similarity value should be negative (because
the exposure value would be reduced in this case). Figure 3.33 shows an
example of generalization/specialization.
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Figure 3.33: Example of generalization/specialization of HRA situations
At the bottom of the ﬁgure, two situations are deﬁned: HighwaySituation
and HighwayOvertakeSituation. The latter is a specialization of the for-
mer: HighwayOvertakeSituation contains all inﬂuence factors HighwaySi-
tuation contains, but in addition it has the inﬂuence factor Overtake.
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2. Change robustness: Due to the fact that our ontology is subject to
continuous extensions, we have to deal with these changes in the similarity
metric as well. If a change is made in the ontology, the similarity metric of
two situations should only change if the concept hierarchy the inﬂuence
factors of the situation belong to changes. This might happen if the
concept hierarchy is further reﬁned, meaning an intermediate concept is
added. Figure 3.34 shows an example illustrating this requirement.
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Figure 3.34: Example of change robustness of HRA situation similarity
The example shows two situations: CountryRoadSituation and High-
waySituation. Concepts and inﬂuence factors that are directly (and in-
directly) related to these situations have a gray background. If the con-
cept or inﬂuence factor is independent of the situations, it has a white
background. The expectation of (and the requirement for) a similarity
function calculating the similarity of the two situations is that it should
depend only on the structure of the elements with the gray background.
If, for example, the sub-tree on the right Natural_Condition changes, one
would not expect the similarity value between CountryRoadSituation and
HighwaySituation to change.
These general requirements will guide us in the process of our HRA situ-
ation similarity discussion. Note that we have another "soft" requirement
or rather a constraint: Our goal should be to represent/reﬂect the expert's
expectations.
Foundation and theoretical discussion
We begin our discussion on situation similarity by reviewing Recio-Garcia's
approach to structural similarity in ontologies [RgDaGc+06] and discuss the
applicability of his approach for our goal: HRA situation similarity. Garcia
has proposed diﬀerent ontology-based distance metrics that are based on
the location of the element (instance) in the ontology. Due to the fact that
Recio-Garcia's work is based on instance similarity and our ﬁrst requirement
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(Generalization/Specialization) is only applicable to sets of inﬂuence factors,
we will review the functions with respect to the second requirement (and our
constraint to be as close to experts' expectations as possible). In order to
understand Recio-Garcia's instance similarity functions, he introduces some
helper functions, which we use as well:
superC (c, C) is the subset of concepts in C that are superconcepts
of c
superi (i, C) is the subset of concepts in C of which i is an instance
CN is the set of all concepts in the current knowledge base
LCS (i1, i2) is the set of the least common subsumer concepts of the
two individuals. Note that a "least common subsumer"
concept is a concept both instances belong to, but the
concept has no child-concept to which both instances
belong! (Very informally, it can be described as the ﬁrst
common concept.)
prof (Ci) is the depth/profundity of the concept Ci. Note that the
"depth" is the graph distance of a node to the root.
prof (i) is the depth/profundity of the individual i
With these helper functions, Recio-Garcia deﬁned the following three sim-
ilarity functions. All of these functions have as domain a pair of ontology
instances and as range a real number between [0, 1], where 0 indicates no
similarity and 1 total similarity.
fdeepbasic (i1, i2) =
max {prof (LCS (i1, i2))}
max {prof (Ci)} ,∀Ci ∈ CN (3.2)
The ﬁrst similarity function (3.2) calculates the relation between the least
common subsumer concept and the maximal concept depth in the ontology.
Let's look at an abstract example (cf. Figure 3.35) to better understand this
similarity function.
Figure 3.35: Abstract ontology similarity example
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We are interested in the similarity between i1 and i2. The numerator says:
max {prof {LCS (i1, i2)}}
The least-common concept (LCS) of i1 and i2 is the concept "_2". This
is the ﬁrst node the two instances have in common if we go along the path
from the instance back to the root ("Thing"). We get:
max {prof {”_2”}} = 1
The profundity ("prof") of concept "_2" is 1. (This is essentially the graph
distance of a node to the root.) Due to the fact that our LCS set has only
one element (because we have a tree structure), the max operator returns
the value of prof("_2"), which is 1.
The analysis of the formula yields the ﬁnding that the denominator is in-
teresting: This is because it includes all other concepts/classes existing in
the ontology. It asks for the maximal profundity (depth) of concepts in the
ontology/graph. In our example, the concept with the highest profundity
value is "_1_1_1_1":
prof(”_1_1_1_1”) = 4, thus,
fdeepbasic(i1, i2) = 1/4 = 0.25
The conclusion of the review of this distance metric is that this similarity
metric is not change-robust (does not fulﬁll our requirement 2): If the path
starting with _1 changes in a way that the maximal concept profundity of
this branch changes, the similarity of i1 and i2 changes as well.
Thus, this similarity metric is not appropriate for our purpose because one
could not, for example, calculate the similarity of our vehicle speed instances
(from the example above) without knowing the complete remaining ontol-
ogy.
Garcia provides another version that is shown in (3.3). This similarity func-
tion has the same numerator as Equation 3.2, but the denominator focuses
only on the local sub-ontologies of concepts to which the respective instances
i1 and i2 belong.
fdeep (i1, i2) =
max {prof (LCS (i1, i2))}
max {prof (i1) , prof (i2)} (3.3)
Informally speaking, this similarity function calculates the relative
depth/height of the least common concept and the (maximum) depth
of the individuals. For this it uses only information given by the instances
(and their parent concepts). Therefore, it fulﬁlls our requirement of change
robustness.
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The result of fdeep applied to our example (cf. Figure 3.35) is:
fdeep (i1, i2) = 1/max {4, 3} = 1
4
However, one question remaining is whether our constraint about the ex-
pert's expectation is met. In order to elaborate on this we introduce yet
another instance similarity function (of Recio-Garcia) (cf. Figure 3.4):
cosine (i1, i2) =
|superi (i1, CN) ∩ superi (i2, CN)|√|superi (i1, CN)| ∗√|superi (i2, CN)| (3.4)
This function may look complex, but it is in fact quite easy to understand:
In the numerator, the number of common concepts of the two instances is
calculated. This is divided by the geometric mean of the number of concepts
belonging to each of the instances. The geometric mean serves the purpose
of normalizing the number of concepts. Due to the fact that in our ontol-
ogy, one inﬂuence factor belongs to exactly one concept in the ontology, we
can replace the numerator by the depth/height of the least common con-
cept of the respective instances. However, we have already seen this as the
numerator of the two similarity functions fdeepbasic and fdeep discussed
above! In this case, the denominator is in this case the geometric mean
of the depths of the instances. Equation 3.5 shows "our" version of the
similarity function as discussed:
cosineSAHARA (i1, i2) =
prof (LCS (i1, i2))√|superi (i1, CN)| ∗√|superi (i2, CN)| (3.5)
Thus, the diﬀerence is that cosine (and cosineSAHARA) does not divide the
numerator by the maximum of the depths of the instances (like in fdeep),
but combines the depths of both instances. This satisﬁes our constraint for
alignment with experts expectations better. This can easily be seen in the
following example, shown in Figure 3.36.
fdeep (iAAAA, iBBBB) = 1/max {5, 5} = 1/5 (3.6)
fdeep (iAAAA, iB) = 1/max {5, 2} = 1/5 (3.7)
Even though iBBBB is "further away", the similarity calculated with fdeep
yields the same result for both comparisons.
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Figure 3.36: Example of fairness of cosine and fdeep
In contrast, if we use cosine as a similarity function, we get:
cosine (iAAAA, iBBBB) = 1/
(√
5 ∗
√
5
)
= 1/5 = 0.2 (3.8)
cosine (iAAAA, iB) = 1/
(√
5 ∗
√
2
)
= 1/
√
10 ≈ 0.316 (3.9)
The path from iAAAA → iBBBB is longer and has a similarity value of
0.2. The shorter path iAAAA → iB has a value of (around) 0.32, which
implies higher similarity.
Thus, the similarity function cosine is closer to the natural interpretation of
similarity. This is true because fdeep strictly selects the concept hierarchy
of one instance and does not respect the other instance. In this example, the
selection process is given by the max function. Cosine, in contrast, uses
the geometric mean. By doing so, it incorporates the concept hierarchies of
both inﬂuence factors.
We conclude our review of Recio-Garcia's ontology (instance) similarity func-
tions by stating two general ﬁndings:
− The construct Least-Common-Subsumer-Concept gives us a partition-
ing point for the ontology. All concepts towards the root are contained
in both inﬂuence factor concept hierarchies; thus, they contribute to the
notion of similarity. The dissimilarity, in contrast, is induced by the
structure beyond the LCS concept (towards the instances).
− One has to be careful with strictly selective functions, such as max,
because they allow only one concept to "contribute" to the similarity re-
sult. The expectation of similarity (in the domain of functional safety and
HRA situations) usually incorporates information about both concepts
for coming up with a similarity assessment. Thus, the danger of selective
functions is that one loses the natural expectation. Normalizations with
a geometric mean are more suitable than the maximum "mean.
With fdeep and cosine, Recio-Garcia proposed two similarity functions; one
uses the maximum as mean, the other one uses the geometric mean. These
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are, however, just two means, and there exist many more. The question is
if there is another mean that suits our needs even better.
Discussion of Hölder mean
For a more in-depth analysis of possible means we used a generalization of
all (power) means, the Hölder mean. (The Hölder mean is sometimes also
termed generalized mean.) Equation 3.10 shows the speciﬁcation of the
Hölder mean:
Mp (x1, . . . , xn) =
(
1
n
·
n∑
i=1
xpi
)1/p
=
p
√
xp1 + . . .+ x
p
n
n
(3.10)
Many common means are (or can be expressed as) special cases of the
Hölder mean. Table 3.2 shows some of the well-known means expressed as
instances of the Hölder mean:
Table 3.2: Special cases of the Hölder mean
Short-name Mathematical deﬁnition
min limp→−∞Mp (x1, . . . , xn) = min {x1, . . . , xn}
x¯harm M−1 (x1, . . . , xn) = n1
x1
+...+ 1
xn
x¯geom limp→0Mp (x1, . . . , xn) = n
√
x1 · . . . · xn
x¯arithm M1 (x1, . . . , xn) =
x1+...+xn
n
x¯rsm M2 (x1, . . . , xn) =
√
x21+...+x
2
n
n
max limp→∞Mp (x1, . . . , xn) = max {x1, . . . , xn}
Cauchy's proof of "inequality of arithmetic and geometric mean" was further
generalized using the Hölder mean:
min (x1, . . . , xn) ≤ x¯harm ≤ x¯geom ≤ x¯arithm ≤ x¯rsm ≤ max (x1, . . . , xn)
(3.11)
This chain of inequations shows that increasing the order of power (of the
Hölder mean) always results in a value that is at least as high as the values
produced by all lower order means. For our purpose of HRA situation sim-
ilarity, we use a mean for normalizations, i.e., as the denominator. As the
denominator, we want a mean that does not result in being zero. In this
sense, the maximum is of course a good function, but, as discussed above,
it is too "selective". The geometric mean, on the other hand, delivers "0" if
one of the elements is equal to "0". Based on the "inequality chain" above,
we can derive that there is a mean with p > 0 that serves our needs. By
analyzing the special cases shown above, we could derive that the arithmetic
mean (p=1) is already valid (wrt. our requirements). Figure 3.37 shows the
arithmetic (p=1), the rooted-square mean (p=2), and a higher-order power
110
SAHARA - a Structured Approach for Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessments
mean (p=4) for two values ranging both from 0 to 10. Please note that the
x-axis (to the left) and the y-axis (into the page) represent the two values
and the z-axis (upwards) shows the corresponding mean value.
Figure 3.37: Example means: arithmetic (p=1), rooted-square (p=2), order-4 (p=4)
Due to the nature of (power) means, they deliver the same result if both
values are the same! The diﬀerence is the way the mean "behaves" if the two
values are diﬀerent. The observation is that the higher-order power means
favor high values in the sense that the impact a low value has becomes
more and more unimportant. The extreme case is limp→∞ = max, where
only the maximum value is used. Favoring high values and emphasizing
high diﬀerence values is for the purpose of HRA situation similarity is not
necessary and could not be justiﬁed; thus, lower-order means such as the
arithmetic or rooted-square mean are appropriate for us.
Based on this review of means, we can update our cosineSAHARA similarity
function and use the arithmetic mean instead of the geometric mean:
instanceSimSAHARA (i1, i2) =
prof (LCS (i1, i2))
|superi(i1,CN)|+|superi(i2,CN)|
2
(3.12)
Up to now, we have discussed similarity metrics in general and derived some
basic principles for deﬁning our HRA situation similarity function. In the
discussion, we focused on similarity functions working on ontologies (due
to the review of Recio-Garcia's work), but all of the reviewed similarity
functions were deﬁned based on the instance level. While an HRA situation
is an instance as well, similarity is deﬁned by its (referenced) building blocks:
the set of inﬂuence factors. In the next section, we will therefore transfer
our lessons learned from single inﬂuence factor similarity to similarity of sets
of inﬂuence factors. This will enable us to deal with the requirement for
"Generalization/Specialization" as well.
The transfer towards HRA situation similarity
In this section, we will present our approach for calculating the similarity
of HRA situations. For this we combine our fundamental and theoretical
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ﬁndings from the previous chapters in order to come up with a similarity
function that fulﬁlls our requirements introduced above.
The general structure of this section and of our solution is as follows:
1. We extend the notion of similarity from (single) inﬂuence factor similarity
to set similarity (because an HRA situation is a set of inﬂuence factors).
2. Then we transfer the idea of the Least-Common-Subsumer concept to
sets of inﬂuence factors. As discussed above, the LCS concept divides
the ontology into similar and dissimilar parts. We use this partition for
fulﬁlling the change robustness requirement.
3. We introduce a metric that incorporates the generalization/specialization
requirement.
4. We tweak our solution based on practical experience to better fulﬁll the
constraint of being as close to HRA experts notion of similarity as possible.
(1) The naïve approach towards set similarity is to calculate the similarity
of all pairs of elements and combine these into a set similarity. While the
general idea is straightforward and correct, the challenge here is to decide
which pairs of inﬂuence factors to use for the similarity calculation. A set is
unordered by deﬁnition. There is no induced way to pair up elements from
two sets. A typical approach is, of course, to form the cross-product, i.e., to
create all possible pairs. However, this approach generates many "useless"
pairs - "useless" in the sense of comparing apples and oranges. That one
builds "useless" pairs is bad, but this approach would actually be even worse
because the number of useless pairs would reduce the impact of the relevant
pairs. The question is what a relevant pair is. What one expects is that we
build pairs that are closely related, meaning pairs of inﬂuence factors that
are similar. However, these are cyclic requirements in the sense that we need
the similarity values of all pairs in order to decide which pairs to calculate
the similarity for.
The way out of this dilemma is that to incorporate information that gives
us domain knowledge on similarity: the concept hierarchy. Recall that the
concept hierarchy was the basis for all similarity functions discussed above.
We need to look deeper into the characteristics of our ontology. Technically,
our/an ontology is a (directed, acyclic) graph structure. The inﬂuence fac-
tors of an HRA situation are leaves or endpoints of this graph. The concept
hierarchy to which the (selected) inﬂuence factors belong is a path in the
graph from/towards the root. As discussed in the review of the inﬂuence
factor similarity functions, the similarity of two inﬂuence factors can be cal-
culated by some sort of relation between common path segments (of both
inﬂuence factor paths) and overall path segments or even maximal paths in
the ontology. The general pattern is/was:
SimilarityV alue =
SimilarFraction
SimilarFraction+DissimilarFraction
(3.13)
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For the extension towards a set of inﬂuence factors we therefore need to
deﬁne a similar part and dissimilar parts. The challenge is that we have
to deal with multiple paths. Some segments of these paths are shared be-
tween two situations, whereas some segments are exclusive to one situation.
The overall Least-Common-Subsumer-Concept is the inﬂuence factor root,
OASISCharacteristic. Thus, we have a common root of all paths. Due to
the fact that all inﬂuence factors belong exactly to one path, the directed,
acyclic graph is more precisely a tree structure in our case. HRA situation
similarity can therefore (technically) be reduced to graph similarity of tree
structures.
Given one HRA situation and the OASIS ontology, the tree representation of
the HRA situation constitutes a sub-ontology, or a sub-graph of the overall
OASIS ontology. In this tree, only such information is contained that is some-
how related to the situation. The situation-induced tree structure already
fulﬁlls the Change robustness requirement because only direct or indirect
information is contained in an HRA situation tree. Figure 3.34 shows a tree
representation of the sub-ontology induced by the two situations Country-
RoadSituation and HighwaySituation.
(2) As stated above, calculating a tree similarity is often done by calculating
common parts and diﬀerent parts. We already stated that we can leverage
the LCS concept to distinguish between similar and dissimilar parts. If we
consider the tree representation of the (two) HRA situations we want to
compare, we can use the LCS concept on each path to divide the path
into a common segment and potentially a diﬀerent segment. The common
path segment obviously starts at the root and continues up to the point
where the child concepts are diﬀerent (or only the inﬂuence factors are
diﬀerent). If we apply this to two trees, we can deﬁne the LCS of two trees
to be the maximal sub-tree covered by both trees. This abstract sub-tree
therefore deﬁnes our border between similarity and dissimilarity. Applied to
our application domain, the HRA situation similarity, the abstract sub-tree
deﬁnes an abstract (common) sub-situation. Note that abstract in this
context means that the situation may contain branches ending in concepts,
not in concrete inﬂuence factors. Figure 3.38 shows an example of the graph
representation and the abstract (common) situation.
The example is already known from the change robustness example (cf.
Figure 3.34. This time, however, the gray background does not indicate a
direct or indirect dependency on one of the situations, but rather elements
belonging to both situations. Thus, the abstract common situation is given
by the conglomerate of the gray-backgrounded elements. An example of a
common concept without a common inﬂuence factor is given by the concept
Street Type .
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Figure 3.38: Example of abstract (common) HRA situation
In order to formalize an abstract situation, we deﬁne two helper functions:
InfSet (SituationOASIS) := {i ∈ InflFactSetOASIS |
i ∈ SituationOASIS} (3.14)
ConSet′ (i ∈ InflFactSetOASIS) := {c ∈ ConceptSetOASIS |
i instanceOf c ∨
∃c′ ∈ ConSet′ (i) :
i instanceOf c' ∧
c′ isSubclassOf c } (3.15)
ConSet (SituationOASIS) :=
⋃
i∈InfSet(SituationOASIS)
ConSet′ (i)
(3.16)
(3.14): The function InfSet is deﬁned for an OASIS situation. The func-
tion extracts the set of inﬂuence factors from the OASIS situation. In this
function, the set InflFactSetOASIS denotes in this function the set of all
inﬂuence factors contained in the OASIS ontology.
(3.15): In contrast, the function ConSet′ calculates for one OASIS inﬂuence
factor the concepts to which the inﬂuence factor belongs. (Analogously to
InflFactSetOASIS , ConceptSetOASIS denotes the set of all concepts in
OASIS.) The deﬁnition is inductive: A concept is concept of an inﬂuence
factor iﬀ it is directly the parent of the inﬂuence factor, or if it is the parent
of a concept which is a concept of the inﬂuence factor. With these helper
functions we can deﬁne abstSit (Sit1, Sit2), which calculates the abstract
situation induced by Sit1 and Sit2 by:
(3.16): The function ConSet combines both functions into a function cal-
culating all concepts that are related to an OASIS situation.
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comInfSet (Sit1, Sit2) := InfSet (Sit1) ∩ InfSet (Sit2) (3.17)
comConSet (Sit1, Sit2) := ConSet (Sit1) ∩ ConSet (Sit2) (3.18)
abstSit (Sit1, Sit2) := comInfSet (Sit1, Sit2)∪
comConSet (Sit1, Sit2) (3.19)
(3.17): The function comInfSet calculates the set of common inﬂuence
factors of both situations. It is simply the intersection of the InfSet's of
both situations.
(3.18): The function comConSet analogously calculates the set of common
concepts.
(3.19): Finally, the function absSit ﬁnally calculates the abstract situation.
The abstract situation constitutes the commonality of both situations. It is
therefore the union of the common inﬂuence factors (cf. comInfSet) and
the common concepts (cf. comConSet).
With the concept of an abstract HRA situation, we can move forward
towards the deﬁnition of our HRA situation similarity function. The very
generic similarity function deﬁned in equation (3.13) can be reﬁned into:
HRASimFunc (Sitnew, Sitold) =
simSit
simSit+mean (disSitnew, disSitold)
(3.20)
where
Sitnew, Sitold : are the situations to be compared
disSitnew : is a value expressing the dissimilarity of Sitnew
disSitold : is a value expressing the dissimilarity of Sitold
simSit : is a value representing the similarity of Sitnew, Sitold
mean () : is a function calculating a/the mean
In order to make this similarity function formal, we need to deﬁne how to
calculate disSitnew, disSitold, simSit, and we need to select a mean.
The concept of abstract HRA situation introduced above is a tree. The
commonality gets stronger the further away a common concept is from the
root. In set theory, a tree is a partially ordered set (T,<), with the relation
< such that for each t ∈ T , the set {k ∈ T : k < t} is well ordered. For
each element t ( t ∈ T ), the order type of the element is called height of t,
denoted height (t, T ). Informally speaking, the height of a tree node is the
length of the path from the node to the root. (The root therefore has the
height 0.)
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For the calculation of the tree size we therefore attribute each node with
its height. Let the tree graph be GTree = (V,E), then we can calculate for
each v ∈ V the corresponding height (v,GTree), and with that we deﬁne:
treeSize (GTree) =
∑
v∈V height (v,GTree)
|V | (3.21)
With the treeSize function we now can calculate "simSit" by using our
abstSit function deﬁned above:
simSit = treeSize (abstSit (Sitnew, Sitold)) (3.22)
disSit1 and disSit2 both represent values for the dissimilar part of the
respective situations. Assume we have two situations Sitnew and Sitold
and their abstract situation tree. If we now subtract the common part of
both situations from one of the situations, what is left is in most cases an
unconnected graph. Figure 3.39 shows an example.
Figure 3.39: Example showing the dissimilar parts of two trees
On the left, both situations are schematically shown; on the right, the dis-
similar parts are shown in blue, and the abstract situation (the common
part) is shown in light gray.
In this example, the dissimilar part of Sit1, i.e., Sit1\Sit2, consists of the
connected graph B → D → G and the single node K. Sit2\Sit1 analo-
gously consists of E → H and J.
The dissimilarity is higher the longer the paths or branches are. The dissim-
ilarities K and J from the example are not as severe as the dissimilarities
B → D → G and E → H. The bigger a sub-graph is in the dissimilarity
graph, the less similar our situations are. Due to the fact that the dissim-
ilar part is in the denominator of our (informal) equation (3.20), higher
sub-graphs need to get higher values. This is already the approach of our
treeSize function! Due to the fact that we do not have one tree but possibly
multiple tree branches, we introduce a virtual new dissimilarity-root and
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place the branches directly on the virtual root. In this way, we can use our
treeSize function as deﬁned above to calculate the dissimilarities as well.
Furthermore, let us deﬁne the helper function disTree (Sit1, Sit2), which
calculates the dissimilarity tree (including the virtual node).
Figure 3.40 shows abstractSituation, disSim1, and disSim2, each annotated
with their treeSize value:
Figure 3.40: Example showing the basic similarity metric of two HRA trees
Now, we can almost construct our HRA situation similarity function. The
missing piece is the selection of our mean. Due to our discussion above,
we selected the arithmetic mean.
The (for now) ﬁnal HRA situation similarity function is therefore deﬁned as:
HRASimFunc (Sitnew, Sitold) =
simSit
simSit+ disSitnew+disSitold2
(3.23)
where
disSitnew = treeSize (disTree (Sitnew, Sitold))
disSitold = treeSize (disTree (Sitold, Sitnew))
simSit = treeSize (abstSit (Sitnew, Sitold))
(3) While we can already calculate a similarity value, it does not (yet)
reﬂect the aspect of Generalization/Specialization of the situations. With
Generalization/Specialization we want to introduce a partial-order relation
for situations. "Partially" for our situations is that the we can compare arbi-
trary situations, but we can only deﬁne a deﬁnite relation of being "bigger"
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or "smaller" in the case where one situation is contained in another sit-
uation. In this case the dissimilarity values between the covered situation
and the covering situation is "0" because the disTree consists only of the
introduced "virtual root", which has treeSize = 0. Due to the fact that
the covering situation is "bigger", its dissimilarity tree contains more nodes
than only the "virtual root" and therefore the value is > 0. If a situation
is "greater" than another, it contains more inﬂuence factors. This makes
the situation more unlikely, i.e., lowers the exposure value. We therefore
want the similarity value to reﬂect a reduction: The similarity value should
be negative. If both situations are equal, both disTree's would result in a
dissimilarity value of "0", but we want the similarity to be one. We therefore
introduce a factor "genSpeFact", which simply deﬁnes the algebraic sign for
the HRASimFunc :
genSpeFact(Sitnew, Sitold) =

1 if Sitnew is covered by Sitold
−1 if Sitnew covers Sitold
1 if Sitnew is equal to Sitold
∈ {−1, 1} else
Note that in this deﬁnition we partitioned the comparison into being "greater
or equal" or "smaller" because with case number 3, we uniﬁed the equality
and the "greater" cases. Whether the exact similarity is positive or negative
is (mathematically) unimportant. The only important aspect is that our
genSpeFact factor never becomes = 0.
The ﬁrst two cases can easily be covered by a signum function:
genSpeFact(Sitnew, Sitold) = sgn(disSitold − disSitnew) (3.24)
However, the problem is that the sgn function is deﬁned to deliver "0" if
the input is "0". Thus, case 3 is not yet fulﬁlled by equation (3.24). We can
leverage the case that by deﬁnition 00 = 1. With that we can deﬁne:
genSpeFact(Sitnew, Sitold) =
(disSitold − disSitnew)
|disSitold − disSitnew| (3.25)
Now we can integrate the "genSpeFact" (3.25) into our HRASimFunc
(3.23):
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HRASimFunc (Sitnew, Sitold) =
genSpeFact(Sitnew, Sitold) · simSit
simSit+ disSitnew+disSitold2
=
(disSitold − disSitnew)
|disSitold − disSitnew| ·
simSit
simSit+ disSitnew+disSitold2
(3.26)
The Generalization/Specialization property of HRASimFunc is shown as an
example in Figure 3.41.
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Figure 3.41: Example showing generalized/specialized situations
The example is the same as that introduced as part of the requirements
discussion. This time we have colored the abstract situation gray. As we
can see, the gray nodes completely cover the inﬂuence factors belonging to
HighwaySituation. HighwayOvertakeSituation additionally has a maneuver,
Overtake , speciﬁed and is therefore a special case of HighwaySituation!
The similarity function comparing HighwaySituation to HighwayOvertake-
Situation delivers (step by step):
Sitnew = HighwaySituation (3.27)
Sitold = HighwayOvertakeSituation (3.28)
disSitnew = 0 (3.29)
disSitold = 1 (3.30)
simSit = 26/12 = 13/6 (3.31)
(3.32)
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and
HRASimFunc (Sitnew, Sitold) =
(1− 0)
|1− 0| ·
(13/6)
(13/6) + 0+12
= 0.8125
(3.33)
If we switch the comparison and compare the old HighwayOvertakeSituation
to the new HighwaySituationsituation, we would get:
HRASimFunc (Sitold, Sitnew) =
(0− 1)
|0− 1| · (3.34)
The negative algebraic sign shows that given the assessment value (expo-
sure) of the old situation, HighwaySituation, the exposure of the new sit-
uation, HighwayOvertakeSituation, must be lower! This complies with the
expectation that an exposure assessment of a more speciﬁc situation results
in lower values, while a generalized situation results in a higher exposure
value.
(4) With the end of part (3) we have ﬁnalized our HRA-Situation similarity
function. In evaluations with industry partners, however, we have found some
issues that can be tweaked to better fulﬁll the industry's needs. We have
identiﬁed two general improvements:
1. We often heard the comment/question:
"The situation similarity is very nice, but can I provide a positive list or
a negative list of inﬂuence factors that should be contained or shouldn't
be contained in the similar situations?"
The idea of just ﬁltering the result with respect to a positive list and neg-
ative list of inﬂuence factors was not considered to be optimal, however,
because we lose information. We "learned" that "should/shouldn't" is
more of a soft requirement in the sense that the similarity value should
be increased/decreased, but not that the situation per se should be re-
moved.
2. Another fact we learned during an evaluation of our similarity value is
that when we compared the experts' expectations with the values cal-
culated, we found one interesting aspect: The top-level OASIS classes
are kind of special - special in the sense that a diﬀerence in similarity
that goes beyond the top-level class is expected to be "more" diﬀerent
than an (top-level) internal diﬀerence with the same similarity result.
Thus, talking about vehicle dynamics and comparing this to environmen-
tal characteristics was considered to be more distinctive than a diﬀerence
within environmental characteristics.
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While theoretically not groundbreaking and more of an optimization issue,
we decided to take care of these comments because our approach aims at
practical applicability.
In the following section, we will therefore present our two improvements.
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3.4.3 Exposure Assessment Support
As described at the beginning of section 3.4, the overall goal of HEAT is to
increase the eﬃciency of reusing HRA situations. The direct beneﬁt of reuse
is, of course, to save time, money, and/or eﬀort because one does not have
to redo things. Another (desired) beneﬁt is to increase the consistency of
the product or system built with reused components. In our case we want
to reuse domain knowledge in terms of assessments of situations. We see
the following two beneﬁts: (1) The direct beneﬁt for a safety engineer is to
speed up and get support for the assessment of new HRA situations. (2)
The indirect beneﬁt would be to make the exposure value of a situation
less expert-dependent and ideally retrieve/have one exposure value for each
situation, independent of the expert who is performing the assessment.
The Requirements
Based on the direct and indirect beneﬁts mentioned above, we can derive two
goals for this section: 1) support the engineer in the assessment task and 2)
increase situation assessment consistency. The goals are not independent, of
course. We should support the engineer in such a way that a new assessment
is consistent with former assessments. The diﬀerence, however, is that 1)
aims at the engineer and his task of performing an assessment, while 2)
states a demand on the artifacts, the assessed situations.
Supporting the task of assessing a situation basically means supporting a
(human) decision and reasoning process. Human decisions are a very com-
plex ﬁeld and still subject to research activities. Baron [Bar08] and Kahne-
man [KT72] list are around 100 eﬀects and biases that inﬂuence and may
ultimately alter decisions. It is not our goal to deal with all these inﬂuences
and/or models of human decision making, but to obey basic observations
and principles and derive assessment support based on these principles. The
basic model is that a decision is inﬂuenced by external facts and internal
knowledge, beliefs, or mental states. If something is decided in the same
way by many persons, in psychology this is termed "intersubjective". If the
decision is individual, it is termed "subjective". Transferring this to the as-
sessment task of situations, we derive that every intersubjective result is an
expert-independent assessment result and that a strongly expert-dependent
one would be subjective. Thus, we need an approach that makes the assess-
ment intersubjective. If we use the partitioning of decision inﬂuences into
external and internal inﬂuences, we can state that the stronger the deci-
sion is based on external facts, the higher the likelihood that the decision is
intersubjective. Our goal is therefore to support the engineer by providing
good external facts for him to perform the assessment.
The other goal, consistent situation assessment, is per se important, but
is also important for the task support discussed above. If the facts, the
database, show an inconsistent picture, the expert might be confused and the
intended support might result in a distraction/confusion instead. Thus, our
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consistency goal is to provide a way to check the consistency of a situation
knowledge-base.
The concrete contributions we address in this chapter are therefore:
− We provide an approach that enables us to check a knowledge base for
situation assessment consistency.
− We provide a concrete situation exposure assessment support approach.
The situation knowledge base consistency check
The stated principle of classical, intuitionistic and many other logic systems,
from a contradiction, anything follows, is of course immanently important
for the assessment process because we do not want anything to be followed
from our knowledge base. The fundamental question we need to answer
ﬁrst, however, is what a contradiction of a situation or an inconsistent HRA
situation knowledge base is. As introduced above, a situation consists of
a set of inﬂuence factors and an exposure value (assessment result). One
single situation by itself cannot be inconsistent. Inconsistency is deﬁned on a
set of (or at least a pair of) situations. Please remember: an HRA situation
consists of a set of inﬂuence factors and an exposure value. Both parts,
the inﬂuence factor set and the exposure value, imply a kind of ordering
relation on situations. We informally deﬁne that two (or more) situations
are inconsistent if the ordering relation implied by the inﬂuence factor set is
not the same as the one induced by the exposure value.
The goal of checking the consistency of an HRA situation knowledge base
can therefore be realized by checking whether the two ordering relations do
not contradict each other. Due to the importance of the ordering relations,
we will recapitulate them brieﬂy.
For the set of inﬂuence factors, we already discussed in the previous section
the property of a situation to be a generalized/specialized situation:
A situation A is said to be more general than another situation B iﬀ all
inﬂuence factors of A are contained in B as well.
If we interpret being more general as "bigger" and more special as "smaller",
we can obviously induce a partial order on a set of situations, with the
ordering relation "general/special".
The exposure ordering relation is given by the total order of the integer
numbers (or by the total order of the subset 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 used to deﬁne an
exposure value).
The generalization/specialization relation induces a partial order while the
exposure values deﬁne a total order. Checking for consistency therefore
means that for each pair of situations having a generalization/specializa-
tion relation, the corresponding exposure values need to reﬂect this relation
as well.
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While the generalization/specialization of situations is already implemented
in the HRA situation similarity function introduced above, we cannot use
the function for the partial ordering. The reason is that the HRA situation
similarity function is total (= it is deﬁned for all pairs of situations) and we
cannot extract the partial order induced by the generalization/specialization
relation.
Therefore, we use only one part to deﬁne the HRA similarity function, the
helper function InfSet (cf. equation (3.14)). This function gives us the set
of inﬂuence factors belonging to a situation. The set inclusion gives us our
partial order, which can easily be represented as an acyclic directed graph.
Figure 3.42 shows a small example. On the right of the text Situation the
exposure value is shown in parentheses: Situation 2.2 (E3) (shown in the
middle) means that the situation 2.2 has the exposure value 3. Below each
situation, we listed the set of inﬂuence factors that induce the partial order.
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Figure 3.42: Consistency check partial order example
Checking the consistency of this graph ﬁguratively means walking from the
bottom (the empty situation/node) to the top node and checking whether
the exposure values decrease or not. If a value decreases along the path,
this would be an inconsistency. In the example, Situation 2.3 and 3 on the
right and the top (nodes with gray background) constitute an inconsistency:
Situation 3 is the successor of Situation 2.3, but the exposure value increases
from 2 to 3 (E2→ E3).
While this approach works and delivers correct results, the solution has
the disadvantage that we need to duplicate the complete situation data in
another tool (in memory). It is better to have an integrated solution, not
only because of the data duplication, but also due to better integration
into a holistic approach. Our solution is therefore to use the infrastructure
and capabilities we have, and to let the ontology (or better the attached
reasoner) do the work.
In order to leverage our ontology to do the work of ordering, we need to
rewrite the situations slightly. The idea is to introduce for each situation
124
SAHARA - a Structured Approach for Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessments
(instance) a corresponding class. Note that we can distinguish between an
instance and a class by the semantics that a class always describes a set,
while an instance represents one individual. Turning an individual into a set
essential means creating a set description in such a way that the set contains
the individual. An abstract example is:
Let i ∈ M be an individual. We can deﬁne I := i ⊂ M as being the set
induced by the individual.
If we now consider the fraction of a situation describing the set of inﬂuence
factors, the "consistsOf" relation, we can create an equivalent class descrip-
tion for each situation similar to the abstract example shown above. Figure
3.43 shows the inﬂuence factor part as a "consistsOf" relation. (The ﬁgure
is taken from the more complete example shown as Figure 3.31.)
Figure 3.43: Situation instance representation example
With each inﬂuence factor we can describe a set of situations: the set of
situations with a consistsOf relation to the inﬂuence factor. This means
that we do not directly build class representations from the inﬂuence factors,
but rather for the situation instances referencing the inﬂuence factor. If
we create a class representation, a set, for each of the inﬂuence factors
and create the intersection of these classes (or sets), we get a class (set)
representation of the situation. To be more precise, we get a set describing all
situations consisting of at least the set of inﬂuence factors. With "at least"
we refer to the fact that situations are contained in the set that consists of
more than the mentioned inﬂuence factors. The set "translation" example
visualized as intersecting sets is shown in Figure 3.44 using a Venn diagram:
In terms of ontology engineering, we deﬁned for each situation and equiva-
lent class description. An example "translation" from individual representa-
tion to class representation is shown in Figure 3.45.
The reasoner uses the equivalent class representation an rebuilds a set hi-
erarchy reﬂecting our desired partial order. This partial order can then be
processed in terms of consistency checks. Due to the fact that the reasoner
does not (only) aim directly at providing a partial order of sets, but tries
to derive as much information about the sets as possible, we also get a list
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Figure 3.44: Venn diagram showing the class representation of an HRA situation
Figure 3.45: Comparison of HRA situation representation as class and as individual
of equivalent situation as a "side eﬀect". We implemented this as an HRA
situation consistency check tool and applied it to industrial case studies.
In the following, we present concrete results and statistics found with the
situation check tool.
Table 3.3 shows the ﬁndings of a total of nine industrial case studies:
Table 3.3 shows in the top part general information about the situation
knowledge base, while the lower part gives some more details about the
inconsistency checking process.
The knowledge bases analyzed contained 148 situations, which we trans-
ferred "as is" from nine industrial case studies. We found that roughly 10%
of the situations were deﬁned (at least) twice. This means that if we had used
the knowledge base as a simple database, without similarity suggestions, the
assessment eﬀort would have been reduced directly by 10%! Another ﬁnd-
ing we could derive as an additional "side eﬀect" was that even though the
situations came from industrial case studies, we found 12 situations without
any exposure value, i.e., unassessed situations.
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Table 3.3: Statistics of HRA situations based on 9 industry case studies
Parameter Value
Overall number of situations 148
Duplicated situations 14
Situations without exposure value assigned 12
Exposure Inconsistencies 19
Partial-order chain lengths 4
PO with length 1 61
PO with length 2 44
PO with length 3 12
PO with length 4 4
The main area of interest in this section is the consistency of the knowledge
base. With the proposed analysis approach, we found a total of 19 inconsis-
tencies. This is a factor of roughly 13%. The case studies were performed
under the umbrella of consistent and structured HRAs, which revealed the
importance of consistency and made the experts focus on and pay atten-
tion to consistent assessments. A value of 13% inconsistency is already a
high value. If we include the mental bias the experts had, one could assume
that in daily work in industry, this value could even be higher. Note that
the unassessed situations neither count as inconsistent nor do they inﬂu-
ence the number of absolute inconsistencies. The percental inconsistency
value, however, is decreased because unassessed situations are counted as
"consistent".
Shown additionally in the lower part of the table are some details gener-
ated during the consistency check. Shown are the partial order chains. With
partial order chains we denote the paths in the graph representation of
the partial order induced by the inﬂuence factor partial order. The longest
chain/path included four situations, and we had four of these chains. The
other data can be interpreted analogously, i.e., we had 44 paths of length 2.
This shows us that the situation hierarchy is very shallow (1.66 on average)
and the lower the hierarchy, the lower the potential for situation inconsis-
tencies.
We conclude this section by summarizing that we developed a theoretical
and technical methodology for checking HRA situation consistency on the
one hand and on the other hand leveraged the ontology and reasoning capa-
bilities as an industry-strength technique for the implementation. Finally, we
applied it practically to nine industrial case studies and were able to show
that the theory as well as the applicability requirement are fulﬁlled.
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Situation assessment support
In the last section, we presented a consistency check technique for our HRA
situation knowledge base. For the part dealing with assessment support for
safety experts, we assume that we applied the consistency technique and
"improved" the knowledge base in such a way that the knowledge base is
consistent. In this section, we will introduce our approach for supporting
the assessment task by leveraging the HRA situation similarity function
presented above and assuming a consistent knowledge base.
In the requirements part, we already discussed some basic background re-
garding the decision process of a situation exposure assessment. We stated
that the goal is to ﬁnd an "intersubjective" assessment result, meaning the
result should be as independent as possible from an individual safety expert.
In order to achieve this, we must deliver good external facts (as discussed
above); "good" in the sense that they help the safety expert in the assess-
ment.
During the design process of the decision support approach, we had to learn,
however, that knowing which information is really helpful for the decision
depends on the situation to be assessed, on the previous situations and as-
sessments available (the knowledge captured so far), and to a large extent
on the individual experts' opinions. We therefore created an approach that
can be adapted to the needs of an expert. The "personalization" we created
was to parameterize and ﬁlter the results we got by using our core approach,
the application of the HRA situation similarity function. The concrete pa-
rameters/ﬁlters we realized are:
− Set ﬁltering
We provide the possibility to deﬁne sets of inﬂuence factors that the
expert deﬁnitely wants to have in similar situations and a set that he
does not want. An informal example is that an expert wants all similar
situations that contain "Highway" but do not contain "driving straight".
This means that he provides a positive and/or negative list of inﬂuence
factors.
− Restricted number of dissimilarities
The assessment process or rather the support of this process by showing
similar situations is such that the engineer looks at the already assessed
situations and estimates a relative change of exposure based on the diﬀer-
ences. However, this becomes more diﬃcult the more "diﬀerences" exist.
Therefore, the experts consider similar situations that exceed a certain
number of diﬀerences as not helpful and want them removed.
Note that one can think of many other ﬁlters and parameters. Our goal
(and contribution) is not to provide concrete parameters and ﬁlters, but
to show general concepts and techniques for future extensions. The two
ﬁlters mentioned are therefore practically relevant ﬁlters on the one hand
and enable us to discuss (more technically) ﬁlter possibilities on the other
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hand. Before discussing these "personalization" options, we want to present
the fundamental idea of displaying similar situations as supportive action in
more detail ﬁrst.
The ﬁrst step is of course to calculate the similarity value of the "new"
situation with the set of situations in the knowledge base. An example vi-
sualization is shown in Figure 3.46. The graph in this example uses a spring
layout. The layout uses as "spring forces" the similarity values calculated
by our similarity function. The example shows that this representation looks
nice/interesting, but is obviously not very helpful for the assessment task.
Figure 3.46: CBR "cloud" of similar situations
We therefore need a more sophisticated approach for presenting or deal-
ing with similar situations. As discussed above, the fundamental idea is to
present similar situations, reason about the change from one situation to
another, and derive a corresponding change of the exposure value. In 1943
Lewin designed the so-called "Force Field Analysis" (FFA) [Lew43]. The
FFA was designed to support decision-making in social psychology. Coming
from social science, the technique aims at reaching a goal in terms of the
change of a social situation. Due to the complexity of social situations, there
was a need to support the decision process by structuring inﬂuential forces.
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On the one hand, there are helping forces, ﬁguratively pulling one towards
the goal, and hindering forces blocking the movement towards a goal.
The transfer of FFA to the decision process of assessing the exposure of an
HRA situation is (due to its simplicity) not too diﬃcult. The desired state is,
of course, the exposure value of the new situation, while the current state is
given by one (or more) previously assessed situation(s). The forces are a little
bit trickier. The goal is to derive an exposure value. Thus we interpreted the
forces as pulling towards a higher exposure value or pushing towards a lower
exposure value. The factors that are "pulling" or "pushing" are the inﬂuence
factors from the dissimilarity sets (cf. disSit in 3.4.2). The dissimilarity sets
were (roughly) the inﬂuence factors contained in one situation, but not in the
other situation. Let us assume without loss of generality that we have two
situations Sitold and Sitnew and the respective dissimilarity sets disSitold
and disSitnew. Furthermore, we know that Sitold has an exposure value
assigned. All inﬂuence factors in the set disSitold are excrescent factors in
the sense that they are not contained in Sitnew. If we were to remove all of
these inﬂuence factors from the situation, we would make the situation more
general and therefore the exposure would increase. Thus, the set disSitold
is pulling towards a higher exposure. Analogously, the inﬂuence factors in
the set disSitnew make the situation more "special", resulting in a lower
exposure. Thus, the set disSitnew is pushing towards a lower exposure.
Figure 3.47 shows a schematic example of the "forces" described above.
Figure 3.47: Example of applying FFA to the exposure decision based on situation similarity
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In this example, the dissimilarities are disSitold = {City} and disSitnew =
{Childen playing in car}. Additionally, the exposure value of the old
situation is given as E4. Starting from E4 on the lower right, the forces are
displayed towards a lower/higher probability. Note that the inﬂuence factors
in the red rectangle are the common inﬂuence factors.
Figure 3.47 shows the forces of only one situation. We could extend the
ﬁgure by adding more abstract (common) situations as red rectangles and
drawing the forces based on the disSit sets. We omit the display of such an
example and assume that it is quite straightforward to understand that such
a picture with more than three of these rectangles gets quite complex visu-
ally. Furthermore, while Figure 3.47 nicely shows the idea of FFA applied to
exposure assessments based on situation similarity, the visual representation
is not the key beneﬁt. The purpose of Figure 3.47 is only to visualize the
application of FFA to the HRA situation exposure assessment.
For the practical application we kept the FFA idea but used a more compact
representation, a table. We explain our practical solution by using a small
example "situation". Let us assume:
I City Area
I µ-split
I 0km/h=vx
I Park
Based on this information, we can query the knowledge base for similar
situations. The result (produced by our approach and tool) is shown in
Figure 3.48. Shown is a screenshot of an Excel table with ﬁve columns. The
meaning of each column is as follows:
1. The column "HRASimFunc" shows the value calculated by the function
HRASimFunc (cf. (3.26)) introduced above.
2. The column "Name" is the name of the situation retrieved from the
knowledge base, i.e., an existing situation the new situation is evaluated
against.
3. The column "IF-" shows the set of inﬂuence factors the old situation has
in addition to the new situation. This is the set disSimold.
4. The column "AR" shows the assessment result in terms of exposure value.
5. The column "IF+" shows the inﬂuence factors the new situation has in
addition to the old situation. This is the set disSimnew.
The example shows in the ﬁrst row the case that a situation is already
contained in the knowledge base (HRASimFunc = 1,00). Thus, we could
short-cut the assessment process and just stick to the former assessment of
being "E2". However, for explanatory reasons we assume the ﬁrst (solution)
row does not exist (i.e., HB03 is not contained in the knowledge base).
The next row shows the situation with the name/id "HB02". This situation
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HRASimFuName IF- AR IF+
1,00 HB03 E2
0,96 HB02 * Down/Uphill_to_2_perCent
* High_µ
E4 * _µ_split
0,96 PLS04 * Down/Uphill_over_8_perCent
* High_µ
E3 * _µ_split
-0,90 TMS02 * Parking_Lot
* Hot_Temperature
E4 * City_Area
* _µ_split
0,89 PT04 * 0m/s²_x
* 30km/h_smallerThan_vx_smallerOrEqual_50km/h
* High_µ
* Drive_Straight
E4 * _µ_split
* 0km/h=vx
* Park
0,89 PT10 * +9m/s²_x
* High_µ
* Accelerate
* 0km/h_smallerThan_vx_smallerOrEqual_30km/h
E2 * _µ_split
* 0km/h=vx
* Park
0,89 PT08 * +3m/s²_x
* High_µ
* Accelerate
* 0km/h_smallerThan_vx_smallerOrEqual_30km/h
E4 * _µ_split
* 0km/h=vx
* Park
Figure 3.48: Example FFA table
additionally states that the vehicle is parked on an in/declined plane and
that there is "High µ" (cf. column "IF-"). The inﬂuence factor missing from
the situation to be assessed, is "µ-split". (Note, that we would usually say it
was exchanged with "High µ".) As explained above, the column AR shows,
the assessment result; in this case "E4" (for HB02). The task would be to
reason about the impact on the exposure when changing from "µ-split" to
"high µ" and the additional (up to 2%) in-/declined plane.
Thus, by leveraging the HRASimFunc-Function and the transferred idea of
Lewin's Force-Field-Analysis we have provided signiﬁcant support for the
decision process for HRA situation exposure.
As mentioned above, we want to present two practically important exten-
sions of the support approach. The focus is not on the concrete ﬁltering
approach, but to show diﬀerent (technical) extension approaches. We will
present the following two "ﬁlters":
− Set ﬁltering
− Restricted number of dissimilarities
A straightforward solution to all of these personalization ﬁlters is to deﬁne
rules and ﬁlter the similarities after calculation. Given the current size of the
knowledge base, this is not a problem, but it is not eﬃcient on the one hand
and not necessary on the other hand. What we want is to restrict the case-
based reasoning, thus, the calculation of HRASimFunc values upfront. The
"cases" stem from our ontology; thus, we need to ﬁrst "tell" the ontology
which situations are relevant and use only those as a basis for case-based
reasoning. The disadvantage, however, is that one might want to ﬁlter the
results after they are presented (based on what he sees). We will ﬁrst present
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ontology changes for the pre-reasoning-ﬁlters and afterwards explain our
solution for post-reasoning ﬁlters.
The ﬁrst ﬁltering option was to deﬁne sets of wanted and unwanted inﬂu-
ence factors. The ﬁrst part, the inﬂuence factors we want to have, is easy to
determine using the ontology. We simply deﬁne a class that contains all sit-
uations "consistingOf" the set of inﬂuence factors. This process is the same
we used for classifying the situations into a hierarchy using the ontology
reasoner (cf. section above). The nice "feature" we did not mention is that
not only the classes are classiﬁed, but the instances of the situations are
also assigned automatically assigned to the respective classes. This means
that we simply deﬁne the class as mentioned, run the reasoner/classiﬁer,
and feed the situation instances of the result into the case-based reasoning
process.
The opposite case, the negative list, is more diﬃcult. Due to the Open World
Assumption underlying OWL, we cannot just deﬁne that something is "not"
the case. If we describe a situation by the set of inﬂuence factors highway,
driving_straight does, for example, not mean that it is not raining!
In an open world scenario we need something we can refer to with "not".
Thus, we need to introduce closure into the ontology (at least for the situa-
tion example). One possibility is to deﬁne a class not by describing properties
that must be true for an instance to be a member of the class, but explicitly
as a set of (disjoint) instances.
The solution process is therefore:
1. Use the class value restriction to deﬁne positive and negative lists of
situations.
2. Take these sets of situations to make the situations disjoint.
3. Create for each set (positive and negative set of inﬂuence factors) a class
deﬁned by the respective set.
4. Deﬁne a new class, which is equivalent to the class describing the set of
situations compliant with the positive list criteria and not with the class
describing the set of situations compliant with the negative list.
The process is visualized/exempliﬁed in Figure 3.49.
Finally, ﬁltering by the number of dissimilarities is only possible once we
know what the dissimilarities are. These are determined during case-retrieval.
Thus, we cannot restrict this through ontological deﬁnitions upfront. Once
we have retrieved the data for displaying the table, we can simply count the
elements in the columns "IF-" and "IF+" and omit the situation if it does
not fulﬁll the maximal dissimilarity restriction.
We conclude this section by summarizing that we presented an ontology-
based exposure assessment support (with practicable extensions) on the
one hand, and provided a technique for checking the consistency of the
knowledge base on the other hand.
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Figure 3.49: Ontology-based situation filtering incl. negative lists
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3.5 ARID - Analysis of Risk through In-system Degradation
In the previous sections, we introduced with GOBI a formalization and inte-
gration framework. We furthermore discussed the formalization of situation
inﬂuences and situation assessments in the previous two sections, OASIS
and HEAT. The other fundamentally important factor for HRAs, besides
operational situations, is the hazard itself. Figure 3.50 shows the integration
of HEAT with the overall thesis on the one hand and the general structure
of this section on the other hand.
Figure 3.50: Integration overview of ARID
The main focus of this section is therefore on risk assessment. In section
"2.2 Core Challenges and Goals" the breakdown of fundamental challenges
was discussed:
6 Structuring of risk assessments
! Hazardous event classiﬁcation
w Dealing with multiple service failures
The challenge of risk assessments is the hazardous event classiﬁcation, i.e.,
performing an assessment and handling the enormous number of hazards if
not only single service failures are considered, but multiple service failures
as well.
This classiﬁcation inherits the challenges of formalizing and structuring con-
135
ARID - Analysis of Risk through In-system Degradation
trollability and severity estimations. However, these challenges are not the
subject of this thesis. For ARID, we take the traditional approach, as per-
formed in practice, of dealing with hazardous event classiﬁcation. Our focus
in this section is on the challenge of dealing with multiple service failures.
If we are talking about a safe vehicle (in the sense of functional safety), we
assume that all risks are acceptable. Hence, we imply or assume that there
is no event that results in a harm scenario that is not acceptable.
Technically, however, acceptability of all risks implies that we cannot stop
with assessing single feature failures, but also need to consider hazards con-
sisting of more than one failing feature. This statement is true in its gener-
icity, but becomes obvious if we consider two examples:
1. Assume we have an active steering system and a power train system
(with the respective features). If we look at the system from an external
feature-oriented perspective, we would assess the risks of both features
independently. If we assume that (due to the trend towards high inte-
gration of functions on one ECU) both systems are sharing the same
ECU, the question arises of what the risk is if the ECU is failing in such
a way that both features are failing dangerously. In this example, one
would obviously expect that this situation, i.e., a hazard comprising two
feature failures, is considered in the risk management process. If we look
at the immanent trend towards ever increasing integration of functions
on shared platforms, the question arises of how critical a common cause
(of multiple features) is. Is the assumption valid that a platform inherits
the maximal ASIL of the functions residing on it (or better: their require-
ments)? If we consider one platform containing an ASIL C function and
compare this to a platform containing 10 ASIL C functions, is it valid
that both platforms are developed with the same rigorousness?
2. Another scenario is given in the context of system-level redundancy.
By system-level redundancy we mean any other feature or service that
can compensate (at least to a certain extent) the failing of a ser-
vice. In automotive systems, system-level redundancy is reﬂected by
the controllability-assessment. Controllability allows reducing the risk
emerging from one system because the driver (or any other person) can
substitute the expected functionality by leveraging another function. A
concrete controllability argument is that a self-acceleration failure is
not too critical because the driver can over-brake the self-acceleration.
This means: If the car is accelerating without the driver's request, the
driver can still stop the car by using the brakes (assuming the brakes are
stronger than the engine, which is enforced by law). Thus, the risk emerg-
ing from the power-train system is reduced by relying on the functioning
of the brakes. If both systems are additionally subject to internal depen-
dencies as discussed in the ﬁrst example, the case is obvious; we need an
additional risk assessment. But even if we assume that both systems are
totally independent (in their realization), the question remains whether
the risk of both systems failing at the same time is acceptable. Shouldn't
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there be a (safety) requirement for ensuring independence in the real-
ization with a rigorousness derived from the risk that both systems are
failing?
The two cases introduced above are both examples in which the features
are dependent. In the ﬁrst case, we had an internal dependency situation;
in the second case, an external dependency situation.
Independent of a concrete situation, the challenge remains that in a worst-
case scenario, we have to assess the power set of feature failures. The fol-
lowing section is therefore structured into three sub-sections:
1. ARID Fundamentals
In this section, we present the modeling basics and fundamental consid-
erations for handling multiple service failures in an HRA.
2. ARID Concepts
In this section, we explain which knowledge we reuse and how we can
leverage this knowledge in the process of further hazard assessments.
3. ARID Analysis Process
In this section, we put the fundamentals and the concepts together and
describe a concrete analysis process.
While the ﬁrst two sub-sections are theoretical, the last part describes the
actual analysis. The theoretical sub-sections discuss the general idea and
the mathematical background of ARID, we will discuss the usage of ARID
and optimizations of the general theory in the analysis sub-section. The
optimization approach relies on OASIS and HEAT. We will therefore explain
their integration and interaction with ARID as part of the optimization
discussion.
After reading this section, the reader will know, on the one hand, how
models and their formal knowledge can be used to deal with multiple service
failures and, on the other hand, how a model-based approach for HRAs, such
as SAHARA (with OASIS 3.3 and HEAT cf. 3.4), enables us to deal with
multiple service failures.
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3.5.1 ARID Fundamentals
In order to understand the basic idea of ARID, we will summarize the tasks
and goals of safety engineering. The fundamental goal is to end up in a
system that only exposes acceptable risk(s). In order to achieve this, the
safety engineer essentially has to perform two tasks: the identiﬁcation and
assessment of risks, which results in necessary risk reductions, and the im-
plementation or realization of the risk reductions. Traditionally, these two
steps have been loosely coupled or only connected via the "safety goals".
This is even known ﬁguratively as the bow tie diagram of hazard analysis
(cf. also 2.7). Regarding this aspect, one can see a huge gap between in-
dustrial practice and scientiﬁc advancement. From a practical point of view,
we see the biggest improvement in hazard analysis in the clean separation
of hazards from system development. However, we only claim this because
hazards and causes for hazards are often mixed deliberately (in industrial
practice). If we assume that the separation of the terms and concepts is
clear (and fulﬁlled), as it is in the scientiﬁc community, a huge step forward
can be made by integrating the hazard analysis into the system development
(without losing the distinction between a hazard and its causes). We there-
fore propose integrating the realization of safety goals and the derivation of
safety goals more closely.
We propose this because especially with the challenge of exponential number
of hazards ahead, we need to limit ourselves to risk assessments that are rel-
evant! The relevance of an assessment can, however, only be determined in
the realization/implementation part: the system development. Thus, a risk
assessment is only relevant iﬀ its result has an impact on the development
of the system.
For the systematic reduction of risk assessments, the negation is maybe even
more interesting: We do not need to perform a risk assessment if we know
that the result will not have an impact on the development of the system!
The fundamental question, however, is how we can know that an assessment
does not impact the further development. We ﬁnd the answer in the realiza-
tion phase of the safety goals. Safety goals are broken down to components
and units. Whether a component is relevant is given by error propagation
models. If there is a cause that could lead to a violation of the safety goal,
the cause is assigned a safety requirement that ensures that the cause does
not appear (with a required likelihood). With this very coarse summary of
the process of safety engineering, we can explain the relevance of a risk
assessment. If we assume that a cause has "received" a certain safety re-
quirement ensuring that the cause does not occur, we can state that a risk
assessment that results in the same (or a less strict) safety requirement will
not yield new information or new restrictions and is therefore not necessary.
In order to work with safety requirements in a more formal way, we reduce
safety requirements to a maximal failure rate (or later a maximal occurrence
probability). Note that this is compliant with most safety standards. As
discussed in the state-of-the-art section, most safety standards deﬁne some
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kind of safety integrity level. ISO 26262 deﬁnes Automotive Safety Integrity
Levels. These levels can be translated into failure rates that need to be
ensured. For automotive systems, the maximal integrity level is ASIL D,
which can be translated into a failure rate of less that 10−8.
We explain the idea of ARID informally discussed above using an abstract
example.
Figure 3.51: Tiny example showing two fault trees for exemplifying the ARID idea
Figure 3.51 shows a fault tree consisting of two top events: ServiceFail-
ure1 and ServiceFailure2. Additionally, two basic events are shown (be1 and
be2). The (very) basic idea of ARID exempliﬁed in this ﬁgure is that if we
assume we are in an automotive context, the maximal safety requirement
(with ASIL D) is quantitatively the requirement of being smaller than 10−8,
as introduced above. Let us assume that one hazard is associated with Ser-
viceFailure1 and the risk assessment result is that ServiceFailure1 must not
have a failure rate higher than 10−8; thus it has an ASIL D safety require-
ment. But in this we have not used our knowledge to the full extent. If
ServiceFailure1 needs to have a failure rate no higher than 10−8 and be1
is the only cause for this service failure, we can derive that the basic event
be1 must not have a higher failure rate than 10−8. With this knowledge,
however, we can derive that the combined failure rate of be1∧ be2 cannot
be higher than 10−8 (independent of the concrete failure rate of be2!).
Due to the fact that ServiceFailure2 consists exactly of this combination,
we can derive that due to the assessment of (the risk associated with) Ser-
viceFailure1, ServiceFailure2 cannot have a higher failure rate than 10−8.
Thus, if we were to assess the hazard consisting of ServiceFailure2, the max-
imal requirement we could get is 10−8, but this is already ensured. Hence,
there is no need to manually assess this hazard! (We would not get more
safety requirements than we already have.) However, we should retain the
information that the hazard has the requirement of 10−8. Note that this
is a very simpliﬁed, synthetic example for showing the basic idea of ARID.
However, it shows that by storing the risk assessment result in the system-
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internal model as a development constraint, we can reuse that knowledge
to reduce the number of hazards to be analyzed.
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Model Basics
As described above, ARID strongly relies on knowledge (contained in mod-
els) about:
I the system (with respect to features and their dependencies)
I the failure propagation and, especially, the basic event (cause) distribution
I the assessment result in terms of quantitative development constraints
(ASILs)
As introduced with GOBI, we already have a formalization for important
terms and concepts such as feature or service. This formalization is impor-
tant for ARID as well. However, it represents only an abstract mathematical
formalization and not a concrete model-based approach. We will not pro-
vide a new model-based approach, but will use common, practically relevant
modeling approaches for the concrete discussion of ARID.
Please note that our approach does not rely on the speciﬁc models pre-
sented. It can be transferred to other model types if they are able to express
the required concepts.
In the following, we will present the required concepts for each of the above-
stated three models.
Figure 3.52: Introductory functional network with service annotation
Figure 3.52 shows an example of a service-annotated functional network.
Shown are four functions (instf1:f1, instf2:f2, instf3:f3, instf4:f4) with
three of the functions being connected in a network and the fourth function
instf4:f4 not connected. The connected functions are connected via inports
and outports, which reside on the sides of the functions: Inports are on
the left side; outports on the right side. Additionally, there are blue ports
displayed on the top of the three rightmost functions. These ports constitute
the service the function delivers.
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More formally, we can deﬁne a function f with inports PI , outports PO,
and services S as:
f = (PI , PO, S) (3.35)
We use the capital letter version to refer to a set of functions and add a
tuple label if appropriate:
FA = {”function name 1” = (PI1 ,PO1 ,S1 ) (3.36)
”function name 2” = (PI2 ,PO2 ,S2 ) (3.37)
...
”function name n” = (PIn ,POn ,Sn )} (3.38)
A connection relation from outports to inports is deﬁned by:
Rconnect ⊆ PO × PI with (po, pi) ∈ Rconnect
iﬀ outport po is connected to inport pi (3.39)
Formally expressed, the example from above is therefore:
FA = {”instf1 : f1” = ( {} , {out1_1} , {} ) , (3.40)
”instf2 : f2” = ( {in2_1} , {out2_1} , {s1} ) , (3.41)
”instf3 : f3” = ( {in3_1, in3_2} , {} , {s2} ) , (3.42)
”instf4 : f4” = ( {} , {} , {s3} ) } (3.43)
Rconnect = {(out1_1, in2_1) , (out1_1, in3_2) , (out2_1, in3_1)}
(3.44)
Besides this service-annotated functional network, we need system-internal
knowledge about the causes why services fail. There are many approaches
available to model cause-eﬀect relations. We refer to Domis [Dom12] for
an extensive discussion of failure logic models and also use the approach
he uses: Component Integrated Component Fault Trees [ADH+10]. Figure
3.53 shows a failure logic model as a Component Fault Tree.
The essential parts of such a failure logic model are:
− A set of service failures SF
− A set of basic events BE
− A Boolean logic formula connecting service failures and basic events; any
representation of a Boolean logic formula can be used. Without loss of
generality we use the canonical sum of products representation:
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Figure 3.53: Introductory failure logic model as Component Fault Tree
fFT (sf) = ∨i ∧j
(
beij ∨ beij
)
with beij ∈ BE (3.45)
Formalized with the introduced deﬁnitions, the example is:
SF = {sf1, sf2, sf3, sf4} (3.46)
BE = {a, b, c, d, e, f} (3.47)
fFT (sf1) = a ∧ b (3.48)
fFT (sf2) = f (3.49)
fFT (sf3) = b ∧ c ∨ e (3.50)
fFT (sf4) = a ∧ d (3.51)
Note that Figure 3.53 additionally shows which basic event belongs to which
function (cf. the black boxes in Figure 3.53). This can be expressed by the
following formal relation:
RFunctionFaults : F ×BE with (3.52)
RFunctionFaults = {(f, be) ∈ F ×BE| (3.53)
Basic event be is contained in function f } (3.54)
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In our example RFunctionFaults holds the following tuples:
RFunctionFaults = { (f1, a) , (3.55)
(f2, b) , (f2, c) , (3.56)
(f3, d) , (f3, e) , (3.57)
(f4, f) } (3.58)
Now we are almost set to present our approach for dealing with hazards
consisting of multiple service failures. However, we need to deﬁne hazards
more formally. For ARID, a hazard is a set of service failures:
H = P (SF ) (3.59)
We further deﬁne an abbreviated notation for the cardinality of a hazard:
For h with |h| = n we write: hn (3.60)
Analogously we denote with Hn the set of all hazards consisting of n service
failures. Hence, we can constructively deﬁne the set of hazards of a system
with the set of service failures SF as:
H =
|SF |⋃
n=1
Hn (3.61)
Note that by deﬁnition cf. 3.59, the Boolean logic formula describing the
failure logic for a hazard to occur is:
FH (h) =
∧
sf∈h
fFT (sf) (3.62)
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ARID's basic idea
In this section, we use the above-discussed ARID fundamentals and intro-
duce the basic idea of ARID on a conceptual level.
The ﬁrst aspect we will discuss in more detail is the formal background of
quantitative safety requirements. The quantitative part of a safety require-
ment is usually given as the maximally allowed failure rate (or hazard rate).
It is often given as a failure in time (FIT) value and is denoted by the Greek
letter λ. One FIT is deﬁned as one failure in 109 hours. This deﬁnition does,
however, imply a constant failure rate. In general, the failure rate is time
dependent λ (t). But if a safety requirement states that a certain failure rate
should not be exceeded, it means that this requirement is a kind of constant
boundary. The actual technical failure rate can be time-dependent, but one
must ensure that the failure rate does not exceed the given boundary at
any time. Our approach deals with eliciting the requirements, and we can
therefore always assume a constant failure rate.
Often (mistakenly) uniﬁed is the occurrence probability (of a failure). How-
ever, a probability always requires the deﬁnition of a certain period of time.
If we assume a continuous process, the failure probability is deﬁned by:
P (T ≤ t) = F (t) =
t∫
0
f (τ) dτ (3.63)
In this equation, F (t) is the failure distribution function and f(t) is the
failure density function. If we assume a constant failure rate (as discussed
above), the respective density function is the exponential density function
fe (t).
fe (t) = λe
−λt (3.64)
The corresponding failure distribution (and probability function), termed
exponential failure distribution (Fe (t)), is:
P (t) = Fe (t) =
t∫
0
λe−λτdτ = 1− e−λt (3.65)
For a given mission time tm and exponential distribution, we can therefore
transform the failure rate into a probability and vice versa. According to the
German Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt (Federal Motor Vehicle Oﬃce), the average
age of vehicles in Germany (as of 01.01.2013) is 8.7 years [KB13]. If we
take this as the mission time of a vehicle we can transform the failure rate
requirements into probability requirements:
We know, of course, that the commonly accepted safety engineering prac-
tice is to use failure rates as the fundamental model. Due to the fact that
calculations with failures rates are very diﬃcult, many tools, such as Fault
145
ARID - Analysis of Risk through In-system Degradation
Table 3.4: Failure probability based on constant failure rate and 8.7 years of mission time
λ P (8.7a)
10−04 100%
10−05 53%
10−06 7.3%
10−07 0.76%
10−08 0.076%
10−09 0.0076%
Tree tools, use the duality of failure rates and probabilities and do internal
calculations with probabilities. We subscribe the same idea and therefore
use probabilities in our approach. In the following, we will discuss the devel-
opment implications of a risk assessment.
Risk assessment results in a quantitative safety goal to be achieved. The
responsibility of the subsequent safety- and systems engineering is to ensure
that this goal is achieved. In order to fulﬁll this, one reduces the occurrence
likelihood of causes of the unwanted top-event. In fault trees, causes and
their relations are given by basic events. The logical formula additionally
introduces the knowledge about which basic events must occur together
to trigger the top-event. A canonical representation of these necessary and
suﬃcient sets of basic events (derived from Boolean logic formulas) is the
prime implicant (or minimal cut set) representation.
Given a Boolean logic formula f (such as our fFT deﬁned above), an im-
plicant of f is a product term p that implies f .(
p is implicant of f
)
⇔
(
p⇒ f
)
⇔
(
∀−→x p (−→x ) = 1⇒ f (−→x ) = 1
)
(3.66)
We can furthermore deﬁne that a prime implicant of a function is an im-
plicant that is minimal. The interesting aspect of prime implicants is that
a (Boolean logic) function can be represented by a complete set of prime
implicants. This representation is called Blake canonical form [Sas96]. It is
a disjunctive normal form (that is not necessarily minimal) [Bro03]. We as-
sume that P (fFT) extracts the set of prime implicants of a Boolean logic
(fault tree) formula. We use ℘ ∈ P (fFT) to refer to a prime implicant of
fFT.
Let us assume that we have a service failure sf and its associated failure
propagation model fFT (sf), as deﬁned above. If we assess the risk of the
hazard consisting of this service failure, we end up with some requirements
for avoiding the service failure to occur. Quantitatively, we assign to the
146
SAHARA - a Structured Approach for Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessments
top-event a safety requirement with a maximal failure rate of ≤ 10−α :
λreq (fFT (sf)) ≤ 10−α.
We furthermore know that based on the fact that the requirement is a
constant failure rate (as a boundary) and that we can assume an average
mission time of 8.7 years, we can translate the failure rate into a maximal
occurrence probability over the lifetime:
Preq (fFT (sf)) ≤ 10−β . It holds that:
Preq (fFT (sf)) = 1− eλreq(fFT(sf))∗8.7a (3.67)
10−β = 1− e10−a∗8.7a (3.68)
or
β = −
ln
(
1− e10−α∗8.7a
)
ln 10
(3.69)
In the following, we will use probability as a requirement. Due to the char-
acteristics of being a prime implicant, we can derive the following necessary
requirement for the prime implicants of fFT (sf):
∀℘ ∈ P (fFT (sf)) : Preq (℘) ≤ 10−β (3.70)
The development constraint is that the actual probability of a prime impli-
cant Pact (℘) to occur must be in the interval:
[
0, 10−β
]
.
If we store these prime implicant requirements and assume that they will
be fulﬁlled during system development, we can systematically reduce the
number of hazards to be assesses. We will explain this using an abstract
example.
We assume that we have already assessed some hazards and have a cor-
responding set of prime implicants P√ with quantitative requirements as-
signed. If we now consider a new hazard h and an implied failure propagation
formula fFT (h), we can calculate the set of prime implicants of this func-
tion: P (fFT (h)).
Given these two sets of prime implicants, it might be that we already have
requirement boundaries for (some of) the prime implicants in P (fFT (h)).
We obviously have concrete boundaries for the set: P (fFT (h)) ∩ P
√
. But
we can furthermore derive boundaries based on the information of the given
requirements. This reasoning is based on the fact that implicants can be
seen as sets of literals (in one conjunction). The usual construct of a subset
relation induces a partial order into the set of literals. This means that we
can order each set of literals (and by this the implicants) partially. If the set
of literals is, for example, {a, b, c}, we can build a partial order as displayed
in Figure 3.54.
Each element in the partial order is a conjunction of literals. Each element
logically implies its descendents (bigger elements). In Figure 3.54, the ar-
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Figure 3.54: Partial order of implicants
rows can therefore be interpreted as logical implications (if the nodes are
conjunctions of the contained literals). For example: a ∧ b⇒ a
The implication can be used for the derivation of the probability require-
ments as well. If we assume that there are two independent events a and b,
and we know that Preq(b) ≤ ς, we know that:
if a⇒ b and P (b) ≤ ς then P (a) ≤ ς (3.71)
Transferred to our prime implicants example, we derive that if one prime im-
plicant ℘? of the new hazard (℘? ∈ P (fFT (h))) implies one prime implicant
for which we have a requirements boundary, it inherits that requirement.
Pact(℘
?) = min
{
Pact(℘) | ℘? ⇒ ℘ ∧ Pact(℘) := Preq(℘)
}
,∀℘ ∈ P
√
(3.72)
We can now furthermore derive that the hazard to be assessed (or the
respective top event) has at least the probability boundary of the prime
implicant with the maximally valued requirement boundary (because the
function is a disjunction of prime implicants).
Pact (fFT (h)) = max {Pact(℘)} ,∀℘ ∈ P (fFT (h)) (3.73)
In the introduction of this section, we stated that each domain has a minimal
boundary of requirement. For avionics, this boundary is a failure rate of
10−9; for automotive, we have a failure rate of 10−8, which is equivalent to
a probability over mission time (of 8.7 years) of 0.076% (cf. 3.4). Thus, if
equation 3.73 results in the following actual constraint:
Pact (fFT (h)) ≤ 0.076% (3.74)
then there is no need to assess the risk of hazard h!
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3.5.2 ARID Concepts
Knowledge reuse approach
The simple technique introduced above can be used already; however, it
is very limited in its capability because we propagate only the minimal re-
quirement to the prime implicants and the maximal requirement to the top
event. In order to understand why this is not very sophisticated knowledge,
we come back to our abstract partial order shown in Figure 3.54. If we as-
sume that we want to assess a hazard that has {a, b} as prime implicant
and if we additionally know that P ({a}) = P ({b}) = 0.5, the algorithm
introduced above can only derive that P ({a, b}) ≤ 0.5. Due to the fact that
all variables (literals) are independent, we know from logics and probability
calculation that
P ({a, b}) = P ({a}) ∗ P ({b}) = 0.5 ∗ 0.5 = 0.25 (3.75)
More generally speaking, the task is to determine for a given prime implicant
a partition into disjoint implicants that delivers the minimal result. If, for
example, we again consider Figure 3.54 and if we further assume that we
want to know the actual requirements implication of the top-most implicant:
{a, b, c}, then we could, of course, determine Pact({a}), Pact({b}), and
Pact({c}) and multiply the results as shown above. Due to the fact that a set
of literals can have a stricter requirement than the multiplication of the single
parts of the set, another possibility for the determination of Pact({a, b, c})
could be to multiply:
Pact({a, b}) ∗ Pact({c}) or (3.76)
Pact({a, c}) ∗ Pact({b}) or (3.77)
...
For only one prime implicant to decide which actual requirements obligation
the implicant has, we need to ﬁnd an optimal combination, which is obviously
not trivial.
In order to formalize this we need some prerequisites:
− We need to formalize the disjointness of sets of literals (in order to be
able to multiply the probabilities)
− We need to determine the set of all possible combinations of disjoint
subsets ({a, b} + {c}, {a, c} + {b}, . . .
− We need to calculate the minimal actual requirement of the sets of
disjoint subsets.
Disjointness
Let ℘1 and ℘2 be two sets of literals (like prime implicants). We deﬁne
P̂(℘1, ℘2) : P×P → P as a function that calculates the commonly implied
149
ARID - Analysis of Risk through In-system Degradation
"implicants" over the set of literals L by:
P̂(℘1, ℘2) =
{
℘|℘ ∈ 2L \ {} ∧ ℘1 ⇒ ℘ ∧ ℘2 ⇒ ℘
}
(3.78)
(Note that we used 2L to refer to the power set of L.)
For example:
P̂({a, b, c} , {b, c, d}) = {{b} , {c} , {b, c}} (3.79)
We can now deﬁne the disjointness decision function as:
Xdisjoint (P) =
{
1 if ∀℘1, ℘2 ∈ P : ℘1 6= ℘2 ⇒ P̂(℘1, ℘2) = ∅
0 else
(3.80)
Thus,
Sets of sets of literals ℘1 . . . ℘n are disjoint (3.81)
⇔ Xdisjoint({℘1, . . . ℘n}) = 1 (3.82)
Combinations of disjoint sets
The next step is to determine all combinations of disjoint sets of prime
implicants. Let ℘ be the prime implicant we are analyzing and P√ the set
of already assessed prime implicants:
ρ(℘,P
√
) =
{
P˜|P˜ ⊂ P
√
∧ Xdisjoint(P˜) ∧ ∀℘′ ∈ P˜ : ℘⇒ ℘′
}
(3.83)
Minimal Actual Requirement of ℘
We can now deﬁne our more sophisticated knowledge extraction function
in the following way:
Let us again assume a set of already assessed prime implicants P√
with requirements boundaries and an unassessed set of prime implicants
P (fFT (h)). For each ℘? ∈ P (fFT (h)) we can derive:
Pact(℘
?) = min
Pact(℘) | Pact(℘) := ∏
℘∈P?
Preq(℘)
 ,∀P? ∈ ρ(℘?,P√)
(3.84)
What is done in equation 3.84 is that we build all disjoint sets of prime
implicants that are implied by ℘? and then calculate the probabilities of the
elements in these sets. Finally, we derive the minimum as an already implied
requirement for ℘?.
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Problem Complexity
While this equation works in theory, in practice the challenge is how to
calculate this. In the worst case. the set of all disjoint sets has exponential
size (exponential with the number of literals). The problem to solve is NP-
hard. We prove this by showing that a maximum clique problem can be
reduced to an instance of our prime-implicant minimization problem!
Let us assume that we have an undirected graph G = (V,E). A clique in
the graph is a subset of vertices C ⊆ V , such that for every two vertices
in C, there exists an edge connecting the two. Let us formalize the edge
decision:
Let v1 and v2 be vertices in V :
Xedge (v1, v2) =
{
1 if ∃e ∈ E : e = {v1, v2}
0 else
(3.85)
We furthermore deﬁne a clique decision function for a subset of vertices
C ⊆ V and the graph G as:
Xclique (C,G) =
{
1 if ∀v1, v2 ∈ C with v1 6= v2 | Xedge (v1, v2) = 1
0 else
(3.86)
Let C = {C ′ ⊆ V |Xclique (C ′, G) = 1} be the set of all cliques of a graph
G. A maximum clique Cmax in G is:
Cmax ∈ C ∧ ∀C ∈ C | |C| ≤ |Cmax| (3.87)
The transformation into our prime-implicant minimization problem is given
by the following.
1. We deﬁne the set of missing edges in G as E:
E = {e | e = {v1, v2} ∧ v1, v2 ∈ V ∧ Xedge (v1, v2) = 0}
2. For every edge e ∈ E we create a (unique) literal le ∈ L
L : E → L is (additionally) a function, mapping edges to literals: L (e) =
le
3. For every vertex v ∈ V we create a set of literals ℘v (a prime implicant)
by:
℘v =
{
lei ∈ L | ∃ei ∈ E : (L (ei) = lei ∧ ∃v′ ∈ V : {v′, v} = ei)
}
4. We deﬁne for every ℘v the requirements maximum as Preq (℘v) = 0.1
(or any other constant with a value  < 1).
5. The prime implicant to be assessed is given by the complete set of literals:
℘? = L
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Figure 3.55: Example showing the clique problem reduction
We claim that the result of our knowledge extraction function 3.84 selects a
set of disjoint prime implicants that imply the maximum clique in the above
graph. Before proving our claim, we show a small example (cf. Figure 3.55).
The four sub-ﬁgures in Figure 3.55 show in (1) the original graph for which
we want to ﬁnd the maximum clique for. In (2), we extended in red the miss-
ing edges (cf. step 1. from above). In (3), we added (unique) literals to each
edge (cf. step 2. above). The ﬁnal set of literals L = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h}.
In (4), we rearranged the graph to better identify the labels of the edges.
The next step, 3., from the above results is a list of sets of literals and 4.
assigns a safety requirement of Preq = 0.1 to it. Both are shown in Table
3.5.
The prime implicant to be analyzed is given by ℘? = L = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h}.
In Table 3.6, we listed the set of all disjoint sets and calculated the respective
requirements.
The minimum in Table 3.6 is given in the last row (with ID=14). The sets
of literals belong to the graph vertices 1, 2, and 5. This is also the maximum
clique set.
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v ℘v Preq(℘v)
1 {d, e, f} 0.1 (= )
2 {c, g} 0.1 (= )
3 {a, f, h} 0.1 (= )
4 {e, g} 0.1 (= )
5 {b, h} 0.1 (= )
6 {a, b, c, d} 0.1 (= )
Table 3.5: Clique problem translation steps 3.+4.
ID disjoint set of sets of literals Preq(℘
?)
1 {d, e, f} 0.1 (= )
2 {c, g} 0.1 (= )
3 {a, f, h} 0.1 (= )
4 {e, g} 0.1 (= )
5 {b, h} 0.1 (= )
6 {a, b, c, d} 0.1 (= )
7 {d, e, f} , {c, g} 0.01 (= 2)
8 {d, e, f} , {b, h} 0.01 (= 2)
9 {c, g} , {b, h} 0.01 (= 2)
10 {c, g} , {a, f, h} 0.01 (= 2)
11 {a, f, h} , {e, g} 0.01 (= 2)
12 {e, g} , {b, h} 0.01 (= 2)
13 {e, g} , {a, b, c, d} 0.01 (= 2)
14 {d, e, f} , {c, g} , {b, h} 0.001 (= 3)
Table 3.6: Determination of minimal requirement based on disjoint sets of literals
Proof:
1. We prove that each disjoint set of prime implicants induces a clique in
its respective set of vertices:
We assume that there is a disjoint set of prime implicants P that does
not induce a clique. The respective vertices are VP ⊆ V . Without lack of
generality, letv1, v2 ∈ VP be the vertices without an edge in the original
graph, and ℘1, ℘2 ∈ P the respective prime implicants. By construction,
we include the missing edge and derive a unique literal l for it. We further
know that this literal must be in ℘1 as well as in ℘2. This, however, is
a contradiction to our assumption that the set of prime implicants P is
disjoint.

2. We prove that the minimal requirement results in the maximum clique:
Each set of literals in the disjoint set of prime implicants has the same
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requirement (0.1). We can in this case deﬁne that the actual requirement
of a set of disjoint prime implicants P℘ is Pact(P℘) = 0.1
|P℘|. Due to
the fact that each set of literals "belongs" to one vertex in the graph
G, it is obvious that the induced clique has the order |P℘|. Using this
observation, the rest of the proof is trivial. 

This tells us that our optimization problem is at least NP-equivalent. Due to
good tool support and eﬃcient heuristics for optimizations, we decided to
use linear programming to implement our knowledge extraction function. A
linear program is a problem that can be expressed in the following canonical
form:
maximize cTx
subject to Ax ≤ b
and x ≥ 0
A binary integer program (BIP) is a program in which the variables x can
only hold 0 or 1. This problem is classiﬁed as NP-hard.
We can translate our problem into an BIP. The construction of matrix A is
as follows:
Each column can be thought of as being one prime implicant we already
assessed and each row describes a literal in the prime implicant we are
looking for. The concrete entry in the table (the coeﬃcient) is 0 or 1,
dependent on whether the literal is contained in the prime implicant or not.
The vector b has only 0 and 1 entries as well. It "selects" the relevant literals,
i.e., if one literal is contained in the prime implicant we are looking for, b
has as the respective entry: "1" and "0" otherwise.
b(℘, l) = χlit(℘, l) :=
{
1 if l ∈ ℘
0 else
(3.88)
For the optimization function max
{
cTx
}
we reformulate our knowledge
extraction minimization function:
154
SAHARA - a Structured Approach for Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessments
min
 ∏
℘∈P?
Preq(℘)
⇔ (3.89)
min
log
 ∏
℘∈P?
Preq(℘)

⇔ (3.90)
min
∑
℘∈P?
log {Preq(℘)}
⇔ (3.91)
max
∑
℘∈P?
− log {Preq(℘)}
 (3.92)
Thus, if we assume (w.l.o.g) that P√ has a numbering such as: P√ =
{℘1, ℘2, . . . , ℘n}, then:
~c
ARID
=

− log {Preq(℘1)}
− log {Preq(℘2)}
...
− log {Preq(℘n)}
 ~xARID =

x℘1
x℘2
...
x℘n
 (3.93)
If we assume the literals l1, l2, . . . , lk and we are investigating for prime
implicant ℘, we get:
~b
ARID
=

χlit(℘, l1)
χlit(℘, l2)
...
χlit(℘, lk)
 (3.94)
A
ARID
=

℘1 ℘2 ... ℘n
l1 χlit(℘1, l1) χlit(℘2, l1) . . . χlit(℘n, l1)
l2 χlit(℘1, l2) χlit(℘2, l2) . . . χlit(℘n, l2)
...
...
...
. . .
...
lk χlit(℘1, lk) χlit(℘2, lk) . . . χlit(℘n, lk)
 (3.95)
Thus the ARID prime implicant BIP problem is given by:
max
{
~c
ARID
T ~x
ARID
}
with A
ARID
~x
ARID
≤ ~b
ARID
(3.96)
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As described above, the vector ~b
ARID
can contain entries with 0. However,
this means that the literal cannot be contained in the solution vector. Thus,
we can reduce the problem by removing all prime implicants (columns) from
A
ARID
for which the literal (the row) should not be contained (as indicated
by ~b
ARID
). Removing a column does however, require to removing the
variable from the solution vector as well. In the following concrete example,
we do not construct the complete BIP but only the reduced version, as
discussed above.
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Example
Figure 3.56 shows an abstract system consisting of four functions (f1, f2,
f3, f4) displayed as black rectangles. The detailed information displays Fault
Trees for four service failures (sf1, sf2, sf3, sf4) and the respective failure
logic. The basic event set B is given as B = {a, b, c, d, e, f}.
Figure 3.56: Abstract example to show the knowledge extraction idea of ARID
We assume that the hazards h with single service failures have already been
assessed. The results of these assessments are shown in Table 3.7. The ﬁrst
column indicates the assessed service failure, the second column contains
the result as probability, the third column shows the failure logic, and the
fourth column represents the Boolean logic formula.
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Table 3.7: Result of the four single service failure hazard and risk assessments.
h = Preq({h}) = fFT (h) = P(h) =
{sf1} 0.76% a ∧ b {{a, b}}
{sf2} 0.076% f {{f}}
{sf3} 7.6% b ∧ c ∨ e {{a} , {b, c}}
{sf4} 53% a ∧ d {{a, d}}
Thus, the internal knowledge we can derive from these assessments is given
by:
Table 3.8: Internal knowledge of prime implicant probability requirements
℘ Preq(℘)
{b, c} 7.6%
{e} 7.6%
{a, b} 0.76%
{a, d} 53%
{f} 0.076%
Now we want to know whether we need to assess the hazard h{3,4} =
{sf3, sf4} consisting of the two service failures sf3 and sf4. We therefore
need to create the combined Boolean logic formula:
sf3 ∧ sf4 = (b ∧ c ∨ e) ∧ (a ∧ d) =
℘?1={a,d,e}︷ ︸︸ ︷
(a ∧ d ∧ e)∨
℘?2={a,b,c,d}︷ ︸︸ ︷
(a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d)
Both prime implicants ℘?1, ℘
?
2 are unknown. We use our binary logic pro-
gramming approach to determine the currently assurable probability.
The BIP for ℘?1 = {a, d, e}:
A =

{e} {a,b} {a,d}
a 0 1 1
d 0 0 1
e 1 0 0
 ~x =
 xexa,b
xa,d
 ~c =
1.1192.119
0.276
 ~b =
11
1

The solution of this BIP is:
~xsol =
11
0
 Preq(℘?1) = 0.05776%
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For this prime implicant we can assure a probability of 0.05776%!
The BIP for ℘?2 = {a, b, c, d}:
A =

{b,c} {a,b} {a,d}
a 0 1 1
b 1 1 0
c 1 0 0
d 0 0 1
 ~x =
xb,cxa,b
xa,d

~c =
1.1192.119
0.276
 ~b =

1
1
1
1

The solution of this BIP is:
~xsol =
10
1
 Preq(℘?2) = 4.028%
For this prime implicant we can only assure a minimal probability of 4.028%!
The ﬁnal step to decide whether the hazard h{3,4} needs to be assessed is
to calculate the maximum of the prime implicant's assurable probabilities.
This is obviously 4.028%. We know that in the automotive domain, the
strictest safety requirement has ASIL D, an associated failure rate of 10−8,
and a probability of 0.076%. Thus, we cannot exclude this hazard from the
assessment.
Decision Optimization
In the example above, we discussed a hazard consisting of the two service
failures sf3 and sf4. While the process via a binary linear program is always
possible, its complexity is exponential. In some special cases we can reduce
the decision complexity and derive the result much easier. The improvement
possibility lies in the dependence of hazards (or service failures). Due to
the fact that we represent all fault trees as disjunctions of conjunctions of
literals, we can deﬁne three internal dependency cases.
1. totally independent
2. sharing a prime implicant
3. sharing a subset of a prime implicant (including sharing only one basic
event)
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These three cases are schematically shown in Figure 3.57. Each dependency
Figure 3.57: Figure showing the three possibilities for internal dependencies
case has some inherent knowledge we can use to optimize knowledge ex-
traction. The "summary" of the knowledge is shown as a formula at the top
of the ﬁgure. In the following, we will present the derivation of this for each
case in the following.
The leftmost case shows the independence case. Let us come back to our
example (cf. Figure 3.56). If we want know whether we need to analyze
the hazard h{3,4} = {sf2, sf3}, we see that the two service failures do not
share any basic event; thus, they are internally independent of each other.
The prime implicants to be investigated are:
sf2 ∧ sf3 =
℘?1={b,c,f}︷ ︸︸ ︷
(b ∧ c ∧ f)∨
℘?2={e,f}︷ ︸︸ ︷
(e ∧ f)
The BIP matrix A
ARID
for the prime implicant ℘?1 looks like this:
A =

{b,c} {f}
b 1 0
c 1 0
f 0 1

The obvious solution is given by "selecting" both prime implicants
{b, c} , {f}. Generalizing the independence case yields the following:
We assume two (internally independent) service failures sfx, sfy. Both have
a corresponding set of prime implicants in the set of assessed prime impli-
cants P√. Due to the internal independence, there is no literal li that occurs
in a prime implicant from sfx as well as one of sfy. We can therefore sep-
arate both sets P√ and L into disjoint sets of prime implicants and literals
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each belonging to either sfx or sfy. Without lack of generality, we assume
that the ﬁrst subset P
√
x = {℘1, . . . , ℘k} and Lx = {l1, . . . , lm} belongs to
sfx and the second subset P
√
y = {℘k+1, . . . , ℘n} and Ly = {lm+1, . . . , lo}
belongs to sfy. The matrix AARID always looks like this:
A
ARID
=

℘1...℘k ℘k+1...℘n
l m
+
1
..
.l
o
0 AARID (sfy)
l 1
..
.l
m
A
ARID
(sfx) 0

Thus, we have two independent BIPs calculating the actual requirement of
sfx and sfy. This we know already because we already assessed the risk of
both single service failures. The result is the multiplication of both top-level
safety requirements: Preq(fFT (sfx)) ∗ Preq(fFT (sfy)).
⇒We can omit the construction of a BIP if the service failures are internally
independent. However, we get the same result by simply multiplying the top-
level requirements.
The middle case of dependency shown in Figure 3.57 is given by the fact
that the two hazards share a complete prime implicant ℘s. Due to the fact
that
(℘s ⇒ fFT (h1)) ∧ (℘s ⇒ fFT (h2))↔ ℘s ⇒ (fFT (h1) ∧ fFT (h2)) (3.97)
℘s is also a prime implicant of the conjunction of the two hazards (or the
"new" hazard h12). All other prime implicants are mutually independent (of
h1 and h2) and can therefore be treated like the ﬁrst case: Determine the
actual requirement by multiplication. Due to the fact that the ﬁnal decision
about the assurable actual requirement of h12 is determined by determining
the maximum over all prime implicant requirements, we can state that the
maximum requirement is given by the shared prime implicants requirement.
This is easy to understand and we therefore omit proving this. We rather
want to point out that for deciding whether two functions share (only) a
prime implicant, we can pair-wise compare the prime implicants yielding a
complexity of O(n2).
The last case (the rightmost case in Figure 3.57) is given by sharing only a
subset of a prime implicant. This means that one prime implicant of h12 in
the ﬁgure would be ℘wxy = w∧x∧y. For both single hazards, however, this
is not a prime implicant (but only an implicant). If we analyze (via the BIP)
this prime implicant ℘wxy, two solutions for the implied constraint system
of the BIP (A ∗ x ≤ b) are obviously the two prime implicants ℘wx = w ∧ x
and ℘xy = x ∧ y. However, this information is not very valuable because
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this basically yields that the actual requirement of the conjunction is the
minimum of the actual requirement of the single hazards.
As stated above, all three cases are a kind of heuristics as to whether it
makes sense to construct and evaluate BIPs. The decision is given by evalu-
ating whether the actual requirement is lower than the minimally achievable
requirement boundary (as discussed above). The least restrictive case is ob-
viously the last case. From this case we can derive that we do not need
to assess combinations of hazards if one hazard already reaches the bound-
ary. More generally, all hazards that contain a partial set of service failures
that have reached the requirements boundary do not need to be analyzed
anymore!
Up to now we dealt with optimizing the eﬃciency and preciseness of the
prediction of the already assurable requirements boundary of a hazard. This
was based solely on internal information, such as information on error prop-
agation and prime implicant requirements. We can use external knowledge
as well. We cannot use external knowledge to better predict the assessment
result of a hazard, but we can try to lower our "expectations". By expec-
tations we mean that we have assumed up to now that each assessment
can result in the (maximal) domain requirement (or the respective mini-
mal probability). If we could reduce our expectations regarding possible risk
assessment results, we could sort out hazard analyses even more eﬀectively!
The starting point for this are the operational situations. If we consider a
set of service failures, the service failures must be compatible in the sense
that they must be critical in a common situation. If one service failure is,
for example, only critical if the vehicle is braking and another one is only
critical if the vehicle is accelerating, there is no critical common situation,
and the hazard does not need to be assessed.
OASIS and HEAT dealt with the formalization and exposure assessment
support of operational situations. In the following, we will recap the part of
the respective discussions that are relevant for ARID.
Relevant "Operational Situation" part
The necessary part of (GOBI and) OASIS/HEAT for ARID is the formal
representation of situations, their inﬂuence factors and inﬂuence factor de-
pendencies (as domain knowledge). The formal part we need in ARID are
the set of inﬂuence factors, IF, the set of situations SIT, and their relations
"imply, inﬂuence, and exclude" (cf. 3.3.3):
SIT = P (IF ) or sit ⊆ IF with sit ∈ SIT (3.98)
With respect to the introduced relations capturing domain knowledge, of
special interest for ARID is the information whether situations are mutually
exclusive or not (please recall the "exclude"-relation). If we query the con-
crete model for all inﬂuence factors that are mutually exclusive, we get a list
of pairs of inﬂuence factors. Let us assume that we have an "incompatibility"
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relation that extracts this information:
Rif-incomp ⊆ IF × IF with (3.99)
(ifa, ifb) ∈ Rif-incomp ⇔ ifa excludes ifb (3.100)
This means that a tuple (ifa, ifb) denotes that the inﬂuence factor ifa
cannot occur together with ifb in one situation. An example would be
(highway, country road) - one can obviously only drive either on a highway
or on a country road. With this relation we can deﬁne the (in-)compatibility
of situations, by introducing the decision function χsit-comp as follows:
χsit-comp : SIT × SIT → {0, 1} with (3.101)
χsit-comp (sita, sitb) :=

0 if ∃ (ifa, ifb) ∈ Rif-incomp with
ifa ∈ sita ∧ ifb ∈ sitb
1 else
(3.102)
This information can be used to "join" situations. For this we overload the
usual mathematical operator ∪ and mark this special operator with a tilde:
∪˜; hence we deﬁne:
sita∪˜sitb =
{
∅ if χsit-incomp (sita, sitb) = 1
sita ∪ sitb else
(3.103)
A situation "join" can be thought of as integrating two sets of inﬂuence
factors into one situation.
Analogously, we use
⋃˜
to "join" sets of situations. We can think of this
set-join as an element-wise situation join:⋃˜
{sit1, sit2, . . . , sitn} = sit1 ∪˜ sit2 ∪˜ . . . ∪˜ sitn (3.104)
This can now be used for deciding whether a set of service failures can share
a "common" situation. We assume in ARID that the single service failure
analyses have been done. Thus, we know for each service failure sf the set
of relevant situations. For ARID we deﬁne a "retrieval" function:
frelSitSF : SF → P (SIT ) with (3.105)
frelSitSF (sf) = {sit ∈ SIT |sit is relevant for sf } (3.106)
If we transition from one service failure to hazards in general, i.e., to sets
of service failures, we can deﬁne a similar function working with hazards
instead of single service failures (leveraging our above-introduced situation
"join"):
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frelSitH : H →P (SIT ) with (3.107)
frelSitH (h) =
{
sit1 ∪˜ . . . ∪˜ sitn | (3.108)
{sit1 ∈ SIT1 ∧ . . . ∧ sitn ∈ SITn}∧
∀i, j ∈ [1..n] : i 6= j ⇒ χsit-comp (siti, sitj) = 1 }
with
h = {sf1, . . . , sfn} and
SIT1 = frelSitSF (sf1)
...
SITn = frelSitSF (sfn)
This deﬁnition gives us for each hazard h ∈ H the set of relevant situations.
This set is empty if the service failures are not dangerous at a common time.
In the section HEAT 3.4, we presented a CBR approach for supporting the
safety engineer in the task of assessing new situations. We used a partial
order to deﬁne consistent assessments of situations. We reuse this in ARID
as well:
The above -etermined set of situations can be pre-processed by HEAT to
determine the maximal exposure occurrence. Let us assume that the max-
imal exposure of the set of joined situations is "E2". If we look up all the
possible ASIL values we could determine, we will recognize that with "E2"
we can only reach "ASIL B". This does, however, reduce the expectable
assessment result and thereby the boundary beyond which we do not need
to assess the hazard anymore. Thus, by leveraging OASIS together with
HEAT, we can increase the eﬀectiveness of reasoning about unnecessary
hazard assessments.
Relevant "Controllability" part
As discussed as part of the Human FVM section in GOBI 3.2.2, a con-
trollability argument usually contains information about other services that
are used in the controllability action. An example is that a service failure
leading to a hazard which aﬀects lateral acceleration might be controllable
by applying an inverse momentum via the steering wheel. Of course, this is
possible if and only if the steering capability is still available. If we have a
common cause and unintentional lateral acceleration fails together with the
steering capability, we cannot argue with this kind of controllability.
A controllability analysis therefore results in a controllability argument
ca ∈ CtrlArg. We can deﬁne that a controllability analysis is a function fCtrl
with a hazard and an operational situation as input and the controllability
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argument ca as output:
fctrl : H × SIT → CtrlArg with (3.109)
fctrl (h, sit) = {ca ∈ CtrlArg |h ∈ H ∧ sit ∈ SIT } (3.110)
For ARID, the dependency of services is particularly relevant, as described
above. Thus, we are interested in the required service. For this we deﬁne
another function fctrlFcts and concatenate this function with our function
fctrl:
fctrlFcts : CtrlArg → P (S) (3.111)
ffctReliance : H × SIT → P (S) with (3.112)
ffctReliance (h, sit) := fctrlFcts (fctrl (h, sit)) (3.113)
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3.5.3 ARID Analysis Process
In the previous sections of ARID, we discussed the basic modeling assump-
tions and presented the basic idea of ARID (cf. 3.5.1). In section 3.5.2, we
discussed the possibilities of predicting the result of a risk assessment in
order to automatically reduce the number of hazards to be assesses.
In this section, we put the basics and the ARID prediction concepts together
and propose a process that eﬃciently handles the (potentially) exponential
number of hazards to be assessed.
In order to understand our process proposal, we remind that the reasons for
considering hazards consisting of multiple service failures in the HRA were:
1. Due to the ever increasing integration and interaction of functions, we
cannot assume that functions will fail independently.
2. Due to the reduction of ASILs by controllability arguments that rely on
other functions, these functions are dependent and one should investigate
the case in which the function and the controllability-relevant function
fail at the same time.
While the case of assessing totally independent functions (theoretically) ex-
ists as well, it implies a multiple point failure, which many industry standards
assume as safe. To be complete with respect to the 2|sf | hazards, we include
this case as well, with an explicit comment on its practical relevance.
Accordingly, we structured the ARID analysis process into four steps:
1. Analyze single service failures
This is the step that is performed "traditionally".
2. Analyze sets of internally dependent service failures
This step extends the ﬁrst step by considering multiple service failures that
are internally dependent (≈ common cause). This case is addressed in
ISO 26262 as "multifunctional degradation". It is therefore even implied
by an international standard.
3. Analyze sets of externally dependent service failures
Besides internal dependencies, we identiﬁed external dependencies via
controllability arguments. We therefore cannot assume that a common
failure of a service and its "controllability" service is simply the conjunc-
tion of the single (internally independent) hazards. Due to the reduction
of the ASIL via decreased C-values (= controllability arguments), we
might end up in a higher ASIL!
4. Analyze sets of independent service failures
Even though the services are totally independent, one must ensure their
independence. This level is therefore important for development because
it could potentially lead to higher requirements for the separation of the
(independent) functions.
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In the following process, we will use the following assumptions and conven-
tions:
(1) All hazards that have been analyzed already are in the set Hanalyzed.
For each hazard h ∈ Hanalyzed we assume that:
− the function frelSitH delivers the relevant situations for the hazard
− the function ffctReliance delivers the service dependency used in the con-
trollability argument.
(2) We know for each analyzed hazard (inHanalyzed), the safety requirement
in terms of minimal probability Preq and a minimal assessment boundary.
(Please note that the minimal boundary given by the domain is the minimum
minimal assessment boundary.) As described in 3.5.2, we can increase (relax)
this boundary using the exposure value of previously analyzed hazards.
We can derive the minimal assessment boundary for an assessed hazard h
by:
fmax E(h) = max {exposure(sit) | sit ∈ frelSitH (h)} (3.114)
fPmin(h) =

0, 076% if fmax E(h) = E4 (λ = 10
−8, a = 8, 7)
0, 76% if fmax E(h) = E3 (λ = 10
−7, a = 8, 7)
7, 3% if fmax E(h) = E2 (λ = 10
−6, a = 8, 7)
53% if fmax E(h) = E1 (λ = 10
−5, a = 8, 7)
(3.115)
(3) If one hazard exceeds its assessment boundary, we put all hazards that
are super-sets of the analyzed hazard in the set of analyzed hazards. Please
note that this might lead to an exponential reduction of hazards to be
analyzed.
(4) Let ν : 2BE → 2|BE| be a valuation function that assigns to each
variable in BE a binary value ∈ {0, 1}. Using this valuation of Boolean
variables, we can bound variables in Boolean logic formulas, such as our
fault tree formula: fFT (sf)|ν .
Analyze Single Service Failures
In this step, we assume that the traditional HRA is performed. We have
linear (O(n)) complexity in this step.
After this step, Hanalyzed consists of all hazards h with |h| = 1.
Analyze Sets of Internally Dependent Service Failures
This step deals with the analysis of internally dependent failures. Internally
dependent means that the dependent service failures share at least one
common basic event (assuming a fault tree representation of the error prop-
agation). The challenge of a possibly exponential number of basic events is
given in this step. Depending on the error propagation, we can assume that
in a worst-case scenario, every service failure is dependent on every other
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service failure.
We therefore separate this case by classifying basic events into single point
faults and multiple point faults (leading to a multiple service failure). The
rationale for this separation has two aspects. The ﬁrst aspect is practical
relevance. It is always important to take care of single point faults, while
multiple point faults are sometimes omitted. The second, more scientiﬁc
reason is that we know that all single fault cases already have a certain re-
quirement assigned (from the ﬁrst process step), while we cannot argue this
for multiple point cases. The diﬀerence therefore lies in the decision process
whether a further assessment is needed or not.
The single point fault case (the ﬁrst case) is the case where one basic
event leads to the triggering of multiple service failures. We therefore need
a common cause analysis based on basic events. We term the resulting set
the maximal inﬂuence set (mi). It is an inﬂuence set because the basic event
(by deﬁnition a single point fault) triggers the top events in that set. We
additionally qualiﬁed it to be maximal to ensure that ALL top events that
are triggered are in the set!
More formally we can deﬁne:
mi(be) =
{
sf ∈ SF | fFT (sf)|ν({be}) = 1 with ν({be}) = {1}
}
(3.116)
Please note that we denote with fFT (sf)|be=1 the fault tree belonging to
the service failure sf in which the basic event be is bound to have the value
"true (= 1)".
The ﬁnal decision fFT (sf)|be=1 = 1 can be eﬃciently decided using the in-
ternal Boolean logic representation of the service failure as a binary decision
diagram (BDD): The BDD should collapse (with |be=1) to the identity node
(= 1).
Once we know the set of maximal inﬂuence sets for each basic event, we
apply our heuristic regarding whether further assessment is needed or not.
If the result is that we need an assessment, the assessment is performed.
The second part of this internal dependency analysis addresses the situation
in which a basic event can only trigger multiple top events if other basic
events are present as well and no subset of them is able to trigger the same
set of top events (= multiple point faults). Please note that this is the right
case shown in Figure 3.57.
The diﬀerence in this case is that the basic event by itself does not trigger
a service failure, but is one contributing factor. We can formalize this by:
fcon : BE → 2SF with (3.117)
fcon(be) = { sf ∈ SF | ∃ path from be to sf } (3.118)
= { sf ∈ SF | ∃ν, ∃β ⊆ BE \ {be} :
|β| > 0 ∧ be⇒ fFT (sf)|ν(β) } (3.119)
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Please note that the expression |β| > 0 removes all cases in which one basic
event triggers a service failure, as in equation 3.116. (The case |β| = 0
would imply that the basic event triggers the service failure without any
other variable restriction.)
Using the function fcon we can assign to each basic event a contribution
importance. The value of the importance is given by the number of service
failures to which the basic event contributes:
importance(be) = |fcon(be)| (3.120)
The higher the value, the more service failures are inﬂuenced and therefore
the more important the basic event for system safety. We therefore use
importance to steer the analysis process by "highest importance ﬁrst".
The subsequent analysis step is performed for each basic event, starting with
the basic event with the highest importance. The basic event be gives us a
set of relevant service failures by SF be = fcon(be). We remove from this
set all service failures that exceed the maximum requirements boundary (in
the ARID analysis step 1).
Using this set, we successively create all sub-sets by their order. We start
with the sub-sets that contain two service failures, continue with all super-
sets containing three service failures, and so on.
Thus, let SF ben ⊆ SF be with
∣∣SF ben ∣∣ = n denote the set of sets of service
failures containing n service failures. We therefore start with SF be2 . For each
of these double service failures, we decide whether an assessment is needed.
If an assessment is necessary, we do the assessment and store the result.
We continue with SF be3 in the same way and move on to the next higher
order SF be4 . We continue the process until we reach the set containing all
sets SF be|SF be|.
This process step does, of course, have the potential of being exponential.
From a safety engineering point of view, we point out that this complexity
is self-made (by design): It is the system's complexity. We claim that if
the design is highly coupled, the safety analysis is complex; if it is loosely
coupled, the process terminates fast (because
∣∣SF be∣∣ is small). Thus, the
complexity of this step simply reﬂects the system's complexity and is not a
lack of analysis process capability!
A similar comment holds for the mathematical complexity w.r.t. time and
space requirements for the computer on which the algorithm is running.
The author argues that if it is not even possible to represent and work with
the implied problem size in a current computer, we doubt that the system's
complexity and thereby the system's safety is under control!
Analyze Sets of Externally Dependent Service Failures
In this step, we deal with externally dependent service failures. Please recall
that external dependency is given by the controllability argument. If one
service fails and the operator is able to avoid or mitigate harm by performing
169
ARID - Analysis of Risk through In-system Degradation
a counteraction, the service the operator relies on becomes a prerequisite
for the safe functioning of the service under analysis (cf. 3.5.2).
We introduced in 3.5.2 the functional controllability reliance function
ffctReliance (cf. 3.113), which delivers for each analyzed hazard the set of
services on which the risk assessment is relying.
At this stage of the ARID process, all hazards consisting of either a single
service failure or internally dependent service failures have been analyzed.
Externally dependent service failures have not been analyzed yet as such,
but some of them might already have been analyzed as part of the internal
dependency analysis step. We therefore might have analyzed externally de-
pendent service failures already! The remaining set of externally dependent
service failures is the set of internally independent, but externally dependent
service failures:
Let H be the set of all possible service failures. The relevant subset includes
all hazards h for which it holds that:
I h /∈ Hanalyzed
↪→ The hazard has not been analyzed before.
I @h′ ⊆ h : h′ ∈ Hanalyzed ∧ Preq(h′) ≤ fPmin(h)
↪→ The hazard is not a super-set hazard of a hazard h′ that has already
reached the minimal requirements boundary of the current hazard.
I @h′ ⊆ h : fmax E(h′) > fPmax(h′)
↪→ There is no subset of service failures that restrict the exposure in such
a way that the remaining assessment boundary is reached.
I ∃h′ ⊆ h | [ ∃sit ∈ frelSitH (h) | |ffctReliance(h, sit)| > 0 ]
↪→ The hazard is externally dependent.
Our proposed strategy is again to analyze the hazards consisting of two ser-
vice failures and then increase the cardinality of the hazards to be analyzed.
This sounds very similar to the internal dependency case. We want to point
out that the diﬀerence is that internal dependency is statically given by
the system design and the failure propagation. External dependency (via
controllability arguments) emerges from the analysis process itself. Due to
the fact that the controllability (for automotive systems) needs to be very
simple, the argumentation of risk reduction via controllability in cases of
multiple service failures is very rare.
Analyze Sets of Independent Service Failures
This step ﬁnalizes the ARID analysis and makes the hazard analysis com-
plete. The result of this step can deliver safety requirements for the sepa-
ration mechanism of services or functions. The corresponding term in auto-
motive industry is "freedom from interference".
If H is again the set of all possible hazards and we performed the previous
steps completely, we can state that HInd = H \Hanalyzed is the set that
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contains all hazards that contain independent partitions of service failures.
The advantage is that we can apply the heuristic of totally independent
hazards (cf. Figure 3.57). We can therefore multiply the actual requirements
of the independent subsets of hazards. If we assume (the worst case) that
each independent hazard has only ASIL A (thus, the minimal contribution
for reaching the domain minimum), we can derive that after combining three
independent ASIL A hazards, we already have the probability requirement
of ASIL D!
ASIL A ⇒ P(8, 7a) = 0.0073 (3.121)
ASIL D ⇒ P(8, 7a) = 0.000076 (3.122)
↪→ (0.0073)x = 0.000076 (3.123)
↪→ x ∗ ln(0.0073) = ln(0.000076) (3.124)
↪→ x = ln(0.000076)
ln(0.0073)
≈ 2.744 (3.125)
Thus, we can limit ourselves to the subset of independent hazards that are
triple independent! If we encounter a higher original ASIL level, we can stop
the analysis even faster. Thus, we have as worst case a cubic eﬀort, i.e.,
O(n3) in this step.
With this observation we ﬁnish our discussion of the ARID analysis process.
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3.5.4 ARID Analysis Example
The previous sections of ARID presented our modeling, the fundamental
idea, and a concrete analysis process. In this section, we will present an
example used as an evaluation of ARID. Additionally, we will point out our
tooling support for ARID.
ARID heavily relies on models and computer support for storing and process-
ing of and reasoning on existing knowledge. As an evaluation of ARID, we
developed a prototype tool and applied our analysis process to an example
system using that tool. In the following, we will start by giving an overview
of our tool support. Afterwards we will introduce the example system and
at the end we will provide concrete results and screenshots of our analysis
process.
The tool environment
In ARID section 3.5.1 we stated that we use a port-based system design and
Component Fault Trees as failure logic model as the starting point for ARID.
We consequently used the C²FT tooling environment. The basis of this
environment is a standard UML tool called MagicDraw. The C²FT extension
is realized as a UML proﬁle and a plugin-based fault tree calculation backend.
The ﬁrst step was to extend the meta-model by an ARID proﬁle to rep-
resent the elements Hazard, Hazard Assesssment, Service Failure, Service,
and Cutset.
Figure 3.58 shows the extension:
I At the very top, the Hazard Assessment element is shown. Hazard As-
sessment has as attributes:
. a reference to the system to be analyzed (itsSystem)
. an attribute that manages the references to all hazards (Hazards)
. a variable that contains the current minimal probability of the do-
main (DomainRequirement). Thus, the domain requirement can be
selected for each hazard assessment.
. an attribute that contains references to all services of the system
(Service)
I On the left, the element Hazard is shown. Hazard has the following at-
tributes:
. for easier handling in the ARID process, we store the order of the
hazard in Order.
. the variable SafetyRequirement contains the assigned requirement.
This variable is only set if the hazard has been assessed.
. the variable ActualMaxRequirement, in contrast, contains the
currently assurable requirement. This variable basically holds the
"knowledge" derivable for the respective hazard.
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Figure 3.58: UML (MagicDraw) Profile for ARID
. the Members of the Hazard are the service failures the hazard con-
sists of.
. the Excluded ﬂag indicates whether a hazard has been excluded by
the ARID decision algorithm.
. the Dependencies indicate the external dependencies on other ser-
vices.
. the PrimeImplicants are obviously the prime implicants of the haz-
ards.
I In the middle, the element Service Failure is shown. A service failure has
the following attributes:
. itsFailure is a reference to the respective top event in the Component
Fault Tree
. PrimeImplicants hold the prime implicants of the service failure (as
implied by the Component Fault Tree).
I On the right, the element Service is shown with the following attributes:
. itsReferencedPort is a reference to the port where the service is
manifested.
. one service might have multiple service failures; these are refer-
enced/stored in the variable Failures.
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I Finally, we modeled the prime implicants or, in this case, the cutsets
explicitly with the element Cutset. A Cutset holds as attribute only a list
of basic events itsElements.
This proﬁle enables the model-based representation of the necessary ele-
ments as a MagicDraw model. The logic and the reasoning, however, is
done in a Java-based ARID plugin. This plugin additionally provides an
HRA assessment GUI, which enables easy assessment. This GUI is shown in
Figure 3.59.
Figure 3.59: ARID’s main "control center": the assessment front-end
In order to check for correct knowledge handling, i.e., for requirements prop-
agation and derivation of prime implicants, we additionally created a prime
implicants graph view. This view shows the prime implicants of the system
as a partial order graph. Figure 3.60 depicts this. The blue rectangles repre-
sent a prime implicant (cutset). The label shows the basic events belonging
to the cutset in curly braces and behind that the current assessment knowl-
edge the cutset holds. This knowledge is given by the current probability
interval.
Since the readability of this graph is not optimal, and in order to "save" inter-
mediate states of the graph, we created an export possibility to a GraphViz
"dotty" graph (cf. "Dump to dot" button on the lower right of the Figure
3.60). Figure 3.61 shows the GraphViz-Dot version of the graph shown in
Figure 3.60.
One implementation detail is that the ARID backend works as a free-running
thread that monitors changes of the "knowledge base" and automatically
(and asynchronously) optimizes the knowledge base in such a way that only
relevant information is kept. Relevant information refers to prime implicants
with a requirement that cannot be calculated/derived from other prime
implicant knowledge. Figure 3.62 shows the status information of the opti-
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Figure 3.60: ARID’s evaluation window showing the current "knowledge base" as prime implicant graph
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Figure 3.61: ARID’s knowledge base exported to a GraphViz dot graph
mization thread posted to the message window of MagicDraw. The thread
indicates via the message window how many optimizations are still possible
and performs these optimizations as a "prime implicant integrity check"
(cf. line "*******checkPIIntegrity********" in Figure 3.62).
We decided to integrate this decoupled optimization thread in order to avoid
unnecessary complexity limitations because redundant or superﬂuent infor-
mation is stored in the model. The design as an asynchronous thread was
chosen because this is "only" an optimization thread. The assessment should
not be stalled because internal model optimizations are running. This allows
us to continue with the assessment even though optimizations are running
in the background and even if not all optimizations have been executed yet.
Finally, the concrete assessment is performed/entered into an assessment
dialog. A screenshot of this dialog is shown in Figure 3.63.
At the very top on the left, there is a text ﬁeld for entering the hazard
requirement, i.e., the quantitative assessment result. On the right next to
this text ﬁeld is a drop-down box for selecting the maximal situation the
assessment has. Please recall that this was important for lowering of domain
boundary based on the maximally expectable common situation! Finally, in
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Figure 3.62: ARID’s knowledge base optimization thread
the lower part, one can select the services on which this assessment relies.
This is the ARID-relevant fraction of the controllability argument!
The Example System
The example system we used for evaluation was already introduced in sec-
tion "3.5.2 ARID Concepts". The failure logic model was shown in Figure
3.56. The system model was also introduced as part of the modeling basics
discussions in "3.5.1 Model Basics".
Figure 3.64 shows the system and its failure views again as a collage.
Example Analysis
The example analysis obviously starts with the assessment of the single
service failures. In the example we assume that:
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Figure 3.63: ARID’s assessment dialog
Figure 3.64: ARID’s evaluation example
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− The internally independent service failure "Sys_sf4" externally depends
on service "s3" and has an ASIL C requirement.
− Service failure "Sys_sf3" has an ASIL B requirement.
− Service failure "Sys_sf1" has an ASIL D requirement.
− Service failure "Sys_sf2" has an ASIL A requirement.
Figure 3.65 shows as a result the assessment GUI and the prime implicants
knowledge base (as a dotty graph). One interesting aspect is that the as-
sessment of "Sys_sf2" was not necessary (did not result in any assessment
knowledge): The actual requirement is much lower than the assessment re-
sult. The actual requirement was derived or is implied by the assessment of
"Sys_sf1".
Thus, even though we did not design our method to improve the traditional
case, it might happen that the domain knowledge can exclude hazards even
in the very ﬁrst step.
Figure 3.65: Step 1 of ARID’s evaluation example
The next step in ARID's analysis process is to analyze all internally de-
pendent hazards. In this example, only "Sys_sf3; Sys_sf1" and "Sys_sf2;
Sys_sf1" are internally dependent. The automated analysis, however, shows
that even though these hazards are internally dependent, they already fulﬁll
the highest possible requirement. Figure 3.66 shows the (fully automatic)
result of step 2.
The next step is to analyze all externally dependent service failures. In step
1, we deﬁned only one dependent service failure. The algorithm yields that
we need to assess the hazard; we do so without any further controllability
178
SAHARA - a Structured Approach for Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessments
Figure 3.66: Step 2 of ARID’s evaluation example
argument. The result is shown in Figure 3.67. (We omit the knowledge base
in this ﬁgure.)
Figure 3.67: Step 3 of ARID’s evaluation example
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The ﬁnal step is to analyze all independent hazards. Due to the fact that we
have four single service failures, the set of possible hazards has a cardinality
of 24 − 1 = 15. Currently, we have roughly half of the hazards analyzed
(not manually assessed). The ﬁnal (fully automatic) reasoning again results
in the fact that all hazards already fulﬁll the domain requirement boundary
and do not need to be assessed! Figure 3.68 shows the ﬁnal assessment
control center and the respective (ﬁnal) knowledge base.
Figure 3.68: Step 4 of ARID’s evaluation example
3.5.5 Conclusion of ARID Analysis Example
In the example shown, we only had to manually analyze ﬁve out of a total
of 15 possible hazards. For all other hazards we can assure that the risk is
below the maximally acceptable boundary. Compared with the traditional
analysis, which would perform four manual assessments, we have created
much more conﬁdence by just adding one more assessment (and applying
ARID's reasoning).
The performance and the possibilities for hazard exclusions are, of course,
strongly dependent on the assessment results and the "strength" of the
derivable knowledge. This example was not meant to show eﬃciency, but
feasibility and proof of concept. Due to the fact that this example is synthetic
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and the assessment results were selected by the authors, we performed a
more realistic case study within the "e performance" project.
The second case study was applied to the system model of an electrical
power train. The system comprised ﬁve services and eight service failures.
The complete case study can be read in the thesis of Pierre Iraguha [Ira11].
Table 3.9: The result statistics as an overview
Criterion value
Single service failures 8
Number of all possible hazards 255
Number of manual assessments
Traditionally: 8
With ARID: 13
Number of assessments per step
Step 1: 8
Step 2: 4
Step 3: 1
Step 4: 0
Percentage of overall hazards
Traditionally: 8
255
= 3.1%
With ARID: 13
255
= 5.1%
Coverage of all possible hazards
Traditionally: 8
255
= 3.1%
With ARID: 255
255
= 100%
Additional eﬀort ARID produces
Absolute: 5
Relative: 2%
Increase in conﬁdence
Absolute: 96.9%
Relative: 96.9%
3.1%
= 3126%
Some statistics about the case study are shown in Table 3.9. One can see that
in the ﬁrst step, all single service failures were assessed. Due to the criticality
of the system, the assessment results yielded high ASIL requirements and
subsequently it was possible to omit many multiple service failures from
the assessment. This becomes clear if we investigate the necessary manual
assessments in steps 2 - 4. While in step 2, "4" additional analyzes were
necessary, step 3 required only one additional analysis (although we had
three controllability arguments). Finally, in step 4, no manual assessment
was necessary! Thus the increase of manual assessment compared to the
traditional assessment was 5/8 = 62%. On the one hand, this is additional
eﬀort, but on the other hand we have automatically analyzed 28− 1− 13 =
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242 additional hazards. Thus, compared to the overall number of all possible
hazards, we assessed only 13255 = 5.1% of all hazards the system is subject
to. (The traditional approach would analyze 8255 = 3.1%.)
Because one has to spend additional eﬀort, the question arises of whether
this eﬀort should be spent or not. One aspect is, of course, that ARID delivers
100% conﬁdence for the safety engineer that he did not miss anything.
However, a closely related question is if any safety requirements are missed if
only single service failures are assessed. One hypothesis is that ARID does not
deliver any additional safety requirement. We proved this hypothesis wrong
using our industrial case study and showing that the traditional approach
misses essential safety requirements.
Safety requirements are essentially given by diﬀerent boundaries for basic
events or basic event combinations. We therefore compared the quantitative
requirements of the basic events after the ﬁrst step, the traditional analysis,
with the ﬁnal requirement after ARID: We derived that eight basic events
(out of 25) had insuﬃcient safety requirements. To seven of them, the
traditional analysis assigned the lowest level of QM and to one an ASIL A.
This means that only one of them would have had any safety requirement
assigned. ARID's result was that all of them had the highest level assigned
to them - ASIL D. Thus, in reality these failures are highly critical, but
no safety engineer would have paid any attention to seven of them and to
one of them only with minor rigor. The reason for this was that all of them
contribute to multiple service failures, but each single service failure by itself
has only QM or ASIL A "criticality". Even though this is only one example,
we claim to have refuted the hypothesis that the eﬀort is not worth being
spent.
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4 Evaluation
In the previous chapter, we presented our solution approach SAHARA and
its building blocks GOBI, OASIS, HEAT, and ARID. As part of the single
blocks, we already discussed evaluations and feasibility studies.
In this chapter, we will not repeat all aspects of our evaluation(s) but con-
cisely summarize our evaluation results and thereby argue our contribution
again. For details of the respective evaluations, we will refer to the respective
section.
We will apply the following recurring argumentation structure to each build-
ing block:
1. We will state the problem addressed by the building block as discussed
in the problem statement section 1.2.
2. We will repeat our contribution of the stated problem, as presented in
section 3.1.
3. We will present our evaluation summary showing why we think our solu-
tion actually solves the problem.
As discussed in the problem statement, we are aiming at a holistic, model-
based approach to a structured HRA process. The ﬁrst building block, GOBI,
served the purpose of providing an integration framework. Therefore, GOBI
as a conceptual model, constitutes the prerequisite for our core contributions
OASIS, HEAT, and ARID. We did not explicitly evaluate the validity of the
GOBI model, but assume its validity implicitly by showing that our core
contributions could be evaluated successfully.
In this section, we will present the evaluation of our core contributions
and discuss their validity. Following our overall breakdown structure of the
problem statement, we evaluated our contributions with regard to the two
challenges identiﬁed in the problem statement:
− Consistency and reuse of operational situations (this is addressed in OA-
SIS and HEAT)
− Coping with hazards consisting of multiple service failures (this is ad-
dressed in ARID)
Figure 4.1 depicts the problems on the left, the solution block(s) we evalu-
ated in the middle and the claimed advancement of the state of the art on
the right.
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Figure 4.1: Overview over evaluation structure
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4.1 Evaluation of OASIS and HEAT
As discussed in section "Problem Statement", the challenge of formaliz-
ing operational situations and their assessments was broken down to the
technical challenges as follows:
6 Structuring of risk assessments
6 Correctness of situation analysis
w Formalization of operational situations
↪→ OASIS - Ontology-based Analysis of Situation Inﬂuences on
Safety
w Consistency and reuse of operational situation assessments
↪→ HEAT - Handy Exposure Assessment Technique
In the discussion of the problem statement, we identiﬁed the challenge of
situation analysis correctness. The core aspects of this challenge were the
consistency of situation assessments and their reuse. In order to achieve
this, one fundamental prerequisite was the formalization of operational situ-
ations. In OASIS we addressed this prerequisite, and with the evaluation we
answered the question of whether it is possible to formalize HRA situations.
In HEAT we rely on the OASIS' formalization of operational situations,
then add consistency checks and provide a reuse approach for operational
situation assessments.
4.1.1 Evaluation of OASIS
For OASIS we evaluated the validity of the claimed contribution:
We developed an ontology-based situation inﬂuence factor classiﬁcation by
classifying inﬂuence factors and integrating HRA-relevant domain knowledge
into an ontology. This allowed us to propose a structured situation deﬁnition
approach.
The formalization of operational situations ﬁnally referred to two main as-
pects: (1) structuring possible inﬂuence factors of an operational situation
and (2) providing a process for using these inﬂuence factors in a way that
allows coming up with actual situations. Therefore, our evaluation had two
aspects as well. We proved inﬂuence factor structuring by formalizing the
inﬂuence factors of nine industrial case studies, the examples given in ISO
26262, and examples we developed on our own. The overall number of sit-
uation descriptions was around 300 and the overall number of inﬂuence
factors extracted and formalized was around 200. Each inﬂuence factor was
classiﬁed into one of the OASIS classes. Figure 3.14 on page 71 shows the
distribution between the ﬁrst two levels of the identiﬁed relevant classiﬁca-
tion concepts. We found that using the hierarchy of classes OASIS provides,
it was very straightforward to assign a class to each inﬂuence factor. One
example of an inﬂuence factor to classify is "foliage": From the top level it is
clear that it is an "Environmental Characteristic" (not something belonging
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to the human or the vehicle). The second level of classes are "natural con-
dition" and "usage location". In OASIS, these classes are separated roughly
by being "purely natural" or "man-made". "Foliage" is obviously purely nat-
ural and therefore belongs to the class "natural condition". The next reﬁned
class is "ground condition" and, even more speciﬁcally it is "natural cover-
age". One can follow this classiﬁcation breakdown by looking at Figure 3.11
on page 66. Thus, the classiﬁcation signiﬁcantly helped in classifying the
inﬂuence factors. Another result of the evaluation was showing feasibility: It
was possible to integrate all inﬂuence factors into one of these classes.
The second part of the evaluation is given by the example "Powersteering"
(cf. end of 3.3.4). For this (industrial case study) we showed how to use
our process and the captured domain knowledge (from the former step) and
support the process of complete situation deﬁnitions. We evaluated com-
pleteness in the sense that all situations that can be built using the inﬂuence
factors contained in the OASIS ontology are either deﬁned or are (provably)
irrelevant. One important aspect is how much manual eﬀort the deﬁnition of
the complete set of relevant operational situations costs. In our case study,
nine hazards were analyzed. In the ﬁrst step, all usage locations (a total of
14) had to be analyzed manually. For the next step, the OASIS knowledge
base delivered (automatically) pre-selected restrictions on possibly relevant
combinations of (1) hazards and usage locations and (2) hazards and maneu-
vers. The number of possible combinations in case (1) - hazards and usage
locations - was restricted to 85 reasonable combinations out of a total of
138. Thus, roughly 60% remain. With the physical constraints implied by
the hazards and the physical model contained in OASIS, the relevant com-
binations of (2) - the relevant maneuvers per hazard - were automatically
reduced from 138 to 106. One example of this automatic reduction is: The
hazard "delayed steering" physically implies that one wants to steer, i.e.,
that the steering angle is not "0". The domain knowledge contained in OA-
SIS provides the information that "driving straight" implies a steering angle
of "0". Therefore, this combination can be computed as being not relevant.
The restriction of these two combinations does not mean, however, that one
needs to manually assess 85 and 106 combinations. Similar to the extraction
of relevant information, we can use OASIS knowledge to combine these two
by reasoning on which combinations of maneuvers and usage locations make
sense. Thereby we integrate the aspects of hazard, maneuver, and usage lo-
cation. This allowed further reduction of the number to 52 combinations
out of a total of 756 possible combinations. These 52 combinations were
assessed manually. The result of the ﬁnal (manual) assessment was that all
52 combinations are relevant; for all other combinations, OASIS delivered
an explanation as to why the combination is not relevant. Thus, the manual
eﬀort was reduced from 1890 to 14 * 9 + 52 = 178. (1890 is the product of
9 hazards, 14 usage locations, and 15 maneuvers). Thus, with OASIS, less
than 10% of the eﬀort was necessary compared to a traditional analysis.
Evaluation result of OASIS:
The evaluation has proven two things:
(1) It is possible to formalize a situation by using our proposed classiﬁcation
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of inﬂuence factors: the OASIS ontology.
(2) Our proposed approach for deﬁning situations results in a complete set of
situations with less eﬀort: in our case study, less than 10% compared to the
traditional analysis. However, the approach is only complete with respect to
situations that can be built using inﬂuence factors contained in the OASIS
ontology.
Limitations of OASIS:
One limitation of our situation deﬁnition process is that it relies on the
completeness of the inﬂuence factors in the ontology (for each class used).
Thus, one could redeﬁne our achieved completeness as being complete with
respect to already formalized domain knowledge.
4.1.2 Evaluation of HEAT
The existence of HEAT can be interpreted as another proof for the validity of
the situation formalization OASIS delivers. Without formalized operational
situations, it would not be possible to check consistency and provide a reuse
approach.
In the evaluation of HEAT, we proved the validity of our contribution:
Situation modeling and exposure assessment support, through model-based
situation representation with a similarity function, for reusing assessment
results of (similar) situations to support the safety engineer in consistent
situation assessments.
The ﬁrst claim is that we can automatically check the consistency of a set
of situation assessments. To evaluate this, we ﬁlled our situation knowledge
base (which is provided by OASIS) with data from 9 industrial case studies,
which led to 148 situations (including their industrially determined exposure
value). As discussed in section 3.4.3, the evaluation was very successful. We
could (fully automatically) identify 19 exposure inconsistencies among these
148 situations; thus, a factor of roughly 13% inconsistent situations. This
was already a huge beneﬁt for the industrial partner. This is not only true
because we found inconsistencies, but the industrial case studies had been
manually checked for consistency before and we could prove that a manual
consistency check is insuﬃcient. In addition to the deﬁcient result, the ef-
fort for the manual checking took four experts about two weeks of eﬀort.
Our automated analysis took around ﬁve minutes of calculation time. One
disadvantage was that the formalization as HEAT situations took around
twice as long as the descriptive notation in an Excel table. In order to check
whether this is a drawback of the method or the result of insuﬃcient tool-
ing support, we double-checked the elicitation of the formalized information
by typing exactly the same information into a (structured) Excel template.
In this case, no signiﬁcant increase in eﬀort was observable. Thus, by im-
proving the tooling, we could remove this drawback to improve practical
applicability.
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The second and main aspect of the problem statement was to enable eﬃ-
cient reuse of already assessed operational situations. During our evaluation,
we answered two questions:
(1) Is there potential for reusing situations?
(2) Does the approach support the safety engineer in performing a consis-
tent assessment?
To evaluate these questions, we reused our nine industrial case studies. The
ﬁnding for the ﬁrst question was that we identiﬁed 14 duplicated situations.
We considered these as candidates that could have been found using exist-
ing approaches, such as Excel tables: One can easily search for a situation
in an Excel table and reuse the example. Thus, we asked ourselves in how
many cases our approach would have supported the engineer by present-
ing similar situations. The indicator we used for this is the hierarchy of
similar operational situations HEAT calculates. The hierarchy describes a
generalization/specialization relation of operational situations. A more gen-
eral situation restricts the upper bound of possible exposure values, whereas
more special operational situation restricts the lower bound. Thus, if there
is a hierarchy, this means the situations are similar and they are candidates
the approach would propose as similar situations with their exposure values
as (consistent) exposure boundaries. The number of situations contained in
a hierarchy was 60: 44 + 12 + 4 = 60 - cf. Table 3.3 "Partial-order chain
lengths" on page 127. Thus, in almost 40% of the cases HEAT would have
supported the situation assessment compared to the 9% maximum of pos-
sible reuse in traditional HRAs.
The other question, whether HEAT would help to produce a consistent as-
sessment, was not really a question anymore. Due to the construction that
HEAT proposes only consistent assessment values, it was obvious that con-
sistency with the knowledge base is not a problem anymore - the safety
engineer simply has to select one of the proposed (consistent) exposure val-
ues.
This strong consistency, ensured via HEAT's assessment support, can, how-
ever, be a drawback as well. Due to the fact that the likelihoods of some
inﬂuence factors are based on statistics and that sometimes diﬀerent statis-
tics arrive at diﬀerent likelihood values, it is possible that one situation has
diﬀerent assessment results. In the current state of the knowledge base, this
would lead to an inconsistency and the knowledge base would not be usable
anymore. However, this limitation is only given for the current implementa-
tion of the OASIS ontology. As described in HEAT, one can easily extend
the OASIS ontology by other separating facts. One solution of this limita-
tion would be, for example, adding the respective statistic as one parameter
of a situation. This would make the situation only similar and not identical
anymore, and our knowledge base could be used again.
Evaluation Result of HEAT:
The evaluation has shown that it is possible to check the consistency of
a knowledge base. In our evaluation, the consistency check was not only
better but, compared to the manual consistency check, almost instanta-
neous. Another aspect we evaluated was whether there is a potential to
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reuse situations. In our case study, 10% of the situations could have been
reused in existing approaches. In contrast, HEAT would have supported the
assessment in 40% of the cases by presenting similar situations.
Limitation:
We see limitations that stem from the current implementation and tools:
The ﬁrst limitation is that modeling situations in our tool is laborious. As
stated above, this is not a general limitation of the method, but a result of
missing tooling support.
Another limitation is that HEAT requires consistent situation assessments
within the knowledge base, even though it is, in practice, possible to have
diﬀerent assessment results for one situation. However, this is not a draw-
back of our method, but rather a matter of using the extension mechanism
of our OASIS ontology to resolve the inconsistency. We did not implement
this because this is a subtlety for practical application and not a matter
of scientiﬁc contribution. Additionally, for practical applications, we experi-
enced two standpoints: Some industrial partners want to have these diﬀerent
statistics and would need a way to handle this, while others consider exactly
the information that there are inconsistencies due to diﬀerent statistics as
an advantage and propose coming up with one statistic or value that is
considered to be valid in the automotive domain.
4.2 Evaluation of ARID
As discussed in section "Problem Statement", the challenge of coping with
multiple service failures was structured as follows:
6 Structuring of hazard analysis
6 Completeness of hazard analysis
! Identiﬁcation of system-level failures
w Dealing with multiple service failures
The overall challenge "Completeness of hazard analysis" focuses on com-
pleteness of the analysis, i.e., on whether all possible hazards were analyzed
or not. Due to the fact that a hazard is a set of system-level failures, one
needs to identify the system-level failures as a prerequisite for the hazard
analysis. As discussed in the related work, the identiﬁcation of system-level
failures is no scientiﬁc challenge anymore. Therefore, in ARID we focus on
completeness of the analysis by dealing with hazards that consist of multiple
service failures.
Our claimed contribution is:
Approach for dealing with multiple service failures. This includes a model-
based representation of multiple service failures and a corresponding method
deﬁning a computer-aided analysis process.
The detailed evaluation was presented in section 3.5. In this section, we
summarize the ﬁndings of the evaluation and answer two questions:
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(1) Does the analysis of hazards consisting of multiple service failures yield
any new information or, does the traditional approach miss safety-relevant
requirements?
(2) Is it possible to analyze all multiple service failures with ARID?
To answer these questions, we performed two case studies, one small case
study for which we provided the model and another industrial case study.
Because the latter originated from industry, it represents a realistic scenario
for the application of ARID.
We evaluated the ﬁrst question using the industrial case study. The case
study comprised almost the complete power train of an electrically driven car
with wheel hub motors. In the end, we compared the safety requirements that
were determined using a traditional HRA and those determined using ARID.
The failure model of that case study contains 25 basic events, meaning 25
possible elements of the power train that could fail. With ARID, we derived
that eight basic events had insuﬃcient safety requirements. The traditional
analysis assigned the lowest level of QM to seven of them and an ASIL
A to one. This means that only one of them would have had any safety
requirement assigned. After performing an ARID analysis, all of them had
the highest level assigned to them - ASIL D. Thus, in reality these failures
are highly critical, but to seven of them, no safety engineer would have
paid any attention, and to one of them only with minor rigor. The reason
for this was that all of them were analyzed as single service failures. One
concrete case identiﬁed was the following: If one analyzes that one cannot
accelerate anymore, this is not too hazardous because one can steer to the
side and turn on the warning lights. If the boost of the power steering fails,
one expects the driver to be able to steer the car without any support, thus,
this hazard is not critical. If the stability control is lost, this is not critical in
most cases because the driver should be able to control the car on his own
by using the brakes, the acceleration, and the steering capabilities. However,
in the case study one identiﬁed basic event led to a multiple service failure
because the electrical power system was aﬀected. The basic event described
the fault that no energy is available anymore and the engines are not shut
down. The shutdown of the engines was important in the case study because
the electrical engines are blocked if they are not energized and not short-
circuited. The result on the system level is that the driver cannot accelerate,
the boost of the power steering is lost, and additionally stability is lost
because the engines are blocked. In this case of multiple service failures, no
driver can handle the situation anymore, i.e., it is highly critical. The reason
why this case was not considered was that the basic event got multiple times
a QM and ASIL A assigned. After the assignment of ASIL A, each additional
single service failure that resulted in an ASIL A (or QM) was assumed to be
covered already (because the basic event already had ASIL A assigned to
it). The case that a multiple assignment of ASIL A could result in a higher
ASIL, in this case ASIL D, was not considered because no multiple service
failure analysis was performed. While this is only one case study, we assume
that such cases are the rule, not an exception. We therefore state that it
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is not acceptable to only perform hazard analyses for single service failures.
We furthermore strongly vote for rising the note in ISO 26262 saying that
multi-functional degradation should be analyzed to an explicit and exposed
normative requirement.
The other question we addressed in the ARID evaluation is whether it is
feasible/eﬃcient to analyze all possible hazards. For this we performed two
case studies. We used the smaller, theoretical case study to check whether
ARID's algorithm works as expected. We did this by explicitly investigat-
ing the progress and the changes in ARID's internal knowledge base. We
showed that the concepts and algorithms work as expected and that the
knowledge base was produced as expected. The ﬁnal result was that we
had to manually assess ﬁve out of maximum of 15 hazards. This is one
additional manual assessment compared to the traditional approach, but we
can guarantee that all possible hazards have been analyzed, including those
consisting of multiple service failures. Due to the fact that the system was
theoretical and that it was built by us for the purpose of evaluation, these
numbers do not seem to deliver hard proof.
We therefore performed another larger (industrial) case study. The system
and the failure propagation of the case study model were not originally built
for ARID analyses and are therefore representative. The results of this case
study were discussed in section 3.5.5. The main concern when moving from
single service failures to multiple service failures was the exponential number
of assessments or analyses that need to be performed. However, this is only
a problem if these need to be analyzed manually. If they are analyzed auto-
matically, it is not a problem. In our case study, only 13 manual assessments
had to be performed with ARID, whereas the traditional approach required
eight manual assessments. Thus, the manual assessments increased by 5;
the assessments performed automatically are 242 with ARID and 0 tradi-
tionally. Thus, with the traditional approach, we analyzed only 3.1% (= 8)
of all hazards. Using ARID we achieved a coverage of 100% (= 255) and
had to assess only 5.1% (= 13) manually. Thus, with only minor additional
(manual) eﬀort, we were able to analyze all possible hazards. In addition
to this increase in hazard analysis coverage, we found insuﬃciencies with
respect to safety requirements if only the traditional approach had been
applied (as discussed above).
Evaluation result:
The evaluation has shown that with our method it is possible to practically
analyze all hazards of a system, while the traditional approach only analyzes
single service failures. Thus, using ARID, multiple service failures can be
handled. Additionally, we uncovered that, at least for our industrial case
study, the traditional approach results in insuﬃcient safety requirements.
Limitation:
ARID strongly relies on the availability of system models and corresponding
failure propagation models. This is currently a limitation of ARID because
we experienced that these models are rarely found in practice.
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4.3 Overall Evaluation Result
The fundamental challenge we addressed in this thesis was how to structure
and formalize HRAs in order to make the result less dependent on experts'
experience and to increase the consistency of the result of an HRA.
As the name "Hazard analysis and risk assessment" implies, the overall task
can be subdivided into two steps: (1) hazard analysis and (2) risk assess-
ment. The result produced in the ﬁrst step, the hazard analysis, are lists
of hazardous events. A hazardous event is a combination of a hazard and
an operational situation, which needs to be assessed in the second step.
The fundamental challenge of being more consistent and less dependent
on experts' experience for this step essentially means formalizing the de-
scription of operational situations. With OASIS, we provided a methodology
that allows the safety engineer to deﬁne situations more formally. We eval-
uated this using several industrial case studies and were able to show the
eﬀectiveness of OASIS for deﬁning operational situations. Thus, with the
formalization of operational situations, we advanced the state of the art for
deﬁning hazardous events.
The next step (2) is the risk assessment. In this step, the expert needs to
come up with an integrity level reﬂecting the necessary risk reduction that
needs to be achieved during the development. In the automotive domain, the
determination of the integrity level is based on determining three parame-
ters: exposure, controllability, and severity. To achieve the fundamental goal
of making the HRA less experience-dependent, the determination of these
three parameters needs to be more structured and less expert-dependent.
The input for the ﬁrst parameter is only the respective operational situation,
while the second and third parameters are determined by the combination
of the hazard and the operational situation. Due to the importance of the
operational situations we focused on formalizing the Exposure parameter.
The formalization of the determination of the two parameters Controllability
and Severity is, of course, important as well, but due to the fact that formal-
izing Controllability requires a lot of knowledge about human behavior and
human capability models, this aspect was beyond the scope of this thesis.
The same is true for the "Severity" parameter: One would need a very good
understanding of the criticality of human injuries, which we cannot provide
in this thesis.
Due to the fact that the exposure is the likelihood of an operational situation
(without the hazard), we tightly coupled the assessment of the likelihood of
the operational situation, addressed in HEAT, with its description, addressed
in OASIS. In our evaluation, we were able to show that checking consistency
among a set of assessed situations requires not only orders of magnitude less
eﬀort, but also that we achieved a higher degree of consistency.
With these two steps we were able to achieve a more structured approach for
HRAs than what is performed in modern industrial practice. From a scientiﬁc
point of view, another important issue is the consideration of multiple ser-
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vice failures as hazards. If one considers multiple service failures as relevant
hazards, the challenge arises that the number of hazards grows exponentially
with the number of single service failures. Using a traditional approach, it is
not possible to cope with this complexity. We therefore extended our model-
based HRA approach by ARID and could show that it is feasible to analyze
the exponential number of hazards. This is possible because ARID makes
extensive use of model-based information to automatically reason whether
a hazard needs to be assessed manually or not. Another ﬁnding of our eval-
uation of ARID was that the traditional approach of only considering single
service failures leads to insuﬃcient safety requirements.
Figure 4.2: Our advancements of the state of the art
Figure 4.2 shows our two steps of advancements of the state of the art:
The ﬁrst step made the HRA as it is traditionally performed more consis-
tent, more eﬃcient, and less dependent on experts' experience. The most
important aspect for this was the formalization of operational situations and
their assessments. Based on this more formal, model-based representation of
HRAs we advanced the state of the art even further by providing a method
that allows coping with multiple service failures. We additionally proved that
this is, in practice, a necessary step by showing that by using ARID, stricter
safety requirements are created than in the traditional analysis.
The limitations of our approach are that we did not formalize the assessment
of controllability and severity. This has to be done in a traditional way and
there is neither a way to check the consistent assessment of these parameters
nor is it possible to eﬃciently reuse the result of these assessments. If this
were to be done, the overall result would probably be even more consistent
and eﬃcient. We omitted these parameters because the operational situation
is more important on the one hand, and because on the other hand, the
knowledge needed for the formalization is out of scope: One needs a good
background in human capability modeling for controllability assessments and
in medicine for formalizing the severity.
The fundamental limitation of our approach to handling multiple service
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failures is that we need appropriate system and failure propagation models
in order to perform the analysis. However, these models are seldom available
in modern automotive practice.
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5 Summary and Conclusion
In this section, we will ﬁrst give a short summary of the contributions of
SAHARA with respect to advancements of the state of the art. In the second
subsection, we will reﬂect on the overall work, the challenges, and the lessons
learned during our work on SAHARA. We conclude this section with a short
outlook on future work.
5.1 Contributions
In this thesis, we advanced the state of the art of hazard analysis and risk
assessments (HRA) in the automotive domain. The HRA is a very important
step for the safety of automotive systems because in this step, the safety
goals are determined. The subsequent task of safety engineering is to ensure
the correct implementation of these safety goals.
Figure 5.1: Schemantic overview of SAHARA
Although this step is highly important, the current state of the art of HRAs
lacks eﬃciency, consistency and correctness. The quality of the result is
to a large extent dependent on experts' experience. The most important
aspect, which is currently handled very informally, is the deﬁnition of op-
erational situations that are relevant when a hazard occurs. (Please recall
that the determination of hazards is not a challenge in the current state of
the art.) Thus, one advancement is to formalize operational situations and
combine this with the already existing approaches for hazard identiﬁcations.
This makes the current process of HRAs more consistent, more eﬃcient,
and increases the correctness of the results. Besides improving the HRA as
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performed nowadays, another drawback of the current state of the art of
HRAs is that only single service failures are considered as hazards. Due to
the high integration of functions and the ever increasing functional depen-
dencies, one has to consider multiple services failing at the same time as
well. If one transitions from single service failures to multiple service fail-
ures, the big challenge is that this means that the number of hazards to
be analyzed grows exponentially with the number of single service failures.
With the current state of the art, this cannot be handled because currently
every hazard needs to be analyzed manually. This means that a safety expert
would have to perform an exponential number of hazard analyses.
For both challenges of the current state of the art, we pursued a model-
based formalization of the HRA as our fundamental solution with the HRA
embedded in a model-based engineering approach, it is easier to assure con-
sistency and correctness of the results on the one hand; on the other hand, it
enables computer-aided hazard analysis, which we consider the only way to
handle an exponential number of hazards. Thus, our overall and fundamen-
tal ﬁrst step was to translate the HRA into a model-based representation.
As our basic modeling approach, we reused Parnas' Four-Variable-Model
(FVM). However, we extended it to make the three most important aspects
in an HRA more explicit: We created an interacting Four-Variable-Model,
with the System, the Human, and the Environment being the single FVMs.
The big advantage is that we can talk more explicitly about the operational
environment and therefore about operational situations. The assessment of
the likelihood of operational situations is termed exposure. This parame-
ter, as well as the other two parameters controllability and severity, were
discussed in the context of our interacting FVMs. The formalization of con-
trollability and severity was beyond the scope of this thesis. However, we
presented how our model can be extended, by sketching the integration of
Rasmussen's Skill-Rule-Knowledge model to represent controllability actions
more formally. We termed this formalization step GOBI. It serves as the for-
malization and model-based engineering basis for coping with the challenges
stated above.
5.1.1 Consistency and reuse of operational situations in traditional HRAs
As discussed above, the ﬁrst challenge was to make the HRA more con-
sistent and more eﬃcient and to increase the correctness of the results.
We identiﬁed the most important aspect to be formalized: the operational
situation. Operational situations in combination with hazards are the basis
for the determination of the three parameters Exposure, Controllability, and
Severity. The determination of exposure is done solely by investigating the
operational situation (without the hazard). Because the deﬁnition of situa-
tions and the determination of their likelihood is separated in the traditional
process separated, we divided our approach to situation deﬁnition and expo-
sure likelihood determination into OASIS and HEAT, respectively. However,
the results are highly cohesive contributions.
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With OASIS, we aimed at making operational situations more formal in the
sense that we structured and classiﬁed the building blocks of an operational
situation, the inﬂuence factors. From the state-of-the-art review we learned
that ontologies are suited best for representing and structuring information.
We consolidated our view on ontologies especially in the diﬀerentiation to
meta-models. Afterwards we developed an extensible classiﬁcation of HRA-
relevant inﬂuence factors as an ontology. For that we used the model-based
HRA representation provided by GOBI and used our separation of "System",
"Human", and "Environment" as the ﬁrst-level classiﬁcation. We discussed
and derived the second level of classes using over 300 operational situations
contained in 10 industrial case studies. We do not claim that the ontology
is complete with respect to all possible inﬂuence factors, but we claim that
the classiﬁcation structure is complete. I.e., all inﬂuence factors found later
on can be integrated into the deﬁned structure. Furthermore, the inﬂuence
factors are complete to represent the 300 operational situations mentioned
above.
Besides the inﬂuence factors themselves, the dependency information with
respect to their occurrence likelihood is important domain knowledge as well.
If we consider, for example, the two inﬂuence factors "vx > 100km/h"
and "city", we can add the domain knowledge that this combination is
highly unlikely. Another example would be the implicit knowledge that
"vx > 100km/h" implies that there is a "driver" operating the vehicle.
We therefore extended our inﬂuence factor classiﬁcation ontology to allow
this domain-knowledge to be captured as well.
With these two steps we formalized the implicit knowledge structure a safety
engineer has in mind and ﬁlled the ontology with data from ten case studies.
We furthermore deﬁned a situation deﬁnition process that uses our formal-
ized information (stored in the ontology) to construct actual operational
situations.
Once we had a more formal deﬁnition of operational situations (with OA-
SIS), we extended this to include the assessment information, the exposure,
of operational situations in our ontology. Our focused goal of consistency
and eﬃciency became important in this step. Situations are consistent if
their assigned exposure values are consistent. Eﬃciency with respect to
operational situations is also obtained by reusing already existing assessment
knowledge, i.e., the exposure value of operational situations. Thus, stored
assessments constitute domain knowledge that can be used to support
subsequent assessments. One can either retrieve former exposure values, or
guide the safety engineer to a consistent assessment of a situation that is
not contained in the current knowledge base. The case of exact retrieval
(like simple database queries oﬀer) is not diﬃcult. It is more sophisticated
and universal to work with similar situations:
One would say, for example, that "driving straight on highway with
100km/h ≤ vx < 130km/h" is very similar to the situation "driving
straight on a country road with 80km/h ≤ vx < 100km/h", but is very
diﬀerent from "parking car with children playing inside".
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We therefore constructed a function that uses the OASIS inﬂuence factor
classiﬁcation to calculate inﬂuence factor and operational situation similar-
ity. This function was integrated into a case-based reasoning engine that
works on ontologies. However, we had to adapt the case-based reasoning
to work with our extended OASIS ontology on the one hand and with our
newly deﬁned situation similarity function (in the case retrieval stage), on
the other hand.
We ﬁnally used the ontological CBR approach to support the safety engineer
in two ways:
(1) To check the consistency of a set of assessed situations, and
(2) to support the safety engineer in assessing (new) situations consistently,
by providing results of previous assessments.
Thus, with the combination of OASIS and HEAT we provided an approach
to more formal operational situations and, therefore, more consistent assess-
ment results of operational situations. In combination with our integrating
HRA framework, GOBI, we therefore advanced the state-of-the-art approach
of HRAs by making it more consistent, eﬃcient, and less dependent on ex-
perts' experience.
5.1.2 HRA approach that copes with hazards consisting of multiple service failures
With the approach described above, we essentially lifted the formality of
HRAs to the same level the remaining process of safety engineering has
already. Considering multiple service failures as hazards and coping with the
emerging complexity goes one step beyond this and advances the state of
the art even more.
Multiple service failures can obviously occur in the case of common causes.
But even if functions are speciﬁed to be independent, the integrity of their in-
dependence is given by the risk implied by both functions failing at the same
time. Thus, one cannot argue omission of any hazards from the analysis, such
as those consisting of multiple service failures. However, this implies that one
needs to analyze an exponential number of hazards (2#single service failures).
In order to cope with this challenge, we rely on computer-aided support for
systematically reducing the number of hazards one needs to assess manually
without omitting any hazard. ARID's fundamental idea is to reuse knowl-
edge from already assessed risks (from single service failure assessments, for
example) and, based on this, decide (automatically) whether we can exclude
the un-assessed hazards from the manual assessment process.
In order to achieve this, we use component-integrated component fault trees
as a formal representation of the system. Based on these models, we con-
structed algorithms that enable us to
(1) store risk assessment results and
(2) use the stored risk assessment information to reason about the necessity
of further assessments.
The basic idea is to assume that each safety goal (derived from a risk assess-
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ment) is (quantitatively) achieved, i.e., the failure rate of each minimal cut
set is lower than or equal to the maximally allowed boundary (which is given
by the safety goal). To make the decision about whether a hazard needs to
be assessed or not, we perform fully automatic analyses with the previously
determined failure rates (of the safety goals) as an information basis. The
analysis result is a failure rate we can already assure with the given set of
safety goals. If this failure rate is lower than the minimum we could produce
with an assessment, there is no need to perform the assessment.
With the help of two case studies, we were able to show the feasibility of
ARID, i.e., to ensure that all hazards are analyzed (either manually or fully
automatically). We could further show that considering multiple service fail-
ures is indispensable: We showed that the safety goals derived from a single
service failure analysis are insuﬃcient and that critical parts of the system
would not be handled adequately in the subsequent safety engineering pro-
cess. With ARID, we have shown that considering multiple service failures
as hazards is feasible and is indispensable from a safety engineering point of
view.
5.1.3 Overall summary
The overall challenge we addressed in this thesis was to come up with a
more structured approach for hazard analyses and risk assessments. The
advancement of the state of the art we provided comprises two steps: The
ﬁrst step was to make the approach currently used in the automotive domain
more formal in the sense that the process is less expert-dependent and that
a higher degree of reuse is achieved. The second step was to advance the
state of the art even further by widening the scope of hazards from single
service failures to multiple service failures.
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5.2 Reﬂection
In this section, we state lessons learned during our work and reﬂect on the
topic of hazard analysis and risk assessments.
Our goals were to make the traditional HRA more consistent and eﬃcient
on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to raise the HRA to the next
level by integrating multiple service failures into the HRA. For both goals,
a more formal representation of HRAs was necessary. Our solution was to
translate the overall process into a conceptual model-based representation
as an interacting Four-Variable-Model.
From model-based HRAs to HRA@runtime?
We see this formalization as one fundamental step for handling hazard- and
risk-related issues in the future. Novel ideas such as product line HRAs or
runtime HRAs need a certain amount of formalism to be realized. For pro-
duct line HRAs, for example, we think that the aspects of the system can be
made variable and a decision modeler would need to be able to derive the
respective interactions with the Human-FVM and the Environment-FVM
that result from an actual product (system variant).
Another enabled future idea is to perform HRAs at runtime. If we con-
sider emerging systems of systems and assume that these systems perform
safety-critical functions collaboratively, we see that one cannot predict all
possible emerging functions and hazards upfront! Thus, it seems reasonable
to move at least parts of the HRA to run-time. We assume that an HRA
at design time is diﬃcult to do for these systems or would result (due to
worst-case assumptions) in limited functionality. By putting the HRA on a
model-based foundation, we therefore provided a ﬁrst important steps to-
wards "HRA@runtime".
However, one drawback of the current realization is the unformalized han-
dling of severity and controllability. For our approach, we used the con-
cepts of ISO 26262 to come up with severity values. This approach does
not consider multiple injuries and there is nothing like an injury algebra to
mathematically combine injuries into one severity level. A similar aspect is
the concrete model of human capabilities. We used a well-known approach
(Rasmussen's SRK model) and formalized this as a black box, but more
as an extension showcase than as an actual model-based human capability
framework. It would be important to further formalize the concrete behav-
ioral capability model and store the knowledge of driving tests and ﬁeld
experience more formally.
However, one drawback of the current realization is the unformalized han-
dling of severity and controllability. For our approach, we used the concepts
of ISO 26262 to come up with severity values. This approach does not
consider multiple injuries and there is nothing like an injury algebra, to
mathematically combine injuries to one severity level. A similar aspect is
the concrete model of human capabilities. We used a well-known approach
(Rasmussen's SRK model) and formalized this as a black-box but more as
an extension showcase than an actual model-based human capability frame-
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work. It would be important to further formalize the concrete behavioral
capability model and store the knowledge of driving test and ﬁeld experi-
ence more formally.
Both aspects address the concrete formalization approach of GOBI and are
handled using a practical approach based on ISO 26262.
Hazard-centric vs. unwanted-event-focused HRA
Another aspect we believe is worth putting research activities into is to
think about whether it is beneﬁcial to change the HRA from hazard-centric
to accident- (unwanted event) focused. Especially if one transitions from
functional safety to system safety, the aspects to focus on are primarily
the unwanted events. These (including their occurrence likelihood) deﬁne
whether or not a system is safe. The current ISO 26262 approach (based on
functional safety) is hazard-centric and the criticality of a hazard is given by
the occurrence likelihood and the severity of harm. With GOBI's formaliza-
tion of the concepts we showed that a hazard is deﬁned by a speciﬁcation or
deviations of a speciﬁcation. The deﬁnition of safety, however, is not depen-
dent on the speciﬁcation, but on the concrete behavior. Thus, we claim that
independent of the speciﬁcation or the intention of an engineer, a system
has a behavior (which includes unwanted behavior) and we, as safety engi-
neers, need to make the complete system behavior safe. There is nothing
like "it's not a hazard, it's a feature" as an adaptation of the quote "it's
not a bug, it's a feature" in safety engineering.
Our idea of an unwanted event (accident) focused approach allows focusing
on the system behavior. During the work on this thesis, the concept of un-
wanted event-centric HRAs re-emerged in diﬀerent industrial projects (which
were independent from this PhD). For example, one addressed autonomous
driving (or highly innovative driving assistance systems). One inherent ques-
tion of these systems is: Which behavior is safe, and which is not safe? Thus,
a behavior-centric approach would not work. The only change was to use
an unwanted-event-focused solution approach.
The potential of our operational situation formalization
For an HRA@runtime, one would require a complete model of operational
situations and their exposure assessment. For this it would be necessary
to model the complete domain knowledge with respect to operational situa-
tions. With OASIS and HEAT, we introduced an ontology-based, knowledge-
conserving approach for inﬂuence factors, operational situations, and domain
knowledge. We showed the suitability of this approach. In order to obtain
an (almost) complete model, automotive companies should collaborate on
one integrated domain knowledge model.
As already stated in the introduction, especially the exposure of operational
situations is not a USP for any company. Companies already try to synchro-
nize their work (manually). With OASIS and HEAT, we provided a common
platform for operational situations (and their exposure assessments) and
thereby make individual HRAs more consistent and the process more eﬃ-
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cient. An institutionalized, central knowledge base using OASIS and HEAT
would therefore be easily possible.
The asymptotic completeness of (relevant) operational situations
When we thought about completeness of operational situations, we tried to
get an idea of how many situations we are talking about when we talk about
completeness. As described in the respective section, our current ontology
includes, over nine industrial HRAs and has shown its usefulness. The more
HRAs the ontology contains, the higher the gain wrt. the reuse of situations
and completeness. We argued as part of our solution approach that a com-
plete list of operational situations cannot be built. With the lessons learned
from the nine industrial case studies, we believe, however, that a complete
list of practically relevant operational situations can be built. If we assume
a simple asymptotic increase of knowledge and further assume that we have
currently covered about 50% of all situations, and that only 99% of all situ-
ations are practically relevant, we would need around 60 real-world industrial
HRAs to build our complete knowledge base! The following mathematical
calculation reﬂects this:
→ 50% = 1− e− 9x ⇒ x ≈ 13
99% = 1− e− y13 ⇒ y ≈ 60
This equation is based on many assumptions (such as the exponential,
asymptotic growth); however, our goal was to get an idea in terms of or-
der of magnitude. For this we believe the estimation of roughly 60 HRAs
is realistic. This, in turn, would mean that a practically relevant (complete)
fraction of inﬂuence factors consists roughly of 400 inﬂuence factors. For
an ontology and for reasoning, this is a very small "problem" space, i.e.,
feasible for a practical application.
Transition from single service failures to multiple service failures
Another more serious problem for future HRAs (and especially a
HRA@runtime) is the challenge of transitioning from single service failures
to multiple service failures as relevant hazards. With ARID we have devel-
oped the ﬁrst approach to dealing with those hazards. In the case studies
we performed during our work, ARID worked very well. But we proved that
the problem is NP-equivalent. Thus, it would be interesting to have more
and more complex industrial case studies to really prove ARID's practical
applicability.
The main fact that became evident for us during our work on ARID is that
ARID's problem complexity strongly depends on the complexity of the sys-
tem. We claimed that if ARID cannot deliver a guarantee for completeness
of the hazard analysis, the engineer has lost control over the complexity
of the system. Even nowadays it is common that system architectures are
changed if the safety engineer cannot ensure the required risk reduction.
We think that safety engineering should have this "veto" already during the
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very ﬁrst step, the HRA! If one cannot prove completeness of the hazard
analysis (due to the complexity of the functional interrelations), one should
change/break these interrelations such that the system's hazards can be
completely analyzed. Our general claim is therefore: Don't build a system
for which you cannot ensure 100% hazard analysis coverage!
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5.3 Future Work
In this section, we will present four possible future work areas based on this
thesis.
The ﬁrst is to create a product line HRA approach.
The second is an extension to the ﬁrst. The idea would be to integrate ARID
into the decision modeler to produce only 100% analyzable systems.
The third is to move from functional safety to system safety and adapt the
HRA accordingly.
The fourth is to transfer this to another domain.
Currently, GOBI and the subsequent reﬁnements by OASIS and HEAT are a
knowledge base that can be used for concrete HRAs. However, if there were
multiple HRAs or diﬀerent versions of the system for which to perform an
HRA, one would need to apply the HRA process (with SAHARA support)
to each single HRA. Product line approaches deal with this challenge on
the system level by integrating all variants in a 200% model and use a
decision/variation modeler to "extract" concrete versions from the 200%
model. As future work, it would therefore be interesting to investigate a
200% HRA model and use this model in conjunction with the 200% system
model, to not only reuse and derive versions of the system, but additionally
their respective HRAs. To do so, one would need to identify variable and
constant elements in the HRA model. One would furthermore need a kind of
HRA decision dependency model to ensure consistent and correct extraction
of HRAs.
The second idea is a continuation of the product line HRA idea. As dis-
cussed in the reﬂection, one should use ARID in the investigation of the
design space. A 200% model and the decision model rules for extracting
concrete systems represent a structured representation of the design space.
It would therefore be a great advantage if ARID could be applied to or in-
tegrated into the 200% model. By doing this, we could restrict the design
space to systems for which we can ensure 100% coverage of hazard analy-
ses. One important prerequisite would be a product line fault tree (or failure
propagation) approach. However, at the moment we cannot say whether
the existing approach is suﬃcient to be used in a product line approach
for ARID. If we assume that this is given, the next challenge would be to
apply the iterative knowledge capturing (as quantitative prime implicants
knowledge) in a product line environment. This would require deciding for
each piece of knowledge to which version this information contributes and
to which it does not. Thus, one would need to deﬁne for each piece of
knowledge an additional rule in the decision modeler (or similar variability
information).
Another inherent problem of a product line approach could be problem com-
plexity. We claimed that one should only build a system for which 100%
hazard analyses can be ensured. If we build a 200% model, the complexity
is obviously much higher, and we want to restrict the concrete systems to
be analyzable. This, however, introduces complexity into the step of deriv-
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ing the 200% ARID model. One would probably need an iterative decision
process in the sense that ARID is not fully applied to the 200% model, but
only some parts. Then a ﬁrst level of decision resolution is made and the
resulting 150% model is the basis for the next steps of ARID and so forth.
However, this is only a rough solution idea of the author and one would need
to investigate the problem in more detail and derive a concrete solution ap-
proach based on a good understanding of the problem space of product line
ARID applications.
The fourth area of future work addresses our current focus on automotive
systems. The idea is to transfer this formalization approach to other do-
mains. If we consider domains that are similar to the one of automotive,
such as commercial vehicles, we assume that the transfer would be pretty
straightforward. However, if we try to migrate this idea to domains such
as avionics, or medical devices, we see some challenges arising. One chal-
lenge is that in medical devices, there does not exist a risk graph approach;
thus, no parameters (like E, S, C) are deﬁned. One would have to come
up with these essential parameters. Furthermore, formalizing medical opera-
tional situations, like we did for automotive is much more diﬃcult for medical
devices because the variance in medical devices is much higher than in au-
tomotive systems. One medical device is a clinical thermometer, another is
a brachytherapy device, and a third is an X-ray device. The "environment"
and the environmental assumptions are very diﬀerent compared to the auto-
motive domain. One idea would be to classify the medical devices ﬁrst and
derive an operational situation domain model for each class. Whether this
is feasible is an open question, however.
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